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Abstract
We present game semantics of Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT), which solves a long-
standing problem open for more than twenty years. Specifically, we introduce a category
with families (CwF) of a novel variant of games and strategies, which induces an interpre-
tation of MLTT equipped with one-, zero-, N -, pi- and sigma-types as well as Id -types or
a cumulative hierarchy of universes (n.b., the last two types are incompatible with each
other in our semantics), and the interpretation is faithful for the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment.
Notably, it generalizes conventional game semantics of simple type theories in a natural,
canonical way in the sense that the category of conventional games and strategies forms a
reflective subcategory of the CwF, and the latter inherits the game-semantic and the domain-
theoretic structures of the former. Also, our semantics can be regarded as a mathematical
formalization of the standard BHK-interpretation (or the meaning explanation) of MLTT,
giving a mathematical, semantic, intensional foundation of constructive mathematics, com-
parable to the set-theoretic one for classical mathematics. By its conceptual naturality and
mathematical precision, the game semantics provides useful insights on the syntax as well.
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1 Introduction
The present work establishes game semantics of Martin-Lo¨f type theory, or more broadly, that
of dependent type theories, solving a long-standing problem open for more than twenty years.
Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT) [ML82, ML84, ML98] is an extension of the simply-typed
λ-calculus [Chu40], whose logical part, under the Curry-Howard isomorphisms (CHIs) [SU06],
corresponds to intuitionistic (higher-order) predicate logic [TS00], in which the extension is made
by dependent types [Hof97], i.e., types that ‘depend on terms’. It was proposed by Per Martin-Lo¨f
in 1970-1980’s through several revisions as a foundation of constructive mathematics [TvD88] in
the same sense as the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) [End77] for
classical mathematics, but also it has been a subject of active research in computer science since
it is also a functional programming language, and one may extract programs from its proofs in
such a way that extracted programs are ‘correct by construction’ [CAB+86].
However, although MLTT is conceptually based on the BHK-interpretation of intuitionistic
logic [TvD88] (or the meaning explanation of MLTT [ML84, DP16, NPS90]), which interprets
proofs as (an informal, unspecified concept of) ‘constructions’, mathematical, semantic formula-
tions of the BHK-interpretation with an appropriate degree of intensionality have been scarce.
In the literature, several mathematical formalizations of the BHK-interpretation of MLTT such
as realizability and syntactic models [Reu99, Smi84, Bee12, AMV84, Coq98] have been proposed;
they take, as realizers, e.g., Turing machines (TMs) or λ-terms; however, TMs are too low-level or
too intensional for MLTT, and λ-terms are still syntax.1 Here, note that the BHK-interpretation
is informal in nature, and formulated syntactically as MLTT; also, it is reasonable to think
of such ‘constructions’ as some computational processes, which must be an intensional concept.
Hence, a mathematical, semantic, intensional formulation of the BHK-interpretation of MLTT, if
achieved, would be a standard mathematical semantics of MLTT, which would promote a deeper
understanding of MLTT and thus be strongly desired.
On the other hand, game semantics [A+97, AM99, Hyl97] refers to a particular kind of
denotational (mathematical) semantics of logic and computation [Win93, Gun92, AC98] that
models formulas (or types) and proofs (or terms) as games and strategies, respectively. As
various full completeness/abstraction results [Cur07] in the literature have shown, game semantics
is highly intensional in nature and has the appropriate degree of abstraction. Another advantage
of game semantics is its conceptual naturality: It models logic (resp. computation) by dialogical
arguments (resp. computational processes) between the participants of games, giving a semantic
(or syntax-independent) explanation of syntax in a conceptually natural (yet mathematically
precise) fashion. Hence, for the mathematical, semantic, intensional nature, game semantics
appears perfect as a standard mathematical semantics of MLTT.
However, it is technically quite challenging to establish game semantics of MLTT, more gen-
erally, that of dependent type theories. In fact, the problem has been open for more than twenty
years (while game semantics of many other logical/computational features has been established)
though predicates (resp. dependent types) are fundamental in logic (resp. computation).
Remark. Abramsky et al. established denotational semantics of dependent type theories based
on game semantics [AJV15]. Nevertheless, although they gave an elegant interpretation of pi-
types, they merely follow an established recipe to interpret sigma-types inductively via adjoints;
consequently, the semantics is not completely game-semantic in the sense that they model types
and terms respectively by lists of games and lists of strategies, dropping, to some degree, the
mathematical elegance and the conceptual naturality of game semantics. Also, they do not
interpret universes. Another mathematical, semantic, intensional model of MLTT was proposed
1In particular, if one has the semantics-first-view, i.e., semantic concepts come first, and syntax is just a
notation for them, then a syntactic model would be unsatisfactory.
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just recently by Blot and Laird [BL18], but it employs sequential algorithms [BC82] (not game
semantics) to overcome the problem of the work by Abramsky et al. (n.b., their idea on how
to interpret sigma-types without the list construction looks somewhat similar to ours, but note
that their work came after the preprint [Yam16] of the present work). Thus, to the best of our
knowledge, game semantics of dependent type theories was not given before the present work.
As a standard mathematical model of MLTT, the present work establishes game semantics
of MLTT, solving the long-standing open problem mentioned above. Concretely, we introduce a
category with families (CwF) [Dyb96, Hof97], a well-established algebraic semantics of MLTT,
of a novel variant of games and strategies, called predicative (p-) games and predicative (p-)
strategies, respectively, which induces an interpretation of MLTT equipped with one-, zero-, N -,
pi- and sigma-types as well as Id -types or a cumulative hierarchy of universes (n.b., the last two
types are incompatible with each other in our game semantics). The interpretation is faithful for
the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment. Compared to the denotational models [AJV15, BL18] mentioned
above, our contribution is to give another mathematical, semantic, intensional model of MLTT,
employing a natural generalization of games and strategies (not lists of them), viz., p-games and
p-strategies, which is in line with standard game semantics rather than sequential algorithms. In
fact, the category of conventional games and strategies forms a reflective subcategory of the CwF
of p-games and p-strategies, and the latter inherits the game-semantic and the domain-theoretic
structures of the former. Also, our game semantics forms a particular instance of the realizability
semantics of MLTT [Str08]. Finally, by its conceptual naturality and mathematical precision,
our semantics provides useful insights on the syntax such as the incompatibility of Id-types and
universes mentioned above, denial of Equality Reflection (EqRelf) and Function Extensionality
(FunExt), and validity of Uniqueness of Identity Proofs (UIP).
The rest of the present paper proceeds as follows. First, as preliminaries, we recall the syntax
of MLTT in Section 2, and conventional games and strategies in Section 3. Next, we introduce
the central concepts of p-games and p-strategies in Section 4, based on which we give two CwFs
WPG and µWPG in Section 5. The CwF WPG induces an interpretation of MLTT equipped
with one-, zero-, N-, pi- and sigma-types as well as Id-types; however, it cannot interpret the
introduction rule of universes because not every (dependent) type inWPG is computational. For
this point, we restrict types in WPG to what corresponds to terms of universes, inducing a full
subCwF µWPG →֒ WPG that interprets one-, zero-, N-, pi- and sigma-types as well as universes,
which, however, cannot interpret Id-types because they are not computational. In Section 6, we
investigate the degree of intensionality of the interpretation in WPG in terms of well-known
type-theoretic principles: It refutes EqRelf and FunExt, while it validates UIP. Finally, we draw
a conclusion and propose further work in Section 7.
2 Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory
For completeness, let us begin with recalling our target formal system, i.e., (an intensional
variant of) MLTT in the style of [Hof97] except that universes form a cumulative hierarchy.
For faithfulness of our interpretation, we adopt the uniqueness (or η-) rules of one-, pi- and
sigma-types. We shall mainly focus on the syntax; for a comprehensive introduction to MLTT,
see [ML82, ML98, NPS90, ML84].
The present section is structured as follows. We first recall judgements in Section 2.1, contexts
in Section 2.2 and structural rules in Section 2.3, which together specify the ‘design’ or ‘format’
of MLTT. We then recall each specific type construction of MLTT in Sections 2.4-2.10.
4
2.1 Judgements
MLTT is a formal system similar to natural deduction [Gen35, TS00] except that vertices of a
derivation (tree) are judgements (not formulas), for which we usually write J (possibly with
subscripts/superscripts). There are the following six kinds of judgements (followed by their
intended meanings):
• ⊢ Γ ctx (Γ is a context);
• Γ ⊢ A type (A is a type in the context Γ);
• Γ ⊢ a : A (a is a term (or program) of type A in the context Γ);
• ⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx (Γ and ∆ are judgmentally equal contexts);
• Γ ⊢ A = B type (A and B are judgmentally equal types in the context Γ);
• Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A (a and a′ are judgmentally equal terms of type A in the context Γ).
Thus, MLTT consists of axioms J and (inference) rules
J1 J2...Jk
J ′ , which are to make
a conclusion from hypotheses by constructing a derivation exactly as in natural deduction. In
Sections 2.2–2.10 below, we present the axioms and the rules of MLTT.
Notation. Henceforth, let Greek capital letters Γ, ∆, Θ, etc. range over contexts, capital letters
A, B, C, etc. over types, and lower-case letters a, b, c, etc. over terms. Strictly speaking, they are
equivalence classes of symbols w.r.t. α-equivalence ≡, i.e., up to renaming of bound variables.
Each type construction of MLTT is defined in terms of formation, introduction, elimi-
nation and computation rules. The formation rule stipulates how to form the type, and the
introduction rule defines terms2 of the type. The elimination and the computation rules describe
how to consume the terms and the result of such a consumption (in the form of an equation),
respectively, both of which are justified by the introduction rule.
As often expressed by ‘MLTT internalizes the CHIs’, contexts, types and terms of MLTT
are meant to be assumptions (or premises), formulas and proofs in logic, respectively, as well.
Therefore, e.g., the judgement Γ ⊢ a : A can be read as ‘the formula A has the proof a under the
assumption Γ’, and so on; see [ML84, DP16, NPS90] for more on this point.
2.2 Contexts
A context is a finite sequence x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An of pairs (xi,Ai) of a variable xi and a
type Ai such that the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn are pair-wise distinct. We write ♦ for the empty
context, i.e., the empty sequence ǫ, but we usually omit ♦ if it appears on the LHS of the turnstile
⊢ in a judgement.
We have the following axiom and rules for contexts:
(Ctx-Emp)
⊢ ♦ ctx
Γ ⊢ A type
(Ctx-Ext)
⊢ Γ, x : A ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Ctx-ExtEq)
⊢ Γ, x : A = ∆, y : B ctx
where x (resp. y) does not occur in Γ (resp. ∆).
2Strictly speaking, the introduction rule defines canonical terms of the type, which in turn defines terms of
the type; see [ML84, DP16, NPS90].
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The axiom Ctx-Emp and the rule Ctx-Ext define that contexts are exactly finite lists of pairs
of a variable and a type. On the other hand, the rule Ctx-ExtEq is a congruence rule because it
states that judgmental equality = on contexts is preserved under ‘context extension’. Note also
that we have ⊢ ♦ = ♦ ctx by Ctx-Emp and the rule Ctx-EqRefl in the next section.
Convention. As in [Hof97], we henceforth skip writing congruence rules for other constructions.
2.3 Structural Rules
Next, let us collect the rules applicable to all types as structural rules:
⊢ x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ctx
(Var) (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n})
x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ⊢ xj : Aj
⊢ Γ ctx(Ctx-EqRefl)
⊢ Γ = Γ ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx(Ctx-EqSym)
⊢ ∆ = Γ ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx ⊢ ∆ = Θ ctx(Ctx-EqTrans)
⊢ Γ = Θ ctx
Γ ⊢ A type
(Ty-EqRefl)
Γ ⊢ A = A type
Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Ty-EqSym)
Γ ⊢ B = A type
Γ ⊢ A = B type Γ ⊢ B = C type
(Ty-EqTrans)
Γ ⊢ A = C type
Γ ⊢ a : A(Tm-EqRefl)
Γ ⊢ a = a : A
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A(Tm-EqSym)
Γ ⊢ a′ = a : A
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A Γ ⊢ a′ = a′′ : A(Tm-EqTrans)
Γ ⊢ a = a′′ : A
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A type
(Ty-Conv)
∆ ⊢ A type
Γ ⊢ a : A ⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Tm-Conv)
∆ ⊢ a : B
The rule Var states the reasonable idea that we may give an element xj : Aj if it occurs in the
context just by ‘copy-catting’ it. The next nine rules stipulate that every judgmental equality
= is an equivalence relation. Finally, the rules Ty-Conv and Tm-Conv formalize the natural
phenomenon that judgements are preserved under the exchange of judgmentally equal contexts
and/or types.
It is easy to see that the following weakening and substitution rules are admissible in
MLTT, but it is convenient to present them explicitly:
Γ,∆ ⊢ J Γ ⊢ A type
(Weak)
Γ, x : A,∆ ⊢ J
Γ, x : A,∆ ⊢ J Γ ⊢ a : A
(Subst)
Γ,∆[a/x] ⊢ J[a/x]
where x does not occur in Γ or ∆ for Weak, and not in Γ for Subst, and J[a/x] (resp. ∆[a/x]) is
the capture-free substitution [Han94] of a for x in J3 (resp. ∆).
In the remaining subsections of Section 2, we introduce specific type constructions in MLTT.
2.4 One-Type
Let us begin with the simplest type, called the unit-type (or the one-type) 1, which is the type
that has just one term ⋆.4 Thus, from the logical point of view, it represents the simplest true
3Here, J denotes the RHS of the turnstile ⊢ in an arbitrary judgement.
4Strictly speaking, 1 has just one canonical term ⋆. However, for simplicity, we are casual about the distinction
between canonical and non-canonical terms in the present work, and we usually call canonical/non-canonical terms
just terms.
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formula.
Rules of the unit-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(1-Form)
Γ ⊢ 1 type
⊢ Γ ctx(1-Intro)
Γ ⊢ ⋆ : 1
Γ ⊢ t : 1(1-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ t = ⋆ : 1
Γ, x : 1 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ c : C[⋆/x] Γ ⊢ t : 1
(1-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R1(C, c, t) : C[t/x]
Γ, x : 1 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ c : C[⋆/x]
(1-Comp)
Γ ⊢ R1(C, c, ⋆) = c : C[⋆/x]
Note that 1-Uniq implies 1-Elim and 1-Comp if we define R1(C, c, t)
df.
≡ c.
The formation rule 1-Form states that the unit-type is atomic, i.e., we may form it without
assuming any other types. The introduction rule 1-Intro defines that it has just one term, viz.,
⋆. Then, the uniqueness rule 1-Uniq should make sense, from which the remaining rules 1-Elim
and 1-Comp immediately follow.
2.5 Zero-Type
Next, let us recall the empty-type (or the zero-type) 0, which is the type that has no term.
Thus, it corresponds in logic to the simplest false formula.
Rules of the empty-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(0-Form)
Γ ⊢ 0 type
Γ, x : 0 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ a : 0
(0-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R0(C, a) : C[a/x]
The formation rule 0-Form is similar to 1-Form, and the elimination rule 0-Elim corresponds in
logic to ex falso, i.e., ‘anything follows from a contradiction’. The empty-type has no introduction
or computation rule since it has no term.
2.6 N-Type
We proceed to recall an important atomic type, called the natural number type (or the N-
type) N, which is a type of natural numbers.
Rules of the N-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(N-Form)
Γ ⊢ N type
⊢ Γ ctx(N-IntroZ)
Γ ⊢ zero : N
Γ ⊢ n : N(N-IntroS)
Γ ⊢ succ(n) : N
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x] Γ ⊢ n : N
(N-Elim)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, n) : C[n/x]
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x]
(N-CompZ)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, zero) = cz : C[zero/x]
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x] Γ ⊢ n : N
(N-CompS)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, succ(n)) = cs[n/x,RN(C, cz, cs, n)/y] : C[succ(n)/x]
Again, the formation rule N-Form says that the N-type is atomic. The introduction rules
N-IntroZ and N-IntroZ inductively define (canonical) terms of the N-type: zero (for 0 ∈ N)
and succ(n) if so is n (for n ∈ N ⇒ n + 1 ∈ N). The elimination rule N-Elim represents both
mathematical induction and primitive recursion: To show a predicate C over N, it suffices to
prove C(zero) and C(n) ⇒ C(succ(n)), or equivalently under the CHIs, to define a (dependent)
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function f from N to C, it suffices to define its outputs f(zero) on zero and f(succ(n)) on succ(n)
in terms of f(n) and n. The elimination rule makes sense by the introduction rule, i.e., because
(canonical) terms of the N-type are only zero and successors. The computation rules N-CompZ
and N-CompS stipulate the expected behavior of computations given by N-Elim.
Notation. Given a context ⊢ Γ ctx and a natural number n ∈ N, we define the term Γ ⊢ n : N,
called the nth numeral, by induction on n: 0
df.
≡ zero and n+ 1
df.
≡ succ(n). That is, the nth
numeral is to represent the natural number n.
2.7 Pi-Types
Now, let us recall a central, non-atomic dependent function types (or pi-types) construction
Π. Roughly, the pi-type Πx:AB(x) represents the type of functions f from A to
⋃
x:A B(x) such that
f(a) : B(a) for all a : A, called dependent functions from A to B(x), where we informally consider
types and terms as sets and elements of sets, respectively, and x : A as x ∈ A, and write B(x) for
a (dependent) type B that contain a variable x : A, and B(a) for B[a/x].
Rules of pi-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
(Π-Form)
Γ ⊢ Πx:AB type
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
(Π-Intro)
Γ ⊢ λxA.b : Πx:AB
Γ ⊢ f : Πx:AB Γ ⊢ a : A(Π-Elim)
Γ ⊢ f(a) : B[a/x]
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ a : A
(Π-Comp)
Γ ⊢ (λxA.b)(a) = b[a/x] : B[a/x]
Γ ⊢ f : Πx:AB(Π-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ λxA.f(x) = f : Πx:AB
where in Π-Uniq x does not occur free in f.
The formation rule Π-Form states that we may form the pi-type Πx:AB from types A and B,
where B depends on A. The introduction rule Π-Intro defines how to construct (canonical) terms
of Πx:AB; it is the usual currying yet generalized to dependent types. Then, the elimination and
the computation rules Π-Elim and Π-Comp make sense by the introduction rule. Finally, the
uniqueness rule Π-Uniq stipulates that (canonical) terms of pi-types are only λ-abstractions.
2.8 Sigma-Types
Another important non-atomic type construction is dependent sum types (or sigma-types)
construction Σ. Roughly, the sigma-type Σx:AB(x) represents, again in terms of the set-theoretic
analogy, the space of pairs 〈a, b〉 such that a : A and b : B(a), called dependent pairs of A and B.
Rules of sigma-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
(Σ-Form)
Γ ⊢ Σx:AB type
Γ, x : A ⊢ B type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : B[a/x]
(Σ-Intro)
Γ ⊢ 〈a, b〉 : Σx:AB
Γ, z : Σx:AB ⊢ C type Γ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[〈x, y〉/z] Γ ⊢ p : Σx:AB
(Σ-Elim)
Γ ⊢ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]C, [x : A, y : B]g, p) : C[p/z]
Γ, z : Σx:AB ⊢ C type Γ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[〈x, y〉/z] Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : B[a/x]
(Σ-Comp)
Γ ⊢ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]C, [x : A, y : B]g, 〈a, b〉) = g[a/x, b/y] : C[〈a, b〉/z]
Γ ⊢ p : Σx:AB
(Σ-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ 〈πA,B1 (p), π
A,B
2 (p)〉 = p : Σx:AB
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where
Γ ⊢ πA,B1 (p)
df.
≡ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]A, [x : A, y : B]x, p) : A;
Γ ⊢ πA,B2 (p)
df.
≡ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]B[π
A,B
1 (z)/x], [x : A, y : B]y, p]) : B[π
A,B
1 (p)/x]
are projections constructed by Σ-Elim.
The formation rule Σ-Form is the same as that of pi-types. The introduction rule Σ-Intro
specifies that (canonical) terms of a sigma-type Σx:AB are dependent pairs 〈a, b〉 : Σx:AB of terms
a : A and b : B[a/x]. Again, the elimination and the computation rules Σ-Elim and Σ-Comp make
sense by the introduction rule. Finally, the uniqueness rule Σ-Uniq stipulates that (canonical)
terms of sigma-types are only dependent pairs.
2.9 Id-Types
Note that a judgmental equality of the form Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A is a judgement, not a formula, and
thus, it cannot be used in a context nor derived by an induction principle such as N-Elim. For
this point, (intensional) identity types (or Id-types) construction Id has been introduced.5
Rules of Id-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ a′ : A
(Id-Form)
Γ ⊢ IdA(a, a′) type
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
(Id-Intro)
Γ ⊢ refla : IdA(a, a)
Γ, x : A, y : A, p : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C type Γ, z : A ⊢ c : C[z/x, z/y, reflz/p] Γ ⊢ q : IdA(a, a′)
(Id-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a′, q) : C[a/x, a′/y, q/p]
Γ, x : A, y : A, p : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C type Γ, z : A ⊢ c : C[z/x, z/y, reflz/p] Γ ⊢ a : A
(Id-Comp)
Γ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a, refla) = c[a/z] : C[a/x, a/y, refla/p]
The formation rule Id-Form states that we may form the Id-type IdA(a, a
′) from a type A and
terms a, a′ : A. The introduction rule Id-Intro defines that there is one (canonical) term refla of the
Id-type IdA(a, a). Again, the elimination and the computation rules Id-Elim and Id-Comp make
sense by the introduction rule. Some uniqueness rules of Id-types are examined in Section 6.
2.10 Universes
As the last type construction, we assume the existence of a cumulative hierarchy of universes
U0,U1,U2, . . . The initial idea by Martin-Lo¨f was to have a ‘type U of all types’ to increase the
proof-theoretic strength of MLTT, e.g., it allows one to obtain, by N-Elim, a family of types
x : N ⊢ ListN(x) : U6 such that ListN(x) is the type of x-tuples of natural numbers (where note
that it is impossible for the judgement x : N ⊢ ListN(x) type). In fact, an early version of MLTT
has such a single universe U, but it in particular implies Γ ⊢ U : U, leading to inconsistency
known as Girard’s paradox [Gir72].
For this problem, Martin-Lo¨f later excluded the judgement Γ ⊢ U : U [ML98], and further
proposed the cumulative hierarchy of universes [ML75] in the Tarski-style [ML84], so that every
type Γ ⊢ A type has its ‘code’ Γ ⊢ c : Ui for some i ∈ N such that Γ ⊢ El(c) = A type, where
5We can then, e.g., formulate and prove Peano axioms [Pea79] in the presence of Id-types.
6Originally, the judgements Γ ⊢ A type and Γ ⊢ A : U are rather identified as in [Uni13]. This variant is called
the Russell-style universes [Pal98].
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the dependent type Γ, x : Ui ⊢ El(x) type is the ‘decoding’ operation. Then, in particular, every
universe Γ ⊢ Ui type has its ‘code’ Γ ⊢ ui : Uj for some j > i such that Γ ⊢ El(ui) = Ui type without
inconsistency. Let us adopt this cumulative hierarchy of Tarski-style universes.
Basic rules of such universes are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(U-Form) (for all i ∈ N)
Γ ⊢ Ui type
Γ ⊢ c : Ui(U-Elim) (for all i ∈ N)
Γ ⊢ El(c) type
Γ ⊢ c : Ui(U-Cumul) (for all i ∈ N)
Γ ⊢ c : Ui+1
where the rule U-Cumul explains why they are called cumulative.
However, universes are not yet guaranteed to have a ‘code’ of every type. For this point,
a standard approach is to introduce constructions on ‘codes’ of types that correspond to con-
structions on types [ML84, Hof97, Pal98], e.g., the ‘code’ Γ ⊢ N : U0 such that Γ ⊢ El(N) = N type
and the construction Γ ⊢ Π(A,B) : Umax(i,j) such that Γ ⊢ El(Π(A,B)) = Π(A,B) type for any given
‘codes’ Γ ⊢ A : Ui and Γ, x : El(A) ⊢ B : Uj, and so on.
We may certainly adopt such constructions on ‘codes’ of types. For simplicity, however,
let us employ an equivalent yet more abstract, simpler formulation of the introduction and the
computation rules:
Γ ⊢ A type
(U-Intro) (for some i ∈ N)
Γ ⊢ En(A) : Ui
Γ ⊢ A type
(U-Comp)
Γ ⊢ El(En(A)) = A type
where En(A) is some (not necessarily unique) term assigned to the type A. In this paper, let us
skip specifying the term En(A) for each type A because such details would not be very important.
Remark. The ‘decoding’ operation El is part of the syntax (n.b., it is a dependent type), while
the dual ‘encoding’ operation En is a meta-notation, i.e., En(A) represents a (not necessarily
unique) term of a universe assigned to each type A, since an expression of the form ‘A type’
cannot be an element of a context. Accordingly, we are not forced to have a congruence rule for
En. In fact, we do not require reflection of equality (RoE), i.e., Γ ⊢ A = B type does not imply
Γ ⊢ En(A) = En(B) : Ui [Pal98], which appears conceptually natural: There may be more than
one ‘code’ of a given type.7 Hence, the operation El is surjective but not injective, and therefore,
the uniqueness rule of universes does not hold.
3 Games and Strategies
Next, for completeness, let us recall a conventional variant of games and strategies, specifically,
Guy McCusker’s one [McC98, AM99], for which we adopt the elegant reformulation of strategies
by Samson Abramsky and Radha Jagadeesan [AJ09].8 We select this variant for it is relatively
less restrictive, which is important to interpret various constructions in MLTT (e.g., it interprets
sum types for the first time as game semantics [McC98]), and it combines good points of the
two best-known variants, AJM-games [AJM00] and HO-games [HO00] (so that we may model
various computational features [AM99] though we shall not address this point).
We assume that the reader is familiar with McCusker’s variant, and hence, we just briefly
recall basic definitions; see [McC98] for technical details and [A+97, Hyl97, AM99] for a general
introduction to game semantics.
7Indeed, RoE is not always assumed; for instance, see [Pal98].
8Strictly speaking, the variants of [AM99] and [McC98] are slightly different; legal positions must satisfy the
well-bracketing condition in [McC98] but not in [AM99].
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In the rest of the present section, we recall games in Section 3.1 and strategies in Sec-
tion 3.2, and summarize the section by presenting three categories of games and strategies in
Section 3.3, which are for (simply-typed) computation, classical (propositional) logic and intu-
itionistic (propositional) logic, respectively.
3.1 Games
Let us first review games in game semantics. A game, roughly, is a certain kind of a forest whose
branches correspond to possible ‘moments’, ‘developments’ or (valid) positions in the ‘game in
the usual sense’ (such as chess and poker) it represents. These branches are finite sequences of
moves of the game; a play of the game proceeds as its participants alternately make moves. Thus,
a game is what specifies possible interactions between the participants, and hence, it naturally
interprets a type in computation (resp. a formula in logic) where note that a type (resp. a
formula) specifies possible terms of the type (resp. proofs of the formula). For our purpose,
it suffices to focus on rather standard two-person games between Player (who represents a
‘computational agent’ or a ‘mathematician’) and Opponent (who represents a ‘computational
environment’ or a ‘rebutter’), in which Opponent always starts a play.
Notation. We use the following notation throughout the present paper:
• We use bold small letters s, t,u,v, w, etc. for sequences, in particular ǫ for the empty
sequence, and small letters a, b, c,m, n, x, y, etc. for elements of sequences;
• We define n
df.
= {1, 2, . . . , n} for each n ∈ N+
df.
= N \ {0}, and 0
df.
= ∅;
• We often abbreviate a finite sequence s = (x1, x2, . . . , x|s|) as x1x2 . . . x|s|, where |s| denotes
the length (i.e., the number of elements) of s, and write s(i), where i ∈ |s|, as another
notation for xi;
• A concatenation of sequences s and t is represented by the juxtaposition st of them, but
we often write as, tb, ucv for (a)s, t(b), u(c)v, etc.;
• We write s.t for st if it increases readability, and we define sn
df.
= ss · · · s︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
for each n ∈ N;
• We write Even(s) (resp. Odd(s)) if s is of even-length (resp. odd-length), and given a set
S of sequences and P ∈ {Even,Odd}, SP
df.
= {s ∈ S | P(s)};
• We write s  t if s is a prefix of t, and given a set S of sequences, Pref(S) for the set of
all prefixes of sequences in S, i.e., {s | ∃t ∈ S. s  t };
• Given a poset P and a subset S ⊆ P , Sup(S) is the supremum (sup) of S;
• We define X∗
df.
= {x1x2 . . . xn | n ∈ N, ∀i ∈ n. xi ∈ X } for each set X ;
• Given a function f : A → B and a subset S ⊆ A, we define f ↾ S : S → B to be the
restriction of f to S, and f∗ : A∗ → B∗ by f∗(a1a2 . . . an)
df.
= f(a1)f(a2) . . . f(an) ∈ B∗ for
all a1a2 . . . an ∈ A∗;
• Given sets X1, X2, . . . , Xn, and i ∈ n, we write π
(n)
i or πi for the i
th-projection map
X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xn → Xi, i.e., it maps (x1, x2, . . . , xn) 7→ xi;
• We write x ↓ if an element x is defined, and x ↑ otherwise, and let ≃ denote the Kleene
equality, i.e., x ≃ y
df.
⇔ (x ↓ ∧ y ↓ ∧ x = y) ∨ (x ↑ ∧ y ↑).
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3.1.1 Arenas and Legal Positions
Games are based on two concepts: arenas and legal positions. An arena defines the basic com-
ponents of a game, which in turn induces legal positions of the arena that specify the basic rules
of the game in the sense that each position of the game must be legal. Let us first recall these
two preliminary concepts.
Definition 3.1 (Moves). Let us fix, throughout the present work, four arbitrary pairwise distinct
symbols O, P, Q and A, and call them labels. A move is any triple mxy
df.
= (m,x, y) such that
x ∈ {O,P} and y ∈ {Q,A}, for which we often write m, and define λ(m)
df.
= xy, λOP(m)
df.
= x and
λQA(m)
df.
= y. A move m is called an Opponent (O-) move if λOP(m) = O, a Player (P-)
move if λOP(m) = P, a question if λQA(m) = Q, and an answer if λQA(m) = A.
Definition 3.2 (Arenas [McC98, AM99]). An arena is a pair G = (MG,⊢G), such that:
• MG is a set of moves;
• ⊢G is a subset of ({⋆} ∪MG) ×MG, where ⋆ (or represented more precisely by ⋆G) is an
arbitrarily fixed element such that ⋆ 6∈MG, called the enabling relation, that satisfies:
– (E1) If ⋆ ⊢G m, then λ(m) = OQ;
– (E2) If m ⊢G n and λQA(n) = A, then λQA(m) = Q;
– (E3) If m ⊢G n and m 6= ⋆, then λ
OP(m) 6= λOP(n).
A move m ∈MG of G is called initial if ⋆ ⊢G m, and non-initial otherwise.
Notation. Given an arena G, we define M InitG
df.
= {m ∈MG | ⋆ ⊢G m } ⊆MG.
Remark. In [McC98, AM99], an arena refers to a triple G = (MG, λG,⊢G), and labels are assigned
to each move ofG by the labeling function λG :MG → {O,P}×{Q,A}. Instead, we have embedded
labels into each move of an arena; the modification is technically convenient for our generalization
of games given in Section 4 since then labels on each move are unambiguous without underlying
arenas. Also, it is required for the axiom E1 in [McC98, AM99] that n ⊢G m⇔ n = ⋆ whenever
⋆ ⊢G m. We have dropped this condition also for the generalization of games.
In other words, an arenaG is to specify moves of a game, each of which is Opponent’s/Player’s
question/answer, and which move n can be performed for each move m by the enabling relation
m ⊢G n, where ⋆ ⊢G m means that Opponent can initiate a play by m.
The axioms E1, E2 and E3 are to be read as follows:
• E1 sets the convention that an initial move must be Opponent’s question;
• E2 states that an answer must be performed for a question;
• E3 says that an O-move must be performed for a P-move, and vice versa.
Example 3.3. The terminal arena T is given by T
df.
= (∅, ∅).
Example 3.4. The flat arena flat(S) on a set S is given byMflat(S)
df.
= {qOQ}∪{mPA | m ∈ S },
where q is any element such that q 6∈ S, and ⊢flat(S)
df.
= {(⋆, qOQ)} ∪ {(qOQ,mPA) | m ∈ S }. For
instance, N
df.
= flat(N) is the arena of natural numbers, and 2
df.
= flat(B), where B
df.
= {tt,ff }, is
that of booleans.
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We shall later focus on well-founded arenas:
Definition 3.5 (Well-founded arenas [CH10]). An arena G is well-founded if so is the enabling
relation ⊢G downwards, i.e., there is no countably infinite sequence (mi)i∈N of moves mi ∈ MG
such that ⋆ ⊢G m0 ∧ ∀i ∈ N.mi ⊢G mi+1.
Strictly speaking, interactions between Opponent and Player in a game are represented not
by finite sequences of moves but by j-sequences :
Definition 3.6 (Occurrences). Given a finite sequence s, an occurrence in s is a pair (s(i), i)
such that i ∈ |s|.
Definition 3.7 (J-sequences). A justified (j-) sequence is a pair s = (s,Js) of a finite
sequence s of moves and a map Js : |s| → {0} ∪ |s| − 1 such that 0 6 Js(i) < i for all i ∈ |s|. A
justified (j-) sequence of an arena G is a j-sequence s such that s ∈M∗G ∧∀i ∈ |s|. (Js(i) =
0 ⇒ ⋆ ⊢G s(i)) ∧ (Js(i) 6= 0 ⇒ s(Js(i)) ⊢G s(i)); for each i ∈ |s|, the occurrence (s(i), i) is
initial (resp. non-initial) in s if Js(i) = 0 (resp. otherwise).
Notation. We write JG for the set of all j-sequences of an arena G.
Remark. Unlike the traditional formulation [McC98, AM99], we have defined j-sequences in such
a way that makes sense even without underlying arenas, which is important for Definitions 3.10,
3.11 and 3.14, and in turn for Section 4.
Convention. We say that an occurrence (s(Js(i)),Js(i)) is the justifier of a non-initial one
(s(i), i) in a j-sequence s of an arena G, and (s(i), i) is justified by (s(Js(i)),Js(i)) (or there
is a pointer from the former to the latter in s).
The idea is that each non-initial occurrence in a j-sequence must be performed for a specific
previous occurrence, viz., its justifier, in the j-sequence. Technically, pointers are to distinguish
similar yet different computations (see [AM99, Cur06] for this point), and also they are funda-
mental for innocence and noetherianity of strategies recalled later (Definitions 3.56 and 3.59).
Next, the following concepts (Definitions 3.8 and 3.9) are technically convenient:
Definition 3.8 (J-subsequences). A j-subsequence of a j-sequence s = (s,Js) is a j-sequence
t = (t,Jt) that satisfies:
• t is a subsequence of s, for which we write t = (s(i1), s(i2), . . . , s(i|t|)), where 1 6 i1 <
i2 · · · < i|t| 6 |s|;
• Jt(ir) = il, where 1 6 l < r 6 |t|, iff there are moves s(j1), s(j2), . . . , s(jk) occurring in s,
each of which is excluded in t, where il < j1 < j2 · · · < jk < ir and 0 6 k 6 |s| − 2, such
that Js(ir) = jk ∧ Js(jk) = jk−1 ∧ Js(jk−1) = jk−2 · · · ∧ Js(j2) = j1 ∧ Js(j1) = il.
Remark. A j-subsequence of a j-sequence of an arena G is not necessarily a j-sequence of G; for
instance, the j-subsequence s ↾ 2 of the j-sequence s = q.q.tt .0 of the arena 2 ⊸ N is not a
j-sequence of the arena but that of the component arena 2 (n.b., this example would make sense
by the end of Section 3.1.3).
Definition 3.9 (Equality on j-sequences). J-sequences s and t are equal, written s = t, if they
are the same finite sequence, and their justifiers coincide, i.e., ∀i ∈ |s|.Js(i) = Jt(i).
Remark. Equality of j-sequences s and t implies that the moves s(i) and t(i) have the same
labels for all i ∈ |s| thanks to embedding of labels into moves (Definition 3.1).
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Convention. Henceforth, we are casual about the distinction between moves and occurrences,
and by abuse of notation, we often keep the pointer structure Js of each j-sequence s = (s,Js)
implicit and abbreviate occurrences (s(i), i) in s as s(i). Also, we often write Js(s(i)) = s(j) if
Js(i) = j 6= 0. This convention is mathematically imprecise, but it would not bring any serious
confusion in practice; in fact, it has been conventional in the literature of game semantics.
Next, let us recall the notion of the ‘relevant part’ of previous occurrences in a j-sequence:
Definition 3.10 (Views [McC98, AM99]). The Player (P-) view ⌈s⌉ and the Opponent
(O-) view ⌊s⌋ of a j-sequence s are respectively the j-subsequences of s defined by the following
induction on |s|:
• ⌈ǫ⌉
df.
= ǫ;
• ⌈sm⌉
df.
= ⌈s⌉.m if m is a P-move;
• ⌈sm⌉
df.
= m if m is initial;
• ⌈smtn⌉
df.
= ⌈s⌉.mn if n is an O-move such that m justifies n;
• ⌊ǫ⌋
df.
= ǫ;
• ⌊sm⌋
df.
= ⌊s⌋.m if m is an O-move;
• ⌊smtn⌋
df.
= ⌊s⌋.mn if n is a P-move such that m justifies n.
A Player (P-) view (resp. a Opponent (O-) view) refers to that of some j-sequence, and a
view (of a j-sequence) to a P- or O-view (of the j-sequence).
The idea behind the notion of views is as follows. Given a non-empty j-sequence sm such
that m is a P- (resp. O-) move, the P-view ⌈s⌉ (resp. O-view ⌊s⌋) is intended to be the currently
‘relevant part’ of previous occurrences in s for Player (resp. Opponent). That is, Player (resp.
Opponent) is concerned only with the last occurrence of an O- (resp. P-) move, its justifier
and that justifier’s ‘concern’, i.e., its P- (resp. O-) view, which then recursively proceeds. See
[Cur06, Cur98] for an explanation of views in terms of their counterparts in syntax.
Remark. The view of a j-sequence is not necessarily a j-sequence because the justifier of an
occurrence in the j-sequence may be outside of the view (see, e.g., [HO00, McC98] for the details)
which motivates the visibility condition given below.
We are now ready to recall the notion of legal positions :
Definition 3.11 (Legal positions [AM99]). A legal position is a j-sequence s that satisfies:
• (Alternation) If s = s1mns2, then λOP(m) 6= λOP(n);
• (Visibility) If s = tmu with m non-initial, then Js(m) occurs in ⌈t⌉ if m is a P-move,
and in ⌊t⌋ otherwise.
A legal position of an arena G is a legal position that is a j-sequence of G.
Notation. The set of all legal positions of an arena G is denoted by LG.
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The visibility condition is technically to guarantee that the P- and the O-views of each j-
sequence of an arena are both j-sequences of the arena [McC98], and conceptually to ensure that
the justifier of each non-initial occurrence belongs to the ‘relevant part’ of previous occurrences.
As already stated, legal positions are to specify the basic rules of a game in the sense that
each position of the game must be legal:
• During a play of the game, Opponent makes the first move by a question, and then Player
and Opponent alternately perform moves (by alternation), where each non-initial move is
performed for a specific previous occurrence, viz., the justifier of the non-initial occurrence;
• The justifier of each non-initial occurrence belongs to the ‘relevant part’ of previous occur-
rences (by visibility) in the current position of the game.
Remark. For the same reason as the case of j-sequences, we have defined legal positions in such
a way that makes sense even without underlying games.
3.1.2 Games
We are now ready to recall the central notion of games. For convenience, let us call games as
defined in [McC98, AM99] MC-games :
Definition 3.12 (MC-games [McC98, AM99]). A McCusker (MC-) game is a quadruple
G = (MG,⊢G, PG,≃G) such that:
• The pair (MG,⊢G) forms a well-founded arena (also denoted by G);
• PG is a subset of LG, whose elements are called (valid) positions of G, that is non-empty
and prefix-closed (i.e., ∀sm ∈ PG. s ∈ PG);
• ≃G is an equivalence relation on PG, called the identification of (valid) positions, that
satisfies:
– (I1) s ≃G t⇒ |s| = |t|;
– (I2) sm ≃G tn⇒ s ≃G t ∧ λ(m) = λ(n) ∧ Jsm(|sm|) = Jtn(|tn|);
– (I3) s ≃G t ∧ sm ∈ PG ⇒ ∃tn ∈ PG. sm ≃G tn.
A play of G is a countable (finite or infinite) sequence (ǫ,m1,m1m2, . . . ) of positions of G.
Remark. The underlying arena of an MC-game G as defined in [McC98, AM99] is not required
to be well-founded because they do not impose noetherianity on strategies (Definition 3.56) in
the categories of MC-games and strategies; see Section 3.3.
Non-emptiness and prefix-closure of the set PG for each MC-game G formulates the natural
phenomenon that a non-empty ‘moment’ (or position) must have the previous ‘moment’.
Identifications of positions are originally introduced in [AJM00] and also employed in Section
3.6 of [McC98]. They are to identify positions up to inessential details of ‘tags’ for disjoint union
of sets of moves, particularly for exponential ! on games (Definition 3.22); each position s ∈ PG
of an MC-game G is a representative of the equivalence class [s]
df.
= {t ∈ PG | t ≃G s} ∈ PG/≃G.
For this underlying idea, the axioms I1-3 should make sense.
Note that an MC-game G may have a move m ∈ MG that does not occur in any position
of G, or a pair m ⊢G n that is not used for a justification in any position of G. For technical
convenience, we prohibit such unused, redundant structures:
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Definition 3.13 (Economical MC-games). AnMC-gameG is economical if each movem ∈MG
occurs in a position of G, and every pair m ⊢G n ∈MG ×MG occurs as a non-initial occurrence
n and its justifier m in a position of G.
In the present work, we focus exclusively on economical MC-games. Then, observe that the
set MG and the relation ⊢G of each economical game G can be recovered completely from the
set PG. Hence, let us reformulate economical MC-games as:
Definition 3.14 (Games). A game is a pair G = (PG,≃G) of a set PG of legal positions and
an equivalence relation ≃G on PG such that the quadruple
MC(G) = (MMC(G),⊢MC(G), PMC(G),≃MC(G))
forms an MC-game, where:
• MMC(G)
df.
= {s(i) | s ∈ PG, i ∈ |s| };
• ⊢MC(G)
df.
= {(⋆, s(i)) | s ∈ PG, i ∈ |s|,Js(i) = 0 }
∪ {(s(i), s(j)) | s ∈ PG, i, j ∈ |s|,Js(j) = i };
• PMC(G)
df.
= PG;
• ≃MC(G)
df.
= ≃G.
Convention. We writeMC(G) for the pair (MMC(G),⊢MC(G)) and call it the underlying arena
of a game G. Moves of a game G are elements of MMC(G), and the enabling relation of
a game G is the relation ⊢MC(G).
Notation. If the identification ≃G of positions of a game G is just the equality of j-sequences,
then we often write =G or = for it.
Example 3.15. We have the terminal game T
df.
= ({ǫ}, {(ǫ, ǫ)}). From the logical point of
view, which will be clarified shortly, we also call T the unit game, and write 1 for it. Clearly,
the underlying arena of T is the terminal arena given in Example 3.3.
Example 3.16. The flat game flat(S) on a set S is defined by Pflat(S)
df.
= {ǫ, qOQ}∪{qOQ.mPA |
m ∈ S } and ≃flat(S)
df.
= =flat(S), where q
OQ justifies mPA in qOQ.mPA; e.g., N
df.
= flat(N) is the
game of natural numbers, and 2
df.
= flat(B) is the game of booleans. Also, 0
df.
= flat(∅) is the
empty game. Clearly, the underlying arena of flat(S) is the flat arena on S (Example 3.4).
Clearly, the operationMC is a bijection between games and economical MC-games with the
inverse π3,4
df.
= 〈π3, π4〉; in this sense, the two concepts are equivalent. Henceforth, we regard
games, rather than MC-games, as a main entity in the present work.
Next, let us define a substructure relation between games:
Definition 3.17 (Subgames). A gameH is a subgame of a gameG, written H P G, if PH ⊆ PG
and ≃H = ≃G ∩ (PH × PH).
Example 3.18. The terminal game T (Example 3.15) is a subgame of any game. As another
example, consider the flat games 2N
df.
= flat({2n | n ∈ N}) and 2N +1
df.
= flat({2n+1 | n ∈ N}).
Clearly, they are both subgames of N (Example 3.16), but neither is a subgame of the other.
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3.1.3 Constructions on Games
Next, let us recall constructions on games, for which we employ the bijectionMC between games
and economical MC-games for convenience (n.b., it is not strictly necessary yet quite convenient
to describe the constructions in terms of the corresponding ones on economical MC-games). Let
us note that our treatment here is rather brief for they are well-established in the literature.
Convention. For brevity, we omit ‘tags’ for disjoint union + of sets. For instance, we write x ∈
A+B if x ∈ A or x ∈ B; also, given relations RA ⊆ A×A and RB ⊆ B×B, we write RA+RB for
the relation on the disjoint union A+B such that (x, y) ∈ RA+RB
df.
⇔ (x, y) ∈ RA∨ (x, y) ∈ RB.
Let us begin with tensor ⊗. For Player, to play on the tensor A ⊗ B of games A and B is
to play A and B ‘in parallel’, following the switch between A and B made by Opponent; that
is, a position of the tensor A⊗B is an interleaving mixture of a position of A and that of B, in
which only Opponent may switch between A and B. Formally, tensor of games is given by:
Definition 3.19 (Tensor of games [McC98, AM99]). The tensor of games A and B is the game
A⊗B
df.
= π3,4(MC(A)⊗MC(B)), where the MC-game MC(A)⊗MC(B) is defined by:
• MMC(A)⊗MC(B)
df.
= MMC(A) +MMC(B) with the map attMC(A)⊗MC(B) : a ∈ MMC(A) 7→
0, b ∈MMC(B) 7→ 1;
• ⊢MC(A)⊗MC(B)
df.
= ⊢MC(A) + ⊢MC(B);
• PMC(A)⊗MC(B)
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A)⊗MC(B) | s ↾MC(A) ∈ PMC(A), s ↾MC(B) ∈ PMC(B) },
where s ↾MC(A) (resp. s ↾MC(B)) is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of
MC(A) (resp. MC(B));
• s ≃MC(A)⊗MC(B) t
df.
⇔ s ↾MC(A) ≃MC(A) t ↾MC(A) ∧ s ↾MC(B) ≃MC(B) t ↾MC(B) ∧
att∗MC(A)⊗MC(B)(s) = att
∗
MC(A)⊗MC(B)(t).
As explained in [A+97], during a play of the tensor A⊗B, in fact only Opponent can switch
between the component games A and B (by alternation).
Next, let us recall linear implication ⊸. The linear implication A ⊸ B is, intuitively, the
space of linear functions from A to B in the sense of linear logic [Gir87], i.e., they consume
exactly one input in A (strictly speaking, at most one input since it is possible for Player not
to play in A at all, i.e., ⊸ is actually affine implication, but we shall stick to the standard
convention) to produce an output in B. Formally, linear implication between games is given by:
Definition 3.20 (Linear implication between games [McC98, AM99]). The linear implication
between games A and B is the game A⊸ B
df.
= π3,4(MC(A)⊸MC(B)), where the MC-game
MC(A)⊸MC(B) is defined by MC(A)⊸MC(B)
df.
= MC(T ) if B = T ,9 and otherwise by:
• MMC(A)⊸MC(B)
df.
= {axy | axy ∈MMC(A) }+MMC(B), where O
df.
= P and P
df.
= O, with the
map attMC(A)⊸MC(B) : a
xy 7→ 0, bxy 7→ 1, where axy ∈MMC(A) and b
xy ∈MMC(B);
• ⋆ ⊢MC(A)⊸MC(B) m
df.
⇔ ⋆ ⊢MC(B) m;
• m ⊢MC(A)⊸MC(B) n (m 6= ⋆)
df.
⇔ m ⊢MC(A) n∨m ⊢MC(B) n∨ (⋆ ⊢MC(B) m∧ ⋆ ⊢MC(A) n);
9This case distinction is to preserve economy of MC-games under linear implication.
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• PMC(A)⊸MC(B)
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A)⊸MC(B) | s ↾MC(A) ∈ PMC(A), s ↾MC(B) ∈ PMC(B) };
• s ≃MC(A)⊸MC(B) t
df.
⇔ s ↾MC(A) ≃MC(A) t ↾MC(A) ∧ s ↾MC(B) ≃MC(B) t ↾MC(B) ∧
att∗MC(A)⊸MC(B)(s) = att
∗
MC(A)⊸MC(B)(t).
Note that, in the domain A of a linear implication A⊸ B, the roles of Player and Opponent
are interchanged; it is only the difference between A⊸ B and A ⊗ B. Then, dually to A ⊗ B,
during a play of A⊸ B, only Player may switch between A and B (again by alternation) [A+97].
Next, let us recall product & on games, which forms the categorical product in the category
of (MC-) games [McC98, AM99]. It is simple; a product A&B is the ‘disjoint union’ of A and B:
Definition 3.21 (Product of games [McC98, AM99]). The product of games A and B is the
game A&B
df.
= π3,4(MC(A)&MC(B)), where the MC-game MC(A)&MC(B) is defined by:
• MMC(A)&MC(B)
df.
= MMC(A) +MMC(B);
• ⊢MC(A)&MC(B)
df.
= ⊢MC(A) + ⊢MC(B);
• PMC(A)&MC(B)
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A)&MC(B) | (s ↾MC(A) ∈ PMC(A) ∧ s ↾MC(B) = ǫ) ∨ (s ↾
MC(A) = ǫ ∧ s ↾MC(B) ∈ PMC(B)) };
• s ≃MC(A)&MC(B) t
df.
⇔ s ≃MC(A) t ∧ s ≃MC(B) t.
Finally, let us recall exponential ! on games, which is intuitively the countably infinite iteration
of tensor ⊗ on games, i.e., !A ∼= A⊗A⊗ . . . for any game A:
Definition 3.22 (Exponential [AJM00, McC98]). The exponential of a game A is the game
!A
df.
= π3,4(!MC(A)), where the MC-game !MC(A) is given by:
• M!MC(A)
df.
= {(a, i)xy | axy ∈MMC(A), i ∈ N}, where we usually abbreviate (a, i)
xy as (a, i);
• ⋆ ⊢!MC(A) (a, i)
df.
⇔ ⋆ ⊢MC(A) a;
• (a, i) ⊢!MC(A) (a
′, i′) ((a, i) 6= ⋆)
df.
⇔ i = i′ ∧ a ⊢MC(A) a
′;
• P!MC(A)
df.
= {s ∈ L!MC(A) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ PMC(A) }, where s ↾ i is the j-subsequence of s
that consists of moves of the form (a, i) such that a ∈MMC(A) ∧ i ∈ N yet changed into a;
• s ≃!MC(A) t
df.
⇔ ∃ϕ ∈ P (N). ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ ϕ(i) ≃MC(A) t ↾ i ∧ π
∗
2(s) = (ϕ ◦ π2)
∗(t), where
P (N) is the set of all permutations of natural numbers.
Now, it is clear, from≃!A, why we have equipped each game with an identification of positions:
A particular choice of a ‘tag’ ( , i) for an exponential !A should not matter; also, since exponential
! may occur locally in games in a nested form, e.g., !(!A ⊗ B), !A⊸ B, etc., it provides a neat
solution to define a tailored identification ≃G as part of the structure of each game G.
Exponential ! enables us, via Girard’s translation [Gir87] A⇒ B
df.
= !A⊸ B, to recover the
usual implication (or the function space) ⇒.
Theorem 3.23 (Well-defined constructions on games). Games are closed under tensor ⊗, linear
implication ⊸, product & and exponential !, and they preserve the subgame relation P.
Proof. See [McC98] for closure of MC-games under the constructions, where they clearly pre-
serve economy of MC-games and well-foundedness of arenas. Thus, games are closed under the
constructions. Preservation of subgames is easy to show, and so we leave it to the reader.
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3.2 Strategies
We proceed to recall another central notion of strategies in game semantics. Let us adopt, for
mathematical elegance and convenience, the reformulation of strategies given by Abramsky and
Jagadeesan [AJ09]: We call strategies in the conventional sense [McC98] skeletons and define
strategies to be the unions of all ‘equivalent’ skeletons.
A skeleton on a game G is a what tells Player deterministically which move she should make
at each of her turns in G (i.e., odd-length positions of G), while a strategy on G does the same
yet deterministically only up to ≃G. Because positions of a game are to be identified up to the
identification of positions, strategies, not skeletons, have the appropriate degree of abstraction
(for fully complete/abstract interpretation), and they correspond to terms in computation or
proofs in logic. On the other hand, it is skeletons that Player employs during a play of a game.
3.2.1 Skeletons
First, skeletons are usually formulated as follows:
Definition 3.24 (Skeletons [AJ09, McC98]). A skeleton on a game G is a subset σ ⊆ P EvenG ,
written σ :: G, that satisfies:
• (SK1) Non-empty and even-prefix-closed (i.e., ∀smn ∈ σ. s ∈ σ);
• (SK2) Deterministic (i.e., ∀smn, s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ. sm = s˜m˜⇒ smn = s˜m˜n˜).
Remark. The original notion of skeletons [AJ09] is additionally required to satisfy functional
representation independence, which we simply call validity given in Definition 3.27.
That is, if Player employs a skeleton σ :: G, then a play of the game G proceeds as:
ǫ ∈ σ,m1 ∈ PG,m1m2 ∈ σ,m1m2m3 ∈ PG,m1m2m3m4 ∈ σ, . . .
where note that the process m1m2 . . .m2i+1 7→ m1m2 . . .m2i+1m2i+2, if any, is deterministic for
each i ∈ N by the axiom SK2 on σ.
Example 3.25. There is only the trivial skeleton ∗
df.
= {ǫ} on the unit game 1 (Example 3.15),
and there is one n
df.
= {ǫ, q.n} (resp. b
df.
= {ǫ, q.b}) on the natural number game N for each n ∈ N
(resp. on the boolean game 2 for each b ∈ B) (Example 3.16). In contrast to the unit game 1,
the trivial skeleton {ǫ} results in a rather different play in the empty game 0 (Example 3.16),
and hence, let us write  :: 0 for it; the difference is made explicit in Section 4.
Because positions of a game G are identified up to ≃G, we have to identify skeletons on G if
they behave in the same manner up to ≃G, leading to:
Definition 3.26 (Identification of skeletons [AJ09, McC98]). The identification of skeletons
on a game G, written ≃G, is the relation between σ, τ :: G given by:
σ ≃G τ
df.
⇔ σ .G τ ∧ τ .G σ
where σ .G τ
df.
⇔ (∀smn ∈ σ, t ∈ τ, tl ∈ PG. sm ≃G tl ⇒ ∃tlr ∈ τ.smn ≃G tlr).
It is not hard to see that the identification ≃G of skeletons on each game G forms a partial
equivalence relation (PER), i.e., a symmetric, transitive relation; see [AJM00, McC98] for a proof.
We are particularly concerned with skeletons identified with themselves :
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Definition 3.27 (Validity of skeletons). A skeleton σ :: G is valid if σ ≃G σ.
Next, we review two constraints on skeletons: innocence and well-bracketing. Recall that it
corresponds to modeling states and control operators in programming to relax innocence and
well-bracketing of skeletons in game semantics, respectively; in this sense, the two conditions
characterize purely functional computations [AM99]. Roughly, a skeleton is innocent if its com-
putation depends only on P-views, and well-bracketed if its ‘question-answering’ in P-views is
always in the ‘last-question-first-answered’ fashion. Formally:
Definition 3.28 (Innocence of skeletons [McC98, AM99]). A skeleton σ :: G is innocent if:
∀smn, s˜ ∈ σ, s˜m˜ ∈ PG. ⌈sm⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜⌉ ⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ. ⌈smn⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜n˜⌉.
Definition 3.29 (Well-bracketing of skeletons [McC98, AM99]). A skeleton σ :: G is well-
bracketed if it contains only well-bracketed j-sequences, i.e., given sqta ∈ σ, where λQA(q) = Q,
λQA(a) = A and Jsqta(a) = q, each occurrence of a question in t′ with ⌈sqt⌉ = ⌈sq⌉.t′10 justifies
an occurrence of an answer in t′.
Next, recall that a programming language is total if its computation always terminates in a
finite period of time. This phenomenon is captured by totality of skeletons in game semantics in
a sense similar to totality of partial maps:
Definition 3.30 (Totality of skeletons [A+97, CH10]). A skeleton σ :: G is total if:
∀sm ∈ PG.s ∈ σ ⇒ ∃smn ∈ σ.
Nevertheless, it is well-known that totality of skeletons is not preserved under composition
(Definition 3.36) due to ‘infinite chattering’ [A+97, CH10]. For this point, one usually imposes
a condition on skeletons stronger than totality that is preserved under composition [A+97]. We
may certainly just apply the method of [A+97], but it requires an additional structure on games,
which may be criticized as extrinsic and/or ad-hoc; thus, we prefer another solution.
A natural idea is then to require that skeletons should not contain any strictly increasing
(w.r.t. ) infinite sequence of positions. However, we have to relax this constraint: The dere-
liction derA on a game A (Definition 3.48), the identity on A in the category of games, satisfies
the constraint iff so does the game A, but we cannot impose it on games because the implication
⇒ between games, which gives exponential objects in the category, does not preserve it (i.e., if
we imposed the constraint on games, then the category of games would not be closed).
Instead, Pierre Clairambault has applied the same idea to P-views :
Definition 3.31 (Noetherianity of skeletons [CH10]). A skeleton σ :: G is noetherian if σ does
not contain any strictly increasing (w.r.t. ) infinite sequence of P-views of positions of G.
We then define skeletons that behave as proofs in classical logic, or what to be called winning
skeletons, as follows:
Definition 3.32 (Winning of skeletons). A skeleton is winning if it is total, innocent and
noetherian.
A conceptual explanation of winning is as follows. First of all, a proof should not get ‘stuck’,
and thus, skeletons for proofs must be total. In addition, since logic is concerned with the
truths of formulas, which are invariant to ‘passage of time’, proofs should not depended on
‘states of arguments’; hence, it makes sense to impose innocence on skeletons for proofs. Finally,
10Note that ⌈sqt⌉G must be of the form ⌈sq⌉G.t
′ by visibility on sqta (Definition 3.11).
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noetherianity is imposed because if a play by an innocent, noetherian skeleton keeps growing
infinitely, then it cannot be Player’s ‘intention’, and thus, it should result in a win for Player.
Note also that proofs in intuitionistic logic are captured by well-bracketed, winning skeletons
[AM99]. Then, because MLTT is a formal system for intuitionistic predicate logic, we shall focus
on well-bracketed, winning skeletons.
3.2.2 Constructions on Skeletons
Next, let us review constructions on skeletons. Although it has been established in the literature
that they are well-defined and preserve validity, winning and well-bracketing of skeletons, let us
present these facts explicitly as lemmata since the present work heavily relies on the lemmata.
One of the most basic skeletons is copy-cats, which, as the name suggests, simply ‘copy-cat’
the last O-moves:
Definition 3.33 (Copy-cats [AJ94a, AJM00, HO00, McC98]). The copy-cat (skeleton) on a
game A is the skeleton cpA :: A⊸ A defined by:
cpA
df.
= {s ∈ P EvenA[0]⊸A[1] | ∀t  s. Even(t)⇒ t ↾ A[0] = t ↾ A[1] }
where the subscripts [i] on A (i = 0, 1) are to distinguish the two copies of A, and t ↾ A[i]
(i = 0, 1) is the j-subsequence of t that consists of moves of A[i].
Lemma 3.34 (Well-defined copy-cats [McC98]). Given a game A, the copy-cat cpA is a valid,
winning, well-bracketed skeleton on the linear implication A⊸ A.
Proof. We just show that cpA is noetherian as the other points are trivial, e.g., validity of cpA
follows from the definition of ≃A⊸A. Given smm ∈ cpA, it is easy to see by induction on
|s| that the P-view ⌈sm⌉ is of the form m1m1m2m2 . . .mkmkm, and so there is a sequence
⋆ ⊢MC(A) m1 ⊢MC(A) m2 ⊢MC(A) m3 · · · ⊢MC(A) mk−1 ⊢MC(A) mk ⊢MC(A) m. Hence, because
the underlying arena MC(A) of A is well-founded, cpA must be noetherian.
Remark. We have required the underlying arena of each game to be well-founded for every copy-
cat (and dereliction given in Definitions 3.44) to be noetherian as shown in the above proof.
Next, to formulate composition of skeletons, it is convenient to first define the following
intermediate concept:
Definition 3.35 (Parallel composition of skeletons [A+97, McC98, AM99]). The parallel com-
position of skeletons φ :: A⊸ B and ψ :: B⊸ C is the set φ ‖ ψ of j-sequences given by:
φ ‖ ψ
df.
= {s ∈ J | s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ φ, s ↾ B[1], C ∈ ψ, s ↾ B[0], B[1] ∈ prB }
where J
df.
= JMC(((A⊸B[0])⊸B[1])⊸C), the subscripts [i] on B (i = 0, 1) are to distinguish the
two copies of B, s ↾ A,B[0] (resp. s ↾ B[1], C, s ↾ B[0], B[1]) is the j-subsequence of s that consists
of moves of A or B[0] (resp. B[1] or C, B[0] or B[1]), and prB
df.
= Pref(cpB).
Remark. Parallel composition is just a preliminary for composition given below; it does not
preserve the structure of skeletons.
Now, we are ready to recall composition of skeletons:
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Definition 3.36 (Composition of skeletons [McC98, AM99]). The composition of skeletons
φ :: A⊸ B and ψ :: B⊸ C is the skeleton φ;ψ (also written ψ ◦ φ) on A⊸ C defined by:
φ;ψ
df.
= {s ↾ A,C | s ∈ φ ‖ ψ }
where s ↾ A,C is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A or C.
Lemma 3.37 (Well-defined composition on skeletons). Given φ :: A ⊸ B and ψ :: B ⊸ C,
we have φ;ψ :: A ⊸ C. If φ and ψ are winning (resp. well-bracketed), then so is φ;ψ. Given
φ′ :: A⊸ B and ψ′ :: B⊸ C such that φ .A⊸B φ
′ and ψ .B⊸C ψ
′, we have φ;ψ .A⊸C φ
′;ψ′.
Proof. It has been established that skeletons are closed under composition, and composition
preserves innocence and well-bracketing; see [HO00, AM99, McC98] for the details. Also, it has
been shown in [CH10] that winning is preserved under composition. Finally, composition clearly
preserves the preorder . between skeletons.
The composition φ;ψ :: A ⊸ C of skeletons φ :: A ⊸ B and ψ :: B ⊸ C plays implicitly
on the game ((A ⊸ B[0])⊸ B[1])⊸ C, employing φ if the last O-move is of A or B[0], and ψ
otherwise, while Opponent plays on the game A ⊸ C, where φ and ψ communicate with each
other via moves of B[0] or B[1], but the communication is ‘hidden’ from Opponent. This idea
comes from parallel composition plus hiding [A+97] in process calculi [Hoa78, Mil80].
Next, let us recall tensor ⊗ on skeletons:
Definition 3.38 (Tensor of skeletons [AJ94a, McC98, AM99]). The tensor of skeletons φ ::
A⊸ B and ψ :: C ⊸ D is the skeleton φ⊗ ψ on A⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗D defined by:
φ⊗ ψ
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A⊗C⊸B⊗D) | s ↾ A,B ∈ φ, s ↾ C,D ∈ ψ }
where s ↾ A,B (resp. s ↾ C,D) is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A or B (resp.
C or D).
Lemma 3.39 (Well-defined tensor on skeletons). Given φ :: A ⊸ B and ψ :: C ⊸ D, we
have φ ⊗ ψ :: A ⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗ D. If φ and ψ are winning (resp. well-bracketed), then so is
φ ⊗ ψ. Given φ′ :: A ⊸ B and ψ′ :: C ⊸ D such that φ .A⊸B φ′ and ψ .C⊸D ψ′, we have
φ⊗ ψ .A⊗C⊸B⊗D φ′ ⊗ ψ′.
Proof. Straightforward; see [AJ94a, AM99, McC98, AJM00] for a proof.
Intuitively, the tensor φ⊗ ψ :: A⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗D of φ :: A⊸ B and ψ :: C ⊸ D plays by φ if
the last O-move is of A or B, and by ψ otherwise.
We proceed to recall pairing of skeletons:
Definition 3.40 (Pairing on skeletons [McC98, AM99]). The pairing of skeletons φ :: C ⊸ A
and ψ :: C ⊸ B is the skeleton 〈φ, ψ〉 on C ⊸ A&B defined by:
〈φ, ψ〉
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(C⊸A&B) | (s ↾ C,A ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ B = ǫ) ∨ (s ↾ C,B ∈ ψ ∧ s ↾ A = ǫ) }.
Lemma 3.41 (Well-defined pairing on skeletons). Given φ :: C ⊸ A and ψ :: C ⊸ B, we
have 〈φ, ψ〉 :: C ⊸ A&B. If φ and ψ are winning (resp. well-bracketed), then so is 〈φ, ψ〉.
Given φ′ :: C ⊸ A and ψ′ :: C ⊸ B such that φ .C⊸A φ
′ and ψ .C⊸B ψ
′, we have
〈φ, ψ〉 .C⊸A&B 〈φ
′, ψ′〉.
Proof. Straightforward; see [AM99, McC98, AJM00] for a proof.
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That is, the pairing 〈φ, ψ〉 :: C ⊸ A&B of φ :: C ⊸ A and ψ :: C ⊸ B plays by φ if the play
is on C ⊸ A, and by ψ otherwise.
Next, let us recall promotion on skeletons:
Definition 3.42 (Promotion on skeletons [AJM00, McC98, AM99]). The promotion of a skele-
ton ϕ :: !A⊸ B is the skeleton ϕ† on !A⊸ !B defined by:
ϕ†
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(!A⊸!B) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ ϕ }
where s ↾ i is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of the form (b, i) such that b ∈
MB ∧ i ∈ N, or (a, 〈i, j〉) such that a ∈MA ∧ i, j ∈ N, changed into b and (a, j), respectively, and
〈 , 〉 : N× N
∼
→ N is any bijection fixed throughout the present work.
Lemma 3.43 (Well-defined promotion on skeletons). Given ϕ :: !A⊸ B, we have ϕ† :: !A⊸ !B.
If ϕ is winning (resp. well-bracketed), then so is ϕ†. Given ϕ˜ :: !A⊸ B such that ϕ .!A⊸B ϕ˜,
we have ϕ† .!A⊸!B ϕ˜
†.
Proof. Straightforward; see [McC98, AJM00] for a proof.
That is, the promotion ϕ† :: !A ⊸ !B of a skeleton ϕ :: !A ⊸ B plays, given a position
s ∈ P!A⊸!B, as ϕ for each j-subsequence s ↾ i, called the thread of i in s [McC98, AM99].
Hence, if ϕ is innocent, then ϕ† plays in the essentially same way as ϕ; see [McC98] for the
details. We could define noetherianity of skeletons in terms of positions, but then it would not
be preserved under promotion ( )†; it is another reason why we employ P-views for noetherianity.
At this point, let us note that an arbitrary game G coincides with T ⊸ G and T ⇒ G up to
‘tags’ for disjoint union of sets of moves. Hence, we employ:
Notation. Given a skeleton σ :: G, we write σT :: T ⊸ G and σ!T :: T ⇒ G for the obvious
skeletons, both of which coincide with σ up to ‘tags’. Conversely, given skeletons φ :: T ⊸ G
and ψ :: T ⇒ G, we write φT , ψ!T :: G for the obvious skeletons, which coincide with φ and ψ up
to ‘tags’, respectively. Moreover:
• Given skeletons α :: A and β :: B, we define 〈α, β〉
df.
= 〈αT , βT 〉T :: A&B;
• Given a skeleton α :: A, we define α†
df.
= (α!T )†!T :: !A.
Furthermore, given an innocent skeleton ϑ :: !G, we write ϑ‡ :: G for the obvious, unique
(innocent) skeleton such that (ϑ‡)† = ϑ (see [McC98] for the details).
At the end of the present section, let us recall a relative of copy-cats:
Definition 3.44 (Dereliction skeletons [McC98, AM99]). The ith dereliction (skeleton) on a
game A, where i ∈ N, is the skeleton der
(i)
A on A⇒ A defined by:
der
(i)
A
df.
= {s ∈ P Even!A⊸A | ∀t  s.Even(t)⇒ (t ↾ !A) ↾ i = t ↾ A }.
Lemma 3.45 (Well-defined dereliction skeletons). The ith dereliction derA for a given pair of
a game A and a natural number i ∈ N is a valid, winning, well-bracketed skeleton on A⇒ A.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.34.
That is, the ith dereliction der
(i)
A plays essentially in the same manner as the copy-cat cpA,
where der
(i)
A employs specifically the ‘tag’ ( , i) on the domain !A.
Of course, any specific choice of i ∈ N for der
(i)
A should not matter, i.e., each der
(i)
A is ad-hoc,
which illustrates the reason why morphisms in the categories of games are strategies recalled in
the next section, rather than skeletons.
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Lemma 3.46 (Promotion lemma on skeletons [McC98]). Let φ :: !A ⊸ B, ψ :: !B ⊸ C and
ϕ :: !C ⊸ D be skeletons. Then, we have:
1. (der
(i)
A )
† ≃!A⊸!A cp!A :: !A⊸ !A for each i ∈ N;
2. ϕ ◦ (ψ ◦ φ†)† = (ϕ ◦ ψ†) ◦ φ† :: !A⊸ D.
Proof. Straightforward; see [McC98, AM99] for the details.
3.2.3 Strategies
We are now ready to recall strategies in the sense defined in [AJ09], which are skeletons up to
identifications of positions. Formally:
Definition 3.47 (Strategies [AJ09]). A strategy on a game G is a subset g ⊆ P EvenG , written
g : G, that satisfies:
• (ST1) Non-empty and even-prefix-closed;
• (ST2) ≃G-deterministic, i.e., ∀smn, tlr ∈ g. sm ≃G tl ⇒ smn ≃G tlr;
• (ST3) Representation independent, i.e., ∀s ∈ g, t ∈ PG. s ≃G t⇒ t ∈ g.
A skeleton σ :: G implements (or realizes) a strategy g : G, written σ ∝ g, if σ ⊆ g and
∀smn ∈ g.s ∈ σ ⇒ ∃smn′ ∈ σ. smn ≃G smn′.
Remark. Unlike skeletons, every strategy needs an underlying game.
Definition 3.48 (Derelictions [AJ09]). Given a game A, there is a strategy derA : A ⇒ A,
called the dereliction on A, defined by:
derN
df.
=
⋃
i∈N
der
(i)
N .
Clearly, the dereliction derA is a well-defined strategy on the implication A⇒ A for any given
game A, and der
(i)
A ∝ derA for each i ∈ N. As the definition of derelictions indicates, strategies
have the appropriate degree of abstraction, but they are deterministic only up to identification
of positions. Hence, for ‘executing’ a strategy g : G, Player must employ, during a play of G,
some skeleton σ :: G such that σ ∝ g.
The following three lemmata will turn out to be technically useful:
Lemma 3.49 (First skeleton/strategy lemma). If g : G is a strategy, then there is a valid
skeleton σ :: G such that σ ∝ g.
Proof. It suffices to find a (not necessarily unique) valid skeleton σi :: G for each i ∈ N such that
(∀i ∈ N. σi ⊆ σi+1 ⊆ g) ∧ (∀i ∈ N, smn ∈ g. |smn| 6 2i ∧ s ∈ σi ⇒ ∃smn˜ ∈ σi. smn ≃G smn˜)
since then we may obtain a valid skeleton σ
df.
=
⋃
i∈N σi :: G, which clearly satisfies σ ∝ g. The
base case is trivial for we may take σ0
df.
= {ǫ}. For the inductive step, given σi, let us take
any smn ∈ g such that |s| = 2i ∧ s ∈ σi, and define σ
{smn}
i
df.
= σi ∪ {smn}. More generally,
given a subset S ⊆ {t ∈ g | |t| = 2i + 2 }, a skeleton σSi :: G and an element smn ∈ g such
that |s| = 2i ∧ s ∈ σi ∧ (∀smn˜ ∈ g. smn 6= smn˜ ⇒ smn˜ 6∈ σSi ), we inductively (w.r.t. the
set S) define σ
S∪{smn}
i
df.
= σSi ∪ {smn}. By the axiom of choice [End77] and the axiom I3
on G, we may iterate the inductive procedure from σ∅i = σi to obtain some (not necessarily
unique) σi+1
df.
= σSi with S maximal in the sense that there is no element in g to add into S in
the procedure. By the induction hypothesis on i, we may conclude σi ⊆ σi+1 ⊆ g, σi+1 :: G,
σi+1 ∝ {s ∈ g | |s| 6 2i+ 2 }, and σi+1 is valid.
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Lemma 3.50 (Second skeleton/strategy lemma). If σ :: G is a skeleton, and g : G is a strategy
such that σ ∝ g, then:
∀smn ∈ g, s˜ ∈ σ, s˜m˜ ∈ PG. sm ≃G s˜m˜⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ. smn ≃G s˜m˜n˜.
Proof. Let σ :: G, g : G, σ ∝ g, smn ∈ g, s˜ ∈ σ, s˜m˜ ∈ PG and sm ≃G s˜m˜. By the axiom
I3 on G, there is some s˜m˜n′ ∈ PG such that smn ≃G s˜m˜n′. By the axiom ST3 on g, we have
s˜m˜n′ ∈ g. Finally, since σ ∝ g, there is some s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ such that s˜m˜n′ ≃G s˜m˜n˜, whence
smn ≃G s˜m˜n′ ≃G s˜m˜n˜.
Definition 3.51 (Saturations of skeletons [AJ09]). The saturation of a skeleton σ :: G is the
subset SatG(σ) ⊆ P
Even
G given by:
SatG(σ)
df.
= {s ∈ PG | ∃t ∈ σ. s ≃G t }.
Notation. We often omit the subscript G on SatG(σ) whenever the underlying game G of the
skeleton σ is obvious from the context.
Lemma 3.52 (Third skeleton/strategy lemma [AJ09]). Let G be a game.
1. If σ :: G is valid, then Sat(σ) : G and σ ∝ Sat(σ);
2. If σ :: G and g : G, then Sat(σ) = g ⇔ σ ∝ g;
3. If σ, σ˜ :: G are valid, then σ .G σ˜ ⇔ Sat(σ) ⊆ Sat(σ˜);
4. If σ, σ˜ :: G, g : G and σ ∝ g, then σ˜ ∝ g ⇔ σ ≃G σ˜;
5. If g : G, then g =
⋃
{σ :: G | σ ∝ g };
6. If σ :: G, g : G and σ ∝ g, then g =
⋃
{σ˜ :: G | σ ≃G σ˜ }.
Proof. Straightforward; see [AJ09] for a proof.
Note in particular that the fourth clause of the lemma implies a useful fact that any skeleton
σ :: G is valid if ∃g : G. σ ∝ g.
Example 3.53. Let A be an arbitrary game. Since der
(i)
A ∝ derA for each i ∈ N, and φ ∝
derA ⇒ φ = der
(i)
A for some i ∈ N, by Lemma 3.52, we have Sat(der
(i)
A ) = derA for all i ∈ N,
and derA =
⋃
{der
(i)
A | i ∈ N } (recovering the equation derN =
⋃
i∈N der
(i)
N in Example 3.48).
Now, let us proceed to recall constraints on strategies:
Definition 3.54 (Well-bracketing of strategies). A strategy g : G iswell-bracketed if it contains
only well-bracketed j-sequences.
Definition 3.55 (Totality of strategies). A strategy g : G is total if:
∀sm ∈ PG. s ∈ g ⇒ ∃smn ∈ g.
Definition 3.56 (Noetherianity of strategies). A strategy g : G is noetherian if it does not
contain any strictly increasing (w.r.t. ) sequence of P-views.
The constraints on strategies given above match the corresponding ones on skeletons in the
following sense:
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Lemma 3.57 (Constraints on skeletons/strategies). Let G be a game.
1. If a strategy g : G is well-bracketed (resp. total, noetherian), then so is any skeleton σ :: G
such that σ ∝ g;
2. If a valid skeleton σ :: G is well-bracketed (total, noetherian), then so is the saturation
Sat(σ) : G.
Proof. Let us focus on totality since the other two constraints are rather trivial. For the first
clause, we may see that totality of σ follows from that of g and the relation σ ∝ g. For the
second statement, totality of Sat(σ) : G follows from that of σ, I3 on G and ST3 on Sat(σ).
In contrast, it is not quite straightforward to define innocence on strategies:
Example 3.58. Consider a game G given by:
PG
df.
= Pref({abcdef, abc˜d˜ef˜ , abcdef˜ , abc˜d˜ef})
where the moves are pairwise distinct, λ(a) = λ(c) = λ(c˜) = OQ, λ(b) = PQ, λ(d) = λ(d˜) =
λ(f) = λ(f˜ ) = PA, λ(e) = OA, in each position a justifies b, b justifies e, c (resp. c˜) justifies d
(resp. d˜), and e justifies f and f˜ (n.b., a, c and c˜ are initial), and ≃G is the reflexive, symmetric,
transitive closure of the following relation on PG:
{(abc, abc˜), (abcd, abc˜d˜), (abcde, abc˜d˜e), (abcdef, abc˜d˜ef), (abcdef˜ , abc˜d˜ef˜)}
∪ {(abcdef, abc˜d˜ef˜), (abcdef˜ , abc˜d˜ef)}
∪ {(abcdef, abcdef˜), (abc˜d˜ef, abc˜d˜ef˜)}.
Moreover, consider skeletons σ, τ :: G given by:
σ
df.
= Pref({abcdef, abc˜d˜ef})Even
τ
df.
= Pref({abcdef, abc˜d˜ef˜})Even.
Clearly, σ ≃G τ ; however, σ is innocent, while τ is not.
Hence, innocence is not preserved under identification of skeletons. Also, by Lemma 3.52, it
follows that Lemma 3.57 adapted to innocence does not hold.
Then, in light of Lemmata 3.52 and the second clause of 3.57, let us define:
Definition 3.59 (Innocence of strategies). A strategy g : G is innocent if:
g =
⋃
{σ :: G | σ ∝ g, σ is innocent }.
Example 3.60. Consider a strategy g
df.
= P EvenG : G in Example 3.58. We have σ ∝ g and τ ∝ g,
but again σ is innocent, while τ is not. Nevertheless, g is innocent because g = σ ∪ γ, where γ
is an innocent skeleton on G given by σ
df.
= Pref({abcdef˜ , abc˜d˜ef˜})Even.
In general, we cannot have the analogue of Lemma 3.57 adapted to innocence, but:
Lemma 3.61 (Innocence on skeletons/strategies). If a strategy g : G is innocent, then there is
an innocent skeleton σ :: G such that σ ∝ g.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 3.59.
Definition 3.62 (Winning of strategies). A strategy is winning if it is total, innocent and
noetherian.
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3.2.4 Constructions on Strategies
Finally, let us recall constructions on strategies:
Definition 3.63 (Constructions on strategies). Let f : A ⊸ B, g : C ⊸ D, h : A ⊸ C,
k : B⊸ C and e : !A⊸ B be strategies.
• The tensor (product) f ⊗ g of f and g is defined by:
f ⊗ g
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A⊗C⊸B⊗D) | s ↾ A,B ∈ f, s ↾ C,D ∈ g };
• The pairing 〈f, h〉 of f and h is defined by:
〈f, h〉
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A⊸B&C) | (s ↾ A,B ∈ f ∧ s ↾ C = ǫ) ∨ (s ↾ A,C ∈ h ∧ s ↾ B = ǫ) };
• The composition f ; k (or k ◦ f) of f and k is defined by:
f ; k
df.
= {s ↾ A,C | s ∈ f ‖ k }
where f ‖ k
df.
= {s ∈ J | s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ f, s ↾ B[1], C ∈ k, s ↾ B[0], B[1] ∈ prB } and
J
df.
= JMC(((A⊸B[0])⊸B[1])⊸C);
• The promotion e† of e is defined by:
e†
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(!A⊸!B) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ e }.
These constructions on strategies match the corresponding ones on skeletons as the following
two lemmata show:
Lemma 3.64 (Constructions on strategies/skeletons). Let f : A⊸ B, g : C ⊸ D, h : A⊸ C,
k : B⊸ C and e : !A⊸ B be strategies. Then, we have:
1. f ⊗ g =
⋃
{φ⊗ ψ | φ ∝ f, ψ ∝ g };
2. 〈f, h〉 =
⋃
{〈φ, η〉 | φ ∝ f, η ∝ h };
3. f ; k =
⋃
{φ;κ | φ ∝ f, κ ∝ k };
4. e† =
⋃
{ǫ† | ǫ ∝ e }.
If any of the component strategies given above are well-bracketed (resp. total, innocent, noethe-
rian), then it suffices for skeletons implementing the strategy to range over well-bracketed (resp.
total, innocent, noetherian) ones.
Proof. The equations follow immediately from Lemma 3.49 and the fifth clause of Lemma 3.52,
and another statement of the lemma from Lemma 3.57 and Definition 3.59.
Lemma 3.65 (Well-defined constructions on strategies). Let f : A⊸ B, g : C ⊸ D, h : A⊸ C,
k : B ⊸ C and e : !A ⊸ B be strategies, and φ :: A ⊸ B, ψ :: C ⊸ D, η :: A ⊸ C,
κ :: B ⊸ C and ǫ :: !A ⊸ B skeletons such that φ ∝ f , ψ ∝ g, η ∝ h, κ ∝ k and ǫ ∝ e.
Then, φ ⊗ ψ ∝ f ⊗ g : A ⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗ D, 〈φ, η〉 ∝ 〈f, h〉 : A ⊸ B&C, φ;κ ∝ f ; k : A ⊸ C
and ǫ† ∝ e† : !A⊸ !B. Moreover, tensor ⊗, pairing 〈 , 〉, composition ; and promotion ( )† on
strategies preserve well-bracketing and winning of strategies.
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Proof. Let us focus on composition for the other constructions are simpler. We first show f ; k :
A ⊸ C. We may show f ; k ⊆ P EvenA⊸C just as in the case of composition on skeletons; see
[HO00, McC98] for the details. Also, f ; k clearly satisfies the axioms ST1 and ST2. For the axiom
ST3, let s ∈ f ‖ k, t ∈ PA⊸C and s ↾ A,C ≃A⊸C t; we have to show t ∈ f ; k. Take arbitrary
u ∈ PA⊸B[0] and v ∈ PB[1]⊸C such that u ↾ A = t ↾ A, u ↾ B[0] = s ↾ B[0], v ↾ B[1] = s ↾ B[1],
v ↾ C = t ↾ C, att∗A⊸B[0](u) = att
∗
A⊸B[0]
(s ↾ A,B[0]) and att
∗
B[1]⊸C
(v) = att∗B[1]⊸C(s ↾ B[1], C);
note that such u and v must exist. Clearly, s ↾ A,B[0] ≃A⊸B[0] u and s ↾ B[1], C ≃B[1]⊸C v.
Thus, by ST3 on f and k, we have u ∈ f and v ∈ k. Then, because u ↾ B[0] = v ↾ B[1], we may
take w ∈ f ‖ k such that w ↾ A,B[0] = u and w ↾ B[1], C = v, whence t = w ↾ A,C ∈ f ; k.
Next, we show φ;κ ∝ f ; k. We clearly have φ;κ ⊆ f ; k. Now, let smn ∈ f ; k and s ∈ φ;κ;
we have to find some smn˜ ∈ φ;κ such that smn ≃A⊸C smn˜, but it is simply possible by φ ∝ f ,
κ ∝ k, and Lemma 3.50.
Finally, we show preservation of the constraints on strategies under composition. The cases
of well-bracketing and noetherianity are simpler, and thus, let us focus on the conjunction of
totality and innocence. Assume f and k are total and innocent. Then, we have:
f ; k =
⋃
{α;β | α ∝ f, β ∝ k, α and β are total and innocent }
by Lemma 3.64. Hence, it follows from preservation of the conjunction of totality and innocence
of skeletons [CH10] as well as Lemma 3.57 and Definition 3.59 that f ; k is total and innocent.
Finally, as in the case of skeletons, let us employ:
Notation. Given a strategy g : G, we write gT : T ⊸ G and g!T : T ⇒ G for the obvious
strategies, both of which coincide with g up to ‘tags’. Conversely, given strategies f : T ⊸ G
and h : T ⇒ G, we write fT , h!T : G for the obvious strategies, which coincide with f and h up
to ‘tags’, respectively. Moreover:
• Given strategies a : A and b : B, we define 〈a, b〉
df.
= 〈aT , bT 〉T : A&B;
• Given a strategy a : A, we define a†
df.
= (a!T )†!T : !A.
Furthermore, given an innocent strategy g : !G, we write g‡ : G for the obvious, unique (innocent)
strategy such that (g‡)† = g.
3.3 Categories of Games and Strategies
Let us summarize the review of games and strategies so far by:
Definition 3.66 (Categories of games and strategies). The category G is defined by:
• Objects are games;
• Morphisms A→ B are strategies on A⇒ B;
• The composition of ψ • φ : A → C of morphisms φ : A → B and ψ : B → C is the
composition ψ ◦ φ† : A⇒ C of strategies φ† and ψ;
• The identity on each object A is the dereliction derA.
The category LG (resp. WG) is the lluf subcategory of G whose morphisms are winning (resp.
well-bracketed, winning) strategies in G.
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Morphisms in G are not necessarily winning strategies, and hence, it embodies computation.
In contrast, morphisms in LG are winning ones; thus, it captures proofs in classical logic. Also,
intuitionistic logic is modeled by WG for the well-bracketing condition prohibits classical or
controlling behavior of strategies; see [AM99, McC98] for the details.
Theorem 3.67 (CCCs of games and strategies). G, LG and WG are cartesian closed categories
(CCCs), in which a terminal object, products and exponential objects are given by the unit game
1, product & and implication ⇒ on games, respectively.
Proof. We have already shown that the constructions on games are well-defined (Theorem 3.23).
By Lemmata 3.49, 3.52, 3.57, 3.61 and 3.65, we may have, for the axioms on morphisms, recourse
to the corresponding cartesian closed categories of games and skeletons [McC98, AM99].
Corollary 3.68 (CPO-enrichment of games and strategies). The CCCs G, LG and WG are all
CPO-enriched w.r.t. the subset relation ⊆ in the sense of [AC98]. Moreover, these CPOs are all
algebraic, where compact elements in G (resp. LG or WG) are morphisms φ such that the set φ
(resp. ⌈φ⌉
df.
= {⌈s⌉ | s ∈ φ }) is finite.
Proof. Straightforward and left to the reader.
Remark. As mentioned in [AJM00], if we employed skeletons, not strategies, as morphisms in
the categories of games, then it is unknown if Corollary 3.68 holds; it is why we adopt strategies.
4 Predicative Games and Strategies
Having reviewed MLTT and conventional games and strategies, the present section initiates our
main contribution: It presents a generalization of games and strategies, called predicative (p-)
games and predicative (p-) strategies, in order to interpret MLTT.
Before going into details, let us think of why it is difficult to give game semantics of MLTT
because it is helpful for understanding the present work. A possible answer is:
It is hard to interpret (rather extensional) type dependency in terms of intensional
processes in game semantics.
Let us explain what it means as follows. A dependent type is not a problem; we may interpret it
as a family B = (B(x))x:A of games B(x) indexed by strategies x on another game A. However,
because a strategy x : A is ‘gradually and often only partially revealed’ as a play of A proceeds, it
can be impossible for Player, when playing on any subgame Σ(A,B) P A&
⋃
x:AB(x) assumed to
be suitable for interpreting a sigma-type Σx:AB(x), where
⋃
x:AB(x)
df.
= (
⋃
x:A PB(x),
⋃
x:A≃B(x)),
to fix, at the beginning of a play, a strategy x : A, let alone the component game B(x). Thus,
Player may be unable to specify a component game B(x), and Opponent may initiate a play on
any component game B(x′) such that x 6= x′. In other words, we cannot capture the extensional
nature of type dependency in a sigma-type Σx:AB(x) in terms of intensional processes in game
semantics. It is obviously a problem: Consider the pairing 〈a, b〉 : Σ(A,B) of winning strategies
a : A and b : B(a); the pairing is not necessarily winning because Opponent may select the
component game B(a′) for some a′ : A such that a 6= a′, and b is not total on B(a′), e.g., if
B(a′) = 0 (n.b., it is not even guaranteed that b : B(a′) holds). Hence, such a subgame Σ(A,B)
cannot exist. Let us remark that the intensional nature is one of the hearts of game semantics
that make it very natural as semantics of logic and computation, e.g., strategies may be regarded
as continuous functions, and therefore, we should not simply discard the intensionality.
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Our solution for the problem is to incorporate an ‘extensional structure’ into games to inter-
pret type dependency in MLTT that is nevertheless in accordance with the intensional nature of
game semantics. Specifically, we require that the participants of a game have to ‘declare’ their
skeletons in their minds before a play of the game begins; to respect the intensional nature of
games mentioned above, we require the ‘declarations’ to be ‘invisible’ to each other, so that the
chosen skeletons are still ‘gradually and often partially revealed’ as a play proceeds. In this way,
we capture type dependency in MLTT, while keeping the intensional nature of game semantics.
Slightly more technically, the basic idea is sketched as follows. In a game G, every position
s ∈ PG belongs to a (valid) skeleton σ :: G in the sense that s ∈ σ ∪ {sm ∈ PG | s ∈ σ } holds,
e.g., take σ
df.
= Pref({s})Even; thus, it makes no essential difference for Player to first ‘declare’ a
skeleton in such a way that is ‘invisible’ to Opponent and then play by the ‘declared’ one. In this
view, a game corresponds to a set of skeletons with some constraint (Theorem 4.16), equipped
with an identification of positions. By relaxing the constraint, we arrive at the notion of p-games
that can be seen as families of games, modeling type dependency in MLTT in a satisfactory
fashion. Let us note that the ‘declaration’ of skeletons by Opponent is simply omitted in p-
games because it is in any case ‘invisible’ to Player, and also, the resulting inability of Opponent
to control possible plays, unlike Player, is fundamental for the adjunctions given below (see the
proof of Theorem 4.61). Then, p-strategies are the corresponding generalization of strategies.
In addition to the conceptual, game-semantic explanation given above, p-games and p-
strategies are a natural generalization of games and strategies also in terms of category theory.
In fact, the CCC PG of p-games and p-strategies admits the following adjunction:
PG
U
✲
⊥
✛
P
⊃
G
where U : PG → G is a forgetful functor, which ‘forgets’ the ‘declaration’ of skeletons in p-games,
and P : G →֒ PG is a full, faithful inclusion, both of which are cartesian closed. Hence, G is a
reflective subcategory of PG. Also, the lluf subCCC LPG (resp. WPG) of PG whose morphisms
are winning (resp. well-bracketed and winning) admits the following adjunctions:
LPG
U
✲
⊥
✛
P
⊃
LG
WPG
U
✲
⊥
✛
P
⊃
WG
where by abuse of notation we write U and P for the obvious restrictions.
Also, these CCCs PG, LPG and WPG are CPO-enriched, properly inheriting the domain-
theoretic structures of the reflective subCCCs G, LG andWG, respectively. Hence, in addition to
the conceptual, game-semantic naturality, these category-theoretic and domain-theoretic struc-
tures may be taken as mathematical evidences for reasonability of p-games and p-strategies.
The rest of the present section is structured as follows. We first reformulate skeletons (as well
as constraints and constructions on them) as tree (t-) skeletons in Section 4.1 so that they make
sense even without underlying games. This reformulation then enables us to characterize games
as certain pairs of a set of t-skeletons and an identification of positions, called complete pairs in
Section 4.2. Based on this characterization, we define p-games and p-strategies in Section 4.3,
and establish the three CCCs of p-games and p-strategies in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Skeletons as Deterministic Trees
Let us start with reformulating skeletons as tree (t-) skeletons (Definition 4.3). This reformulation
enables us to talk about skeletons without underlying games (n.b., see the last few paragraphs
of Section 4.2 on the technical and the conceptual reasons why we need such a reformulation for
the present work).
Let us first introduce a key construction of the present section:
Definition 4.1 (Tree-form of skeletons). The tree-form of a skeleton σ :: G is the subset
(σ)G ⊆ PG given by:
(σ)G
df.
= σ ∪ {sm ∈ PG | s ∈ σ }.
Notation. We often omit the subscript G on (σ)G when it is obvious.
Clearly, we may recover σ from σ by removing odd-length positions. Therefore, σ and σ are
essentially the same entities (in the context of G), just in different forms.
Moreover, we may restrict the codomain of the map σ :: G 7→ σ ⊆ PG so that the correspond-
ing restriction of the map becomes a bijection:
Lemma 4.2 (Skeletons as deterministic trees). Given a game G, there is a bijection fG between
skeletons σ :: G and subsets S ⊆ PG that satisfy:
• (Tree) Non-empty and prefix-closed: S 6= ∅ ∧ ∀sm ∈ S. s ∈ S;
• (Edet) Deterministic: ∀smn, s˜m˜n˜ ∈ SEven. sm = s˜m˜⇒ smn = s˜m˜n˜;
• (Oinc) Inclusive on odd-length positions: ∀sm ∈ POddG . s ∈ S ⇒ sm ∈ S.
Proof. Let us define fG(σ)
df.
= σ for all σ :: G. First, it is straightforward to see that for each
skeleton σ :: G the subset σ ⊆ PG satisfies the three conditions of the lemma, e.g., σ is non-empty
because ǫ ∈ σ, and it is prefix-closed: For any sm ∈ σ, if s ∈ σ, then s ∈ σ; otherwise, i.e.,
sm ∈ σ, we may write s = tn ∈ PG with t ∈ σ, whence s ∈ σ. For the converse, assume that a
subset S ⊆ PG satisfies the three conditions; then, we clearly have SEven :: G.
Next, we show ( )Even = f−1G . Clearly (σ)
Even = σ for all σ :: G. It remains to establish
SEven = S for all S ⊆ PG satisfying the three conditions. Let S ⊆ PG be such a subset. It
is immediate that s ∈ SEven iff s ∈ S for any s ∈ P EvenG . If tm ∈ S
Even is of odd-length, then
t ∈ SEven and tm ∈ PG, and thus tm ∈ S as S satisfies the axiom Oinc. Conversely, if un ∈ SOdd,
then u ∈ SEven by the axiom Tree and un ∈ PG, whence un ∈ SEven, completing the proof.
In light of Lemma 4.2, we may identify skeletons on a game G with subsets of PG that satisfy
the axioms Tree, Edet and Oinc, or t-skeletons S that satisfy S ⊆ PG and Oinc:
Notation. Given sets S and T of sequences, Oinc(S, T )
df.
⇔ S ⊆ T ∧∀sm ∈ TOdd.s ∈ S ⇒ sm ∈ S.
Given a set U of j-sequences, a set MU and a relation ⊢U ⊆ ({⋆} ∪MU )×MU are defined by:
• MU
df.
= {s(i) | s ∈ U, i ∈ |s| };
• ⊢U
df.
= {(⋆, s(i)) | s ∈ U, i ∈ |s|,Js(i) = 0 } ∪ {(s(i), s(j)) | s ∈ U, i, j ∈ |s|,Js(j) = i }.
Definition 4.3 (T-skeletons). A tree (t-) skeleton is a set S of legal positions such that it
satisfies the axioms Tree and Edet (Lemma 4.2), and the pair (MS ,⊢S) is a well-founded arena.
A tree (t-) skeleton on a game G is a t-skeleton S, written S :: G, such that Oinc(S, PG).
Notation. Let us write TS(S) exactly when a set S of legal positions is a t-skeleton.
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The point of Definition 4.3 is that the concept of t-skeletons makes sense without underlying
games, while it is not the case for skeletons. Note that Lemma 4.2 has established the fact that
skeletons on a game G are in a one-to-one correspondence ( )G with t-skeletons on G.
Also, we may define constraints on t-skeletons without underlying games:
Definition 4.4 (Constraints on t-skeletons). A t-skeleton S is:
• Total if ∀sm ∈ SOdd. ∃smn ∈ S;
• Innocent if ∀smn ∈ SEven, s˜m˜ ∈ SOdd. ⌈sm⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜⌉ ⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ SEven. ⌈smn⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜n˜⌉;
• Well-bracketed if it contains only well-bracketed j-sequences;
• Noetherian if it does not contain a strictly increasing infinite sequence of P-views;
• Winning if it is total, innocent and noetherian.
On the other hand, similarly to identification and validity of skeletons, we need underlying
games for identification and validity of t-skeletons :
Definition 4.5 (Identification of t-skeletons on a fixed game). Let G be a game. A relation .G
on t-skeletons S, T :: G is defined by:
S .G T
df.
⇔ ∀smn ∈ SEven, tl ∈ TOdd. sm ≃G tl ⇒ ∃tlr ∈ T.smn ≃G tlr
and another ≃G, called the identification of t-skeletons, is the symmetric closure of .G, i.e.,
S ≃G T
df.
⇔ S .G T ∧ T .U S.
Definition 4.6 (Validity of t-skeletons on a fixed game). A t-skeleton S :: G is valid if S ≃G S.
Proposition 4.7 (Constraints on skeletons/t-skeletons). A skeleton σ :: G is valid (resp. total,
innocent, well-bracketed, noetherian) iff so is σ ⊆ PG.
Proof. Obvious.
For replacing skeletons with t-skeletons, it remains to define the corresponding constructions
on t-skeletons. For this point, let us introduce:
Definition 4.8 (Constructions on t-skeletons). Let S :: A ⊸ B, R :: C ⊸ D, T :: A ⊸ C,
U :: B⊸ C and V :: !A⊸ B be t-skeletons on games.
• The tensor (product) S ⊗R of S and R is defined by:
S ⊗R
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A⊗C⊸B⊗D) | s ↾ A,B ∈ S, s ↾ C,D ∈ R };
• The pairing 〈S, T 〉 of S and T is defined by:
〈S, T 〉
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(A⊸B&C) | (s ↾ A,B ∈ S ∧ s ↾ C = ǫ) ∨ (s ↾ A,C ∈ T ∧ s ↾ B = ǫ) };
• The composition S;U (also written U ◦ S) of S and U is defined by:
S;U
df.
= {s ↾ A,C | s ∈ S ‖ U }
where S ‖ U
df.
= {s ∈ J | s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ S, s ↾ B[1], C ∈ U, s ↾ B[0], B[1] ∈ prB } and
J
df.
= JMC(((A⊸B[0])⊸B[1])⊸C);
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• The promotion V † of V is defined by:
V †
df.
= {s ∈ LMC(!A⊸!B) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ V }.
We can now establish the desired commutativity:
Proposition 4.9 (Constructions on skeletons/t-skeletons). Given skeletons φ :: A ⊸ B, ψ ::
C ⊸ D, ϕ :: !A⊸ B and ϑ :: A⊸ C, we have the following equations between t-skeletons:
1. φ⊗ ψ = φ⊗ ψ :: A⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗D;
2. ϕ† = ϕ† :: !A⊸ !B;
3. 〈φ, ϑ〉 = 〈φ, ϑ〉 :: A⊸ B&C;
4. ϑ;ψ = ϑ;ψ :: A⊸ D.
Proof. Straightforward yet lengthy; see Appendix A.
Convention. By abuse of notation, we henceforth write cpA and der
(i)
A for the t-skeletons cpA and
der
(i)
A , and call them the copy-cat and the i
th dereliction on a given gameA, respectively. Also,
we henceforth employ small Greek letters σ, τ , φ, ψ, ϕ, etc. possibly with subscripts/superscripts
to represent t-skeletons. Given a t-skeleton σ and an odd-length element sm ∈ σOdd, we write
σ(sm) for the unique move n, if any, such that smn ∈ σ (n.b., σ(sm) ↑ if there is no such n).
At the end of the present section, let us show a technical lemma, which will be used later:
Lemma 4.10 (Validity lemma). If a t-skeleton σ :: G satisfies
∀smn, tlr ∈ σEven. sm ≃G tl ⇒ smn ≃G tlr
then there is a valid one ν :: G such that σ ⊆ ν.
Proof. We define a sequence (νi)i∈N of valid t-skeletons νi :: G such that ν0 ⊆ ν1 ⊆ ν2 ⊆ . . . and
∀i ∈ N. σi ⊆ νi ⊆
⋃2i+1
j=0 P
(j)
G , where σi
df.
= {s ∈ σ | |s| 6 2i+ 1 } and P
(j)
G
df.
= {s ∈ PG | |s| = j },
so that we may take ν
df.
=
⋃
i∈N νi. For the base case, let us just take ν0
df.
= ({ǫ})G = {ǫ} ∪ P
(1)
G .
For the inductive step, assume νi is given. For each tl ∈ νi ∩ P
(2i+1)
G such that
∃smn ∈ σi+1 ∩ P
(2i+2)
G . sm ≃G tl ∧ ∀tlr ∈ P
(2i+2)
G . smn ≃G tlr ⇒ tlr 6∈ σi+1
let us take any (not necessarily unique) tlr ∈ P
(2i+2)
G such that smn ≃G tlr, where such tlr must
exist by the axiom I3 on G, and define σtlri+1
df.
= σi+1 ∪ {tlr}. More generally, given S ⊆ P
(2i+2)
G
and tl ∈ νi ∩ P
(2i+1)
G such that
∃smn ∈ σSi+1 ∩ P
(2i+2)
G . sm ≃G tl ∧ ∀tlr ∈ P
(2i+2)
G . smn ≃G tlr ⇒ tlr 6∈ σ
S
i+1
where σSi+1
df.
= σi+1 ∪ S, let us take any tlr ∈ P
(2i+2)
G such that smn ≃G tlr, and define
σ
S∪{tlr}
i+1
df.
= σSi+1 ∪ {tlr}. By the axiom of choice, we may iterate this construction from S = ∅
until S becomes maximal, and then define νi+1
df.
= νi ∪ σSi+1 ∪ {sm ∈ P
(2i+3)
G | s ∈ σ
S
i+1 }. By
the induction hypothesis, νi+1 is a valid t-skeleton on G such that νi ⊆ νi+1 ⊆
⋃2(i+1)+1
j=0 P
(j)
G ,
which completes the proof.
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4.2 Games as Complete Pairs
Next, let us characterize each game as a pair of a set of t-skeletons with some constraint and an
identification of positions, called a complete pair. This observation leads us to a more general
notion of predicative (p-) games in the next section.
Then, what constraint should we impose? Well, for instance, the set of all t-skeletons on a
fixed game must be consistent in the sense that they share the same well-founded arena and
odd-length positions:
Definition 4.11 (Consistent sets of t-skeletons). A set S of t-skeletons is consistent if it is
non-empty and satisfies:
1. The pair (
⋃
σ∈SMσ,
⋃
σ∈S ⊢σ) is a well-founded arena;
2. ∀σ, τ ∈ S, sm ∈ (σ ∪ τ)Odd. s ∈ σ ∩ τ ⇒ sm ∈ σ ∩ τ .
Any t-skeletons σ and τ are consistent, written σ ≍ τ , if so is the set {σ, τ}.
Note that any singleton set of a t-skeleton is consistent, where the first axiom of Definition 4.11
is satisfied because the underlying structure (Mσ,⊢σ) of each t-skeleton σ forms a well-founded
arena (Definition 4.3).
Let us briefly pause here and note that positions of a given game G may be recovered from
the (consistent) set of all t-skeletons on G, for which we write ts(G), because PG =
⋃
ts(G) (see
the proof of Theorem 4.16). However, it is not the case for the identification ≃G of positions; for
instance, consider the game N ⇒ N : We have q.(q, 0) ≃N⇒N q.(q, 1), but q.(q, 0) 6≃φ q.(q, 1) for
each t-skeleton φ :: N ⇒ N . This point suggests that we should keep ≃G in addition to ts(G):
Definition 4.12 (Consistent pairs). A consistent pair is a pair (S,≃) of a consistent set S
of t-skeletons and an equivalence relation ≃ on the union
⋃
S that satisfies the axioms I1-3
(Definition 3.12).
Definition 4.13 (Union games). The union game on a consistent pair (S,≃) is the game⋃
(S,≃) defined by: ⋃
(S,≃)
df.
= (
⋃
S,≃).
The first axiom and non-emptiness of consistent sets is to ensure that the union game on any
consistent pair is a well-defined game, where note that weakening of the axiom E1 (Definition 3.2)
and embedding of labels into moves (Definition 3.1) are essential, and the second axiom is for
consistent behavior of Opponent on all t-skeletons in the consistent set so that each of the
t-skeletons satisfies the axiom Oinc (Lemma 4.2) w.r.t. the set of all positions of the union game.
Also, note that
⋃
(ts(G),≃G) = G for any game G, i.e., games can be faithfully embedded
into consistent pairs. However, the other direction is not possible because some t-skeletons on
the union game
⋃
(S,≃) on a given consistent pair (S,≃) may not exist in the consistent set
S. For example, consider a consistent set S = {σ, τ} of t-skeletons such that σ = Pref({ac, bc}),
τ = Pref({ad, bd}), where a, b, c and d are pairwise distinct moves such that λ(a) = λ(b) = OQ
and λ(c) = λ(d) = PA, equipped with the trivial identification (i.e., the equality) = on σ ∪ τ .
Observe then that the t-skeleton φ
df.
= Pref({ac, bd}) ::
⋃
(S,≃S) does not exist in S.
For this point, in view of Lemma 4.2, let us introduce:
Definition 4.14 (Complete sets). A consistent set S is complete if any subset A ⊆
⋃
S is an
element of S whenever it satisfies the axioms Tree, Edet and Oinc w.r.t.
⋃
S (Lemma 4.2).
Definition 4.15 (Complete pairs). A consistent pair (S,≃) is complete if so is the set S.
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Intuitively, completeness of a consistent set S means closure of S under ‘patchwork’ A ⊆
⋃
S
of t-skeletons. In the above example, the consistent pair ({σ, τ},=) is not complete; there are
total nine t-skeletons on the union game
⋃
({σ, τ},=), and so we need to add φ and the remaining
six into the set {σ, τ} in order to make the pair complete.
Now, we have arrived at the desired characterization:
Theorem 4.16 (Games as complete pairs). There is a one-to-one correspondence between games
and complete pairs:
1. Given a game G, the pair (ts(G),≃G) of the set ts(G)
df.
= {σ | σ :: G} and the identification
≃G of positions is complete, and G =
⋃
(ts(G),≃G);
2. Given a complete pair (S,≃), t-skeletons on the union game
⋃
(S,≃) are precisely elements
of the complete set S.
Proof. For the clause 1, let G be a game. The pair (ts(G),≃G) is clearly complete. For G =⋃
(ts(G),≃G), it suffices to show PG =
⋃
ts(G). The inclusion
⋃
ts(G) ⊆ PG is immediate. For
the other inclusion, let s ∈ PG; it suffices to show s ∈ σ for some t-skeleton σ :: G, but we may
simply take σ
df.
= (Pref({s})Even)G.
For the clause 2, let (S,≃) be a complete pair. To show ts(
⋃
(S,≃)) ⊆ S, let φ be a t-
skeleton on
⋃
(S,≃); we have to show φ ∈ S. For each i ∈ N, we define a subset S(φ, i) ⊆ S by
τ ∈ S(φ, i)
df.
⇔ {s ∈ τ | |s| 6 2i } = {t ∈ φ | |t| 6 2i } for all τ ∈ S. Then, it suffices to show
S(φ, i) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N. The base case (i = 0) is trivial since completeness of the pair (S,≃) in
particular implies S 6= ∅. Consider the inductive step, where we have to show S(φ, i+1) 6= ∅. We
may take an arbitrary τ ∈ S(φ, i) by the induction hypothesis. By φ ::
⋃
(S,≃), there is some
φsm ∈ S such that sm.φsm(sm) ≃ sm.φ(sm)11 for each sm ∈ φ such that |sm| = 2i+ 1. Thus,
A
df.
= τ ∪ {sm ∈ φ | |sm| = 2i+ 1 } ∪ {smn ∈ φ | |smn| = 2i+ 2 } ⊆
⋃
S, and it cleary satisfies
Tree, Edet and Oinc. Hence, by completeness of the pair (S,≃), we may conclude A ∈ S(σ, i+1),
whence S(σ, i + 1) 6= ∅. Finally, the opposite inclusion S ⊆ ts(
⋃
(S,≃)) clearly holds.
The point of Theorem 4.16 is that it enables us to reformulate games in terms of t-skeletons
(and identifications of positions) in contrast to the tradition of game semantics that skeletons
are defined in terms of underlying games.
Moreover, we may further refine Theorem 4.16 into the following corollary:
Definition 4.17 (Validly complete pairs). A consistent pair (S,≃) is validly complete if each
t-skeleton in the set S is valid (w.r.t. the union game
⋃
(S,≃)), and any subset A ⊆ S is in S if
it is valid (w.r.t.
⋃
(S,≃)) and satisfies the axioms Tree, Edet and Oinc (w.r.t. the union
⋃
S).
Corollary 4.18 (Games as validly complete pairs). There is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween games and validly complete pairs:
1. The pair (vts(G),≃G) of the set vts(G)
df.
= {σ :: G | σ is valid } and ≃G is validly complete
for any game G, and G =
⋃
(vts(G),≃G);
2. Given a validly complete pair (S,≃), valid t-skeletons on the union game
⋃
(S,≃) are
precisely elements of the set S.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.10 and the proof of Theorem 4.16.
11It is Kleene equality.
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Corollary 4.18 refines Theorem 4.16 by establishing that non-valid t-skeletons are actually
redundant for the characterization of games. However, in order to see clearly the relation between
the preset work and existing game semantics, where the latter usually does not discard non-valid
skeletons, we shall not exclude non-valid t-skeletons either, employing Theorem 4.16 as a main
result (rather than Corollary 4.18).
Theorem 4.16 (or Corollary 4.18) makes it evident why games cannot model sigma-types.
For example, consider, for each n ∈ N, the game ListN (n) of lists of natural numbers of length
n defined by ListN (0)
df.
= 1 and ListN (n+ 1)
df.
= ListN (n) ⊗ N , and moreover a consistent pair
({〈n, k1 ⊗ k2 · · · ⊗ kn〉 :: N&ListN (n) | n, k1, k2, . . . , kn ∈ N },=). It then seems that the union
game on the consistent pair captures type dependency of the sigma-type Σ(N, ListN); however,
there is a (valid) t-skeleton 〈n′, k1⊗k2 · · ·⊗kn〉 on the union game such that n 6= n′, i.e., it does not
keep the type dependency, and hence, the union game cannot interpret the intended sigma-type.
That is, in terms of Theorem 4.16, completeness of the set of all t-skeletons on the union game
prohibits it from capturing the sigma-type, where note that the t-skeleton 〈n′, k1 ⊗ k2 · · · ⊗ kn〉
may be obtained by the obvious ‘patchwork’ of t-skeletons on the union game.
Therefore, we have to relax completeness of the set of all t-skeletons on a game, generalizing
pairs of a game and the set of all t-skeletons on the game, in order to establish (generalized)
game semantics of sigma-types. Let us achieve this point simply by defining t-skeletons on the
union game
⋃
(S,≃) on a consistent pair (S,≃) to be elements of the consistent set S, rather
than elements of the complete set ts(
⋃
(S,≃)) of all t-skeletons on the union game.
In addition to discarding completeness, however, we also have to restrict Opponent’s behavior
for the problem of sigma-types explained in the beginning of Section 4. That is, given that the
pairing 〈a, b〉 of strategies a : A and b : B(a) is employed by Player, we have to prohibit Opponent
from selecting a fibre game B(a′) such that a 6= a′. To accomplish this point, Player must be
able to specify and fix a fibre game B(a) before a subsequent development of a game, leading to:
Definition 4.19 (Sum games). The sum game
∑
(S,≃) on a pair (S,≃) of a non-empty set S
of t-skeletons such that the pair (
⋃
σ∈S Mσ,
⋃
σ∈S ⊢σ) is a well-founded arena and an equivalence
relation ≃ on the union
⋃
S that satisfies the axioms I1-3 (Definition 3.12) is defined by:
• P∑(S,≃)
df.
= Pref({qOQS σ
PA
s | σ ∈ S, s ∈ σ }), where qS is any element such that q
OQ
S 6∈MS ,
qOQS justifies σ
PA in qOQS σ
PA
s, and we often abbreviate qOQS and σ
PA as qS and σ, respectively;
• ≃∑(S,≃)
df.
= {(ǫ, ǫ), (qS , qS)} ∪ {(qSσs, qSτt) ∈ P∑(S,≃) × P
∑
(S,≃) | σ ≍ τ, s ≃ t }.
Remark. Union games and sum games are only auxiliary concepts, both of which are mainly to
motivate p-games introduced in the next section.
Clearly, the sum game
∑
(S,≃) on an arbitrary such pair (S,≃) is a well-defined game. A
position qSσs of
∑
(S,≃) is a position s of the union game
⋃
(S,≃) prefixed with moves qSσ,
where σ is any (not necessarily unique) σ ∈ S such that s ∈ σ (n.b., such σ must exist as shown in
the proof of Theorem 4.16). That is, the difference between
∑
(S,≃) and
⋃
(S,≃) is whether to
specify such σ ∈ S, where we also define t-skeletons on
∑
(S,≃) to be elements of the set S, and
positions of the sum game played by each σ ∈ S to be elements of the set Pref({qSσs | s ∈ σ }).
Hence, in a sum game
∑
(S,≃), Player has to determine a t-skeleton σ ∈ S before a subse-
quent development s ∈ σ of a position qSσs, fixing simultaneously the underlying game of the
t-skeleton σ, which of course does not matter if the set S is consistent; however, it does as soon as
we drop the second axiom of consistency (Definition 4.11). Importantly, we may drop the second
axiom for the sum game
∑
(S,≃) without any problem; in contrast, we cannot drop the axiom
for the union game
⋃
(S,≃) since otherwise possible plays by each t-skeleton σ ∈ S may not be
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preserved (which is why we have introduced sum games in the first place). As an astute reader
may have already recognized, by dropping the second axiom on consistent sets and replacing each
union game
⋃
(S,≃) with the sum game
∑
(S,≃), we may solve the problem in game semantics
of sigma-types sketched above: The required game Σ(A,B) is the sum game on the pair of the
set S of all pairings 〈σ, τ〉 of σ :: A and τ :: B(Sat(σ)), and the corresponding restriction of
≃A&
⋃
x:AB(x)
, where each of the second moves 〈σ, τ〉 of positions ‘declares’ a t-skeleton 〈σ, τ〉 to
employ and also fixes the underlying game of the subsequent play. It is the central idea of the
present work and leads us to p-games in the next section; roughly, a p-game is a sum game that
satisfies some additional axioms.
4.3 Predicative Games and Strategies
We are now ready to introduce the central concept of the present work:
Definition 4.20 (P-games). A predicative (p-) game refers to a pair G = (T S(G),≃G) of
a non-empty set T S(G) of t-skeletons, called tree (t-) skeletons on G, and an equivalence
relation ≃G on the set PG
df.
=
⋃
T S(G) of all actual positions of G such that:
1. (Directed completeness) The set VT S(G)
df.
= {σ ∈ T S(G) | σ .G σ } of all valid12
t-skeletons on G is directed complete:
∀S ⊆ VT S(G).Dtd(S)⇒
⋃
S ∈ VT S(G)
where a preorder .G on t-skeletons σ, σ˜ ⊆ PG is given by:
σ .G σ˜
df.
⇔ σ ≍ σ˜ ∧ ∀smn ∈ σEven, s˜m˜ ∈ σ˜Odd.sm ≃G s˜m˜⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ˜. smn ≃G s˜m˜n˜
and Dtd(S) means that the set S is directed (i.e., ∀σ, σ˜ ∈ S. ∃τ ∈ S. σ 6G τ ∧ σ˜ 6G τ)
w.r.t. a partial order 6G on t-skeletons σ, σ˜ ⊆ PG given by:
σ 6G σ˜
df.
⇔ σ ≍ σ˜ ∧ σ ⊆ σ˜;
2. (Downward completeness) The set VT S(G) is downward complete w.r.t. .G:
∀σ ⊆ PG, σ˜ ∈ VT S(G).TS(σ) ∧ σ .G σ ∧ σ .G σ˜ ⇒ σ ∈ VT S(G);
3. (Local identification) The equivalence relation ≃G satisfies the axioms I1-3 (Defini-
tion 3.12) and (LI) Oinc(σ,
⋃
S) ⇔ Oinc(SatG(σ),
⋃
S) for any element σ ∈ VT S(G) and
maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G), where:
SatG(σ)
df.
= {s ∈ PG | ∃t ∈ σ. s ≃G t }
which is called the saturation of σ (w.r.t. G) and often abbreviated as Sat(σ).
The equivalence relation ≃G is called the identification of actual positions of G. A
(valid) position of G is any prefix of a j-sequence qGσs, where qG is any element that justifies
σ in qGσs, and the prefix qGσ is called the initial protocol of qGσs, such that σ ∈ T S(G) and
s ∈ σ. A play of G is a countable sequence (ǫ, qG, qGσ, qGσm1, qGσm1m2, . . . ) of positions of
G, where the sequence (ǫ,m1,m1m2, . . . ) of actual positions is called an actual play of G.
12See Definition 4.29 as well, where the two definitions coincide.
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Notation. We write σ :: G for σ ∈ T S(G), and MG for the set of all moves of a p-game G,
which is defined by MG
df.
= {s(i) | s ∈ PG, i ∈ |s| }. If the identification ≃G of actual positions is
the equality on j-sequences (Definition 3.9), then we often write =G or = for it.
Remark. P-games G are essentially a particular kind of games (except that the underlying arena
of a p-game is not necessarily well-founded) for we may assign labels OQ and PA to elements qG
and σ of initial protocols qGσ, respectively (n.b., see the following paragraph on why we do not
assign the labels to the elements of initial protocols). The point is, however, that a pair of a
game and the set of all skeletons on the game in conventional game semantics is generalized into
a pair of a p-game and the set of all t-skeletons on the p-game; see Theorem 4.61.
Conceptually, a play of a p-game G proceeds as follows. At the beginning, Judge of G asks
Player a question qG ‘What is your t-skeleton?’, and then Player answers it by some σ :: G,
which is kept secret from Opponent; then, an actual play between Opponent and Player follows,
in which Player is forced to play by the ‘declared’ σ. That is, after an initial protocol qGσ, given
an even-length position qGσs of G, Opponent may perform only an O-move m such that sm ∈ σ
if any, and then Player must perform the unique P-move n such that smn ∈ σ if any, and none
otherwise, and so on, resulting in a play (ǫ, qG, qGσ, . . . , qGσs, qGσsm, qGσsmn, . . . ) of G.
Importantly, σ :: G may range over t-skeletons on different games in the conventional sense
(Definition 4.3) because the set T S(G) is not necessarily consistent, and so Player may choose
an underlying game when she selects one σ :: G. In this sense, G is a family of games, where each
component game contained in G corresponds to a maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G), i.e.,
the component game is the union game
⋃
(S,≃G ∩ (
⋃
S ×
⋃
S)) (n.b., the union game satisfies
the axiom I3 thanks to the downward completeness axiom and the axiom LI on G).
Remark. Given a p-game G and a t-skeleton σ :: G, a maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G)
such that Oinc(σ,
⋃
S) holds, i.e., S corresponds to an underlying game of σ, may not be unique;
the non-uniqueness appears natural for it should be possible that a t-skeleton has more than one
underlying game contained in a p-game, e.g., the t-skeleton  = Pref({q}) on the p-game
∫
ListN
(Example 5.2 and Definition 5.3). For now, as a simpler example, take the p-game G given by:
G
df.
= ({{ǫ},,Pref({qa}),Pref({qaq˜}),Pref({qaq′})},=)
where moves are pairwise distinct, q, q˜ and q′ are initial, a is non-initial, and λ(q) = λ(q˜) =
λ(q′) = OQ, and λ(a) = PA. If we take  :: G, then both {,Pref({qa}),Pref({qaq˜})} and
{,Pref({qa}),Pref({qaq′})} are maximal consistent subsets of T S(G) w.r.t. which  satisfies
the axiom Oinc. Nevertheless, it is not a problem because possible plays by  do not vary over
the underlying games corresponding to these subsets of T S(G).
Let us remark that the new axiom LI (together with the downward completeness axiom)
restricts the identification ≃G of actual positions of a p-game G to actual positions of the same
component game contained in G, which makes sense because it is unnatural to identify actual
positions from different games. Also, the axiom is technically quite convenient for generalizing
strategies (Definition 4.30) and essential for the third clause of Lemma 4.34.
On the other hand, completeness of (the characterization of) games (given by Theorem 4.16)
is relaxed into directed and downward completeness of p-games, which enables p-games to give
semantics of MLTT; see Example 4.24 for an illustration. Let us note that the directed and the
downward completeness axioms on p-games are motivated by domain theory [GHK+03, AJ94b]
and category theory [ML13]; concretely, Corollaries 4.60 and 4.62 hold thanks to these axioms. In
addition, the downward completeness axiom plays a fundamental role in the proof of Lemma 4.48.
Finally, note that we do not require that the underlying arena of each p-game is well-founded
because the underlying arena of every t-skeleton is well-founded, and it suffices for Lemma 4.54.
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Remark. One may wonder if it would be more appropriate to impose, instead of directed or
downward completeness, that, given a p-game G and a maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G),
the pair (S,≃G ∩ (
⋃
S ×
⋃
S)) is complete because such a pair corresponds to a game contained
in G. This local completeness axiom is, however, too strong: It is not preserved under sigma Σ
(Section 5.3); also, if we adopted local completeness, then Corollary 4.60 would not hold either.
Similarly, we cannot replace directed completeness with upward completeness, which is the
obvious opposite of downward completeness, for Corollary 4.60 would not hold if we did so.
Example 4.21. As a non-example, consider a pair H = (T S(H),≃H) such that:
• T S(H)
df.
= {{ǫ},,Pref({qa}),Pref({qaq˜}),Pref({qaq′})}, where moves are pairwise dis-
tinct, q, q˜ and q′ are initial, a is non-initial, and λ(q) = λ(q˜) = λ(q′) = OQ, and λ(a) = PA;
• ≃H is the reflexive, symmetric, transitive closure of the relation {(qaq˜, qaq′)}.
Observe then that the pair H is not a p-game because it does not satisfy the axiom LI (though
it is directed and downward complete): If we take S
df.
= {,Pref({qa}),Pref({qaq˜})}, then
Oinc(Pref({qaq˜}),
⋃
S) holds, but Oinc(Sat(Pref({qaq˜})),
⋃
S) does not.
Definition 4.22 (Games as p-games). The predicative (p-) game over a game A is the
p-game P (A) defined by T S(P (A))
df.
= ts(A) = {σ | σ :: A } and ≃P (A)
df.
= ≃A.
Example 4.23. A maximal position of the p-game P (N), which corresponds to the natural
number game N in Example 3.16, is of the form qP (N).n.q.n. Henceforth, we usually abbreviate
P (N) as N . Also, recall the unit game 1 in Example 3.15, the empty game 0 and the boolean
game 2 in Example 3.16. Again, abusing notation, we write 1, 0 and 2 for the corresponding p-
games P (1), P (0) and P (2), respectively. We also write ∗, , tt and ff for the obvious t-skeletons
∗ :: 1,  :: 0 and tt ,ff :: 2, respectively. Let us call the p-games N , 1, 0 and 2, respectively, the
natural number p-game, the unit p-game, the empty p-game and the boolean p-game.
Some maximal positions of these p-games may be depicted as in the following diagrams:
N 1 0 2 2
qN q1 q0 q2 q2
n ∗  tt ff
q q q q
n tt ff
Example 4.24. To illustrate the point of the generalization of games into p-games, consider the
p-game Σ(N, ListN ), which is to interpret the sigma-type Σ(N, ListN), given by:
T S(Σ(N, ListN ))
df.
= {〈n, κ1 ⊗ κ2 · · · ⊗ κn〉 | n ∈ N, ∀i ∈ n. κi :: N }
∪ {〈, κ〉 | ∃n ∈ N. κ :: ListN (n) }
≃Σ(N,ListN )
df.
= =Σ(N,ListN )
where we assign the ‘tag’ ( )[i] to κi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n for the disjoint union on the tensor
κ1 ⊗ κ2 · · · ⊗ κn. It does capture type dependency of ListN (n) on n : N , solving the problem of
games explained previously. Note in particular that the p-game Σ(N, ListN ) is not complete and
not even consistent, i.e., sigma-types cannot be interpreted by games; however, it is directed and
downward complete (which we prove in Section 5.3). We may see, through this example, how it
works to relax completeness of games into directed and downward completeness of p-games in
order to capture the type dependency.
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Next, we adapt the subgame relation P to p-games. In view of Theorem 4.16, the subgame
relation P on games (Definition 3.17) and the subset relation ⊆ on sets of t-skeletons are logically
equivalent. Hence, it is natural to define:
Definition 4.25 (P-subgames). A predicative (p-) subgame of a p-game G is a p-game H
such that T S(H) ⊆ T S(G) and ≃H = ≃G ∩ (PH × PH).
Notation. We write H P G to mean that H is a p-subgame of a p-game G.
Example 4.26. Similarly to games (Definition 3.14), the unit p-game 1 is the least p-game w.r.t.
P (n.b., each p-game G satisfies T S(G) 6= ∅). The subgame relation P on games (Definition 3.17)
is certainly generalized into p-games: A P B ⇔ P (A) P P (B) for any games A and B.
Example 4.27. Let us illustrate the point that some families of games cannot be faithfully
embedded into p-games. For each n ∈ N, let N(n) be the p-subgame of N such that T S(N(n))
df.
=
{}∪{Pref({qi}) | i ∈ {0}∪n− 1}. Let us then form a p-game G by T S(G)
df.
=
⋃
n∈N T S(N(n))
and ≃G
df.
= =G. Note, however, that the p-subgames N(n) disappear in G, i.e., they do not
correspond to maximal consistent subsets of T S(G); in fact, G = N . However, this point does
not matter for the present work since the ‘declaration’ of any N(n) in addition to that of σ :: N
such that σ :: N(n) does not change at all possible plays by σ.
Next, let us generalize identification of t-skeletons on a fixed game (Definition 4.5) along with
the generalization of games into p-games:
Definition 4.28 (Identification of t-skeletons on a fixed p-game). The relation ≃G on T S(G),
called the identification of t-skeletons σ, σ˜ :: G on a p-game G, is defined by:
σ ≃G σ˜
df.
⇔ σ .G σ˜ ∧ σ˜ .G σ
i.e., ≃G is the symmetric closure of the preorder .G given in Definition 4.20.
That is, in comparison with Definition 4.5, for each p-game G Definition 4.28 additionally
requires consistency of σ, σ˜ :: G for the relation σ ≃G σ˜. As in the case of skeletons on a game,
it is easy to show that ≃G on t-skeletons on G is a PER.
Again, we shall be particularly interested in valid t-skeletons on a given p-game:
Definition 4.29 (Validity of t-skeletons on a fixed p-game). Given a p-game G, a t-skeleton
σ :: G is valid if σ ≃G σ.
Clearly, validity of t-skeletons on a p-game generalizes, along with the generalization of games
into p-games, validity of t-skeletons on a game (Definition 4.6), i.e., they coincide for complete p-
games. Note that the subset VT S(G) ⊆ T S(G) (Definition 4.20) is the set of all valid t-skeletons
on G in the sense of Definition 4.29 as well, and hence, no ambiguity arises.
Now, recall that skeletons on a game G are to be identified up to ≃G, and therefore, they are
not appropriate as morphisms in the category of games, which leads to the notion of strategies
(Section 3.2). For the same reason, let us introduce:
Definition 4.30 (P-strategies). A predicative (p-) strategy on a p-gameG is a subset g ⊆ PG,
written g : G, such that gEven satisfies the axiom ST2 (Definition 3.47), and g satisfies the axioms
Tree (Lemma 4.2), ST3 (Definition 3.47) and (PST) Oinc(g,
⋃
S) ∧ σ ∝ g for some maximal
consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G) and t-skeleton σ :: G, where:
σ ∝ g
df.
⇔ Oinc(σ, g) ∧ ∀smn ∈ g. s ∈ σ ⇒ ∃smn′ ∈ σ. smn ≃G smn
′
and such σ is said to implement (or realize) g.
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Just like strategies satisfy the axioms ST1-3 (Definition 3.47), p-strategies satisfy the axioms
Tree and ST2-3 except that the latter has to deal with odd-length positions. Clearly, p-strategies
on a complete p-game are essentially strategies on the corresponding game (by the translation
given in Definition 4.37); in this sense, p-strategies generalize strategies.
By the new axiom PST on p-strategies, every p-strategy g on a p-game G can be seen as a
strategy on a game contained in G that corresponds to a maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G)
that satisfies Oinc(g,
⋃
S) (n.b., as in the case of t-skeletons on a p-game, such S may not be
unique, but it is not a problem), for which g contains odd-length positions in contrast with
strategies. In addition, the axiom also requires g to be implemented by some t-skeleton on G
since otherwise p-strategies cannot reflect the generalization of games into p-games (that is, G
may be incomplete).13 In fact, without the axiom, e.g., in Example 4.24, there would be a
p-strategy on Σ(N, ListN ) that does not respect the type dependency by containing mutually
inconsistent t-skeletons (i.e., having no maximal consistent set of t-skeletons that accommodates
the p-strategy) or being unimplementable by any t-skeleton on Σ(N, ListN ), which is clearly
undesirable. Finally, let us note that the axiom LI on p-games (Definition 4.20) prohibits the
axioms ST3 and PST on p-strategies from contradicting each other.
Now, let us define consistency of p-strategies, which can be just like that of t-skeletons
(Definition 4.11). Nevertheless, since there is always an underlying p-game for each p-strategy
by the definition, let us employ the following equivalent alternative:
Definition 4.31 (Consistency of p-strategies). A set P of p-strategies on a p-game G is con-
sistent if there is a maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G) such that ∀g ∈ P .Oinc(g,
⋃
S). Two
p-strategies g, g˜ : G are consistent, written g ≍G g˜, if so is the set {g, g˜}.
Intuitively, consistent p-strategies play on the same component game contained in a p-game.
An evidence for correctness of Definition 4.30 is offered by the following three lemmata, which
precisely generalize Lemmata 3.49, 3.50 and 3.52, respectively:
Lemma 4.32 (First t-skeleton/p-strategy lemma). If g : G is a p-strategy, then there is a valid
t-skeleton σ :: G such that σ ∝ g.
Proof. By the definition, there is a t-skeleton σ :: G such that σ ∝ g. To show validity of
σ, assume smn ∈ σEven, s˜m˜ ∈ σOdd and sm ≃G s˜m˜. By the axiom I3 on G, there is some
s˜m˜n′ ∈ PG such that smn ≃G s˜m˜n′, whence s˜m˜n′ ∈ g by the axiom ST3 on g. Then, by σ ∝ g,
there is some s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ such that s˜m˜n′ ≃G s˜m˜n˜, whence smn ≃G s˜m˜n′ ≃G s˜m˜n˜.
Lemma 4.33 (Second t-skeleton/p-strategy lemma). If σ :: G is a t-skeleton on a p-game G,
and g : G is a p-strategy such that σ ∝ g, then:
∀smn ∈ gEven, s˜m˜ ∈ σOdd. sm ≃G s˜m˜⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ. smn ≃G s˜m˜n˜.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.50.
Lemma 4.34 (Third t-skeleton/p-strategy lemma). Let G be a p-game.
1. If σ :: G is valid, then Sat(σ) : G and σ ∝ Sat(σ);
2. If σ :: G and g : G, then Sat(σ) = g ⇔ σ ∝ g;
3. If σ, σ˜ :: G are valid, then σ .G σ˜ ⇔ Sat(σ) ≍G Sat(σ˜) ∧ Sat(σ) ⊆ Sat(σ˜);
13As we shall see in Section 4.5, this point corresponds in realizability models [Str08] to the requirement that
each morphism must be realized.
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4. If σ, σ˜ :: G, g : G and σ ∝ g, then σ˜ ∝ g ⇔ σ ≃G σ˜;
5. If g : G, then g =
⋃
{σ :: G | σ ∝ g };
6. If σ :: G, g : G and σ ∝ g, then g =
⋃
{σ˜ :: G | σ ≃G σ˜ }.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.52, where the downward completeness axiom and the
axiom LI on p-games as well as the axiom PST on p-strategies play essential roles.
Next, in light of Corollary 3.68, let us define:
Definition 4.35 (Partial order between p-strategies). Given a p-game G, a partial order 6G on
p-strategies g, g˜ : G is defined by:
g 6G g˜
df.
⇔ g ≍G g˜ ∧ g ⊆ g˜.
By the third clause of Lemma 4.34, we have g 6G g˜ ⇔ σ .G σ˜ for any p-game G, t-
skeletons σ, σ˜ :: G and p-strategies g, g˜ : G such that σ ∝ g and σ˜ ∝ g˜. Then, by directed
and downward completeness of G, the poset PG(G) = (PG(G),6G) on the set PG(G) of all
p-strategies on G gives rise to an algebraic CPO just like the poset of games and strategies
does (Corollary 3.68), and p-strategies on a linear implication between p-games (Definition 4.50)
can be seen as continuous functions [GHK+03, AJ94b]. Furthermore, the poset LPG(G) (resp.
WPG(G)) of all winning (resp. well-bracketed, winning) p-strategies on G induces the same
domain-theoretic structure; see Corollary 4.62.
At the end of the present section, let us define the following constraints on p-strategies:
Definition 4.36 (Constraints on p-strategies). A p-strategy g : G is:
• Total if ∀sm ∈ gOdd. ∃smn ∈ g;
• Innocent if g =
⋃
{σ :: G | σ ∝ g, σ is innocent };
• Well-bracketed if it contains only well-bracketed j-sequences;
• Noetherian if it does not contain a strictly increasing infinite sequence of P-views;
• Winning if it is total, innocent and noetherian.
They properly generalize constraints on strategies in the sense of Proposition 4.38:
Definition 4.37 (Strategies as p-strategies). The predicative (p-) strategy over a strategy
a : A is the p-strategy P (a) : P (A) defined by:
P (a)
df.
= a ∪ {sm ∈ POddA | s ∈ a }.
Proposition 4.38 (Constraints on strategies/p-strategies). Let a : A be a strategy. Then, a is
total (resp. innocent, well-bracketed, noetherian) iff so is P (a).
Proof. Immediate.
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4.4 Cartesian Closed Categories of Predicative Games and Strategies
Let us proceed to generalize constructions on games in Section 3.1.3 for p-games, based on which
we shall define the CCC PG of p-games and p-strategies, the lluf subCCC LPG of PG whose
p-strategies are all winning, and the lluf subCCC WPG of LPG whose winning p-strategies are
all well-bracketed. These CCCs are categorically complete (i.e., with all limits), while none of
the CCCs G, LG andWG is complete. We shall then prove that inclusions G →֒ PG, LG →֒ LPG
and WG →֒ WPG have respective left adjoints, where the functors are all cartesian closed.
Let us begin with defining constructions on p-games, which generalize those on games. Note
that we first need the corresponding constructions on t-skeletons because p-games are defined in
terms of t-skeletons (and identifications of positions).
The case of product & is just straightforward because we already have the corresponding
construction on t-skeletons:
Definition 4.39 (Product of p-games). The product of p-games A and B is the p-game A&B
given by T S(A&B)
df.
= {〈σ, τ〉 | σ :: A, τ :: B } and s ≃A&B t
df.
⇔ s ↾ A ≃A t ↾ A∧s ↾ B ≃B t ↾ B,
where u ↾ A (resp. u ↾ B) is the j-subsequence of a position u ∈ PA&B that consists of moves of
A (resp. B).
Lemma 4.40 (Well-defined product on p-games). P-games are closed under product &, and we
have P (A&B) = P (A)&P (B) for any games A and B.
Proof. Straightforward and left to the reader.
Note that commutativity of the operations P and & in the lemma means that the product
& on p-games properly generalizes that on games. In the following, let us skip mentioning this
point for the remaining constructions on p-games.
Next, the case of tensor ⊗ is slightly trickier: If we define the tensor A ⊗ B of p-games A
and B by T S(A ⊗ B)
df.
= {σ ⊗ τ | σ :: A, τ :: B }, then, e.g., the tensor 2[0] ⊗ N[1] cannot have
the t-skeleton Pref({q[0]tt [0]q[1]0[1], q[1]1[1]q[0]ff [0]}), where for clarity we employ the ‘tags’ ( )[i]
(i = 0, 1) for the disjoint union, and hence, it does not properly generalize tensor ⊗ on games.
To overcome this problem, let us introduce:
Definition 4.41 (Closure operator). The closure clsr(C) of a consistent set C of t-skeletons
is defined by:
clsr(C)
df.
= {σ ⊆
⋃
C | σ is a t-skeleton that satisfies Oinc w.r.t.
⋃
C }
and generalized for any non-empty set S of t-skeletons by:
clsr(S)
df.
=
⋃
{clsr(C) | C is a maximal consistent subset of S }.
Given a consistent (resp. non-empty) set S of t-skeletons and an equivalence relation ≃ on
the union
⋃
S that satisfies the axioms I1-3 (Definition 3.12), the pair (clsr (S),≃) is clearly
complete (resp. locally complete, and hence, directed and downward complete).
We are now ready to define tensor ⊗ on p-games:
Definition 4.42 (Tensor of p-games). The tensor (product) of p-games A and B is the p-game
A ⊗ B given by T S(A ⊗ B)
df.
= clsr({σ ⊗ τ | σ :: A, τ :: B }) and s ≃A⊗B t
df.
⇔ s ↾ A ≃A t ↾
A ∧ s ↾ B ≃B t ↾ B ∧ att
∗
A⊗B(s) = att
∗
A⊗B(t), where u ↾ A (resp. u ↾ B) is the j-subsequence of
a position u ∈ PA⊗B that consists of moves of A (resp. B), and attA⊗B :MA⊗B → {0, 1} maps
a ∈MA 7→ 0, b ∈MB 7→ 1.
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Lemma 4.43 (Well-defined tensor on p-games). P-games are closed under tensor ⊗, and we
have P (A⊗B) = P (A)⊗ P (B) for any games A and B.
Proof. The equation P (A⊗B) = P (A)⊗P (B) holds by the closure operator clsr for T S(A⊗B);
the other points are easy to check and left to the reader.
Let us proceed to generalize exponential ! on games for p-games, for which there is an obstacle
to overcome: A t-skeleton on the exponential !A of a game A may not be obtained from the
promotion of a t-skeleton on A (plus the closure operator) unlike tensor ⊗. However, it is not a
difficult problem; it suffices to introduce:
Definition 4.44 (C-tensor). Given a countable family σ = (σi)i∈N of t-skeletons σi on a p-game
A, the countable (c-) tensor ⊗σ (also written ⊗i∈Nσi) of σ is the t-skeleton defined by:
⊗σ
df.
= {s ∈ LArn(⊗σ) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ σi }
where the arena Arn(⊗σ) = (M⊗σ,⊢⊗σ) of ⊗σ is given by:
• M⊗σ
df.
= {(a, i)xy | i ∈ N, axy ∈Mσi};
• ⊢⊗σ
df.
= {(⋆, (a, i)) | i ∈ N, ⋆ ⊢σi a } ∪ {((a, i), (a˜, i)) | i ∈ N, a ⊢σi a˜ }.
Definition 4.45 (Exponential of p-games). The exponential of a p-game A is the p-game !A
defined by T S(!A)
df.
= clsr({⊗σ | σ = (σi)i∈N, ∀i ∈ N.σi :: A}) and s ≃!A t
df.
⇔ ∃f ∈ P (N).π∗2(s) =
(f ◦ π2)∗(t) ∧ ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ f(i) ≃A t ↾ i, where u ↾ i for each i ∈ N is the j-subsequence of a
position u ∈ P!A that consists of moves of the form (a, i) such that a ∈MA yet changed into a.
Lemma 4.46 (Well-defined exponential on p-games). P-games are closed under exponential !,
and we have P (!A) = !P (A) for any game A.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.43.
Now, let us consider the most involved construction on p-games, namely, linear implication
⊸. First, since we do not have the corresponding construction on t-skeletons, let us introduce:
Notation. We write σ :: Vld(G) iff σ is a valid t-skeleton on a (p-) game G.
Definition 4.47 (UoPLIs). A union of pointwise linear implication (UoPLI) between
p-games A and B is the union φ =
⋃
φp of sets φpσ such that:⋃
φp
df.
=
⋃
σ::Vld(A)
φpσ
where φp = (φpσ)σ::Vld(A) is a family of valid t-skeletons φ
p
σ, and each φ
p
σ is called the pointwise
linear implication (PLI) of φ at σ,14 that satisfies:
1. ∀σ :: Vld(A). ∃τ :: Vld(B). φpσ :: Vld((σ,≃A ∩ (σ × σ))⊸ (τ,≃B ∩ (τ × τ)));
2. ∀σ, σ˜ :: Vld(A), smn ∈ (φpσ)
Even, smn˜ ∈ (φpσ˜)
Even. smn = smn˜;15
3. ∀σ, σ˜ :: Vld(A), sm ∈ (φpσ ∪ φ
p
σ˜)
Odd. s ∈ φpσ ∩ φ
p
σ˜ ∧m ∈MB ⇒ sm ∈ φ
p
σ ∩ φ
p
σ˜
14We shall show shortly that PLIs of a given UoPLI are unique; see Corollary 4.49.
15Another axiom ∀σ, σ˜ :: Vld(A), smn ∈ (φpσ ∪ φ
p
σ˜
)Even. sm ∈ φpσ ∩ φ
p
σ˜
⇒ smn ∈ φpσ ∩ φ
p
σ˜
suffices for the present
work except Theorem 4.61; see the proof of the theorem.
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where s ↾ A is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A. Given another p-game C and
a UoPLI ψ between B and C, the composition of UoPLIs φ and ψ is the UoPLI ψ ◦ φ (also
written φ;ψ) defined by:
ψ ◦ φ
df.
=
⋃
σ::Vld(A)
ψp
φ
p
σ↾B
◦ φpσ
or equivalently by (ψ ◦ φ)p
df.
= (ψp
φ
p
σ↾B
◦ φpσ)σ::Vld(A), where φ
p
σ ↾ B
df.
= {s ↾ B | s ∈ φpσ } = φ
p
σ ◦ σ,
and s ↾ B is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of B.
Notation. The set of all UoPLIs between A and B is written LI(A,B).
Remark. A family φp of PLIs is not part of the structure of a given UoPLI φ though existence
of such a family is required (since otherwise UoPLIs would not be just a particular kind of
t-skeletons; see Lemma 4.48 and Corollary 4.49).
UoPLIs φ between p-games A and B are to serve as t-skeletons on the linear implication
A ⊸ B between A and B (Definition 4.50). Note that σ for each PLI φpσ ranges over all valid
t-skeletons on A in order for A⊸ B to be downward complete (see the proof of Lemma 4.51),
which nevertheless does not restrict at all Opponent’s play on the domain A because for any
s ∈ PA there is some σ :: Vld(A) such that s ∈ σ by Lemma 4.10. Also, the restriction of
τ :: B to valid ones on the codomain of each PLI is for composition of UoPLIs to be well-defined
(see again the proof of Lemma 4.51), which again does not restrict at all Player’s play on the
codomain B. Let us also point out that although each PLI must be valid, it does not restrict
the concept of UoPLIs in the sense that there can be non-valid UoPLIs; see Example 4.52.
One may wonder if it is simpler to define, instead, a UoPLI between A and B to be a t-skeleton
φ such that for any σ :: Vld(A) there is some τ :: Vld(B) such that φpσ
df.
= {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ } is a
valid t-skeleton on the linear implication (σ,≃A ∩ (σ× σ))⊸ (τ,≃B ∩ (τ × τ)) between games.
However, the operation s ↾ A for each s ∈ φ does not make sense for a priori there is no known
arena underlying φ; it is why UoPLIs are defined in terms of PLIs in Definition 4.47, where the
first axiom specifies the underlying arena of each PLI in terms of component valid t-skeletons.
Nevertheless, as the following lemma shows, UoPLIs are just a particular kind of t-skeletons
(by the second axiom), where PLIs may be recovered uniquely from UoPLIs (by the third axiom),
and composition of UoPLIs coincides exactly with that of t-skeletons (Definition 4.8):
Lemma 4.48 (Well-defined UoPLIs). Let A, B and C be p-games. Any UoPLI φ ∈ LI(A,B)
is a t-skeleton such that φpσ = {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ } for each σ :: Vld(A). If φ ∈ LI(A,B) and
ψ ∈ LI(B,C), then ψ◦φ ∈ LI(A,C), and the operation coincides with composition of t-skeletons
(given in Definition 4.8).
Proof. By the first and the second axioms on UoPLIs, it follows that UoPLs are well-defined
t-skeletons, where embedding of labels into moves (Definition 3.1) and weakening of the axiom
E1 (Definition 3.2) are essential (just as in the case of union games; see Definition 4.13).
Now, fix an arbitrary σ :: Vld(A); let us show φpσ = {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ }. The inclusion
φpσ ⊆ {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ } is obvious by the first axiom. To show the other inclusion, take an
arbitrary s ∈ φ such that s ↾ A ∈ σ. In the following, we show s ∈ φpσ by induction on |s|. The
base case is trivial. If s = tm with Even(t), then t ∈ φpσ by the induction hypothesis. Note that
tm ∈ φpσ˜ for some σ˜ :: Vld(A). Hence, if m ∈MA, then s ∈ φ
p
σ by s ↾ A ∈ σ and the first axiom;
if m ∈ MB, then we may conclude from t ∈ φpσ and tm ∈ φ
p
σ˜ that s = tm ∈ φ
p
σ by the third
axiom. If s = tmn with Even(t), then tm ∈ φpσ by the induction hypothesis. Note that tmn ∈ φ
p
σ˜
for some σ˜ :: Vld(A). Hence, by the second axiom, we may conclude from tm ∈ φpσ ∩ φ
p
σ˜ and
tmn ∈ φpσ ∪ φ
p
σ˜ that s = tmn ∈ φ
p
σ ∩ φ
p
σ˜ ⊆ φ
p
σ.
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Next, to show φ ∈ LI(A,B) ∧ ψ ∈ LI(B,C)⇒ ψ ◦ φ ∈ LI(A,C), assume φ ∈ LI(A,B) and
ψ ∈ LI(B,C). Since φpσ ↾ B = φ
p
σ ◦ σ :: Vld(B) for each σ :: Vld(A) by the first axiom on φ
and vertical completeness of B, the composition ψp
φ
p
σ↾B
◦ φpσ of the t-skeletons φ
p
σ and ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
is
well-defined. Moreover, it is easy to see that the family (ψp
φ
p
σ↾B
◦ φpσ)σ::Vld(A) satisfies the three
axioms on UoPLIs, where we employ uniqueness of u ∈ φpσ ‖ ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
for each σ :: Vld(A) and
v ∈ φpσ;ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
such that u ↾ A,C = v [A+97] for the third axiom, whence ψ ◦ φ ∈ LI(A,C).
Finally, the composition ψ◦φ in the sense of Definition 4.8 coincides with the one in the sense
of Definition 4.47 simply because, for the former, every s ↾ A,C ∈ φ;ψ satisfies s ∈ φ ‖ ψ so
that s ∈ φpσ ‖ ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
for some (not necessarily unique) σ :: Vld(A) by the established equations
φpσ = {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ } and ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
= {s ∈ ψ | s ↾ B ∈ φpσ ↾ B }, whence s ↾ A,C ∈ ψ
p
φ
p
σ↾B
◦ φpσ
(n.b., the other inclusion is obvious).
Corollary 4.49 (Uniqueness of PLIs). PLIs of a given UoPLI are unique.
Proof. Immediate from the equation given in Lemma 4.48.
As we have already indicated, UoPLIs between p-games A and B are to serve as t-skeletons
on the linear implication A⊸ B between A and B:
Definition 4.50 (Linear implication between p-games). The linear implication between p-
games A and B is the p-game A ⊸ B given by T S(A ⊸ B)
df.
= LI(A,B) and s ≃A⊸B
t
df.
⇔ s ↾ A ≃A t ↾ A ∧ s ↾ B ≃B t ↾ B ∧ att
∗
A⊸B(s) = att
∗
A⊸B(t), where u ↾ A (resp.
u ↾ B) is the j-subsequence of a position u ∈ PA⊸B that consists of moves of A (resp. B), and
attA⊸B :MA⊸B → {0, 1} maps a ∈MA 7→ 0, b ∈MB 7→ 1.
Lemma 4.51 (Well-defined linear implications between p-games). P-games are closed under
linear implication ⊸, and we have P (A⊸ B) = P (A)⊸ P (B) for any games A and B.
Proof. Let G andH be p-games. Directed completeness ofG⊸ H is easy to verify, and therefore,
we leave it to the reader. For downward completeness of G ⊸ H , assume φ :: Vld(G ⊸ H),
and let ψ ⊆ PG⊸H be a valid t-skeleton such that ψ .G⊸H φ; we have to show ψ :: G ⊸ H .
Let us define, for each σ :: Vld(G), a subset ψpσ ⊆ ψ by ψ
p
σ
df.
= {s ∈ ψ | s ↾ G ∈ σ }; clearly,
ψ =
⋃
σ::Vld(G) ψ
p
σ by Lemma 4.10. Because ψ .G⊸H φ, in particular ψ ≍ φ, for each σ :: Vld(G)
we have ψpσ ≍ φ
p
σ and ψ
p
σ ◦ σ = ψ ◦ σ .H φ ◦ σ = φ
p
σ ◦ σ by Lemma 3.37, whence ψ
p
σ ◦ σ :: Vld(H)
by downward completeness of H and validity of ψpσ . Hence, we may conclude that the family
ψp
df.
= (ψpσ)σ::Vld(G) satisfies the first axiom on UoPLIs (Definition 4.47). Also, it clearly satisfies
the second and the third axioms too, and hence, we may conclude that ψ :: G⊸ H .
Next, let us show that G⊸ H satisfies the axiom LI. It then suffices to observe, for any valid
t-skeleton φ :: Vld(G⊸ H) and maximal consistent subset S ⊆ T S(G⊸ H), that:
Oinc(φ,
⋃
S)⇔ ∀σ :: Vld(G).Oinc(φ ◦ σ,
⋃
S ↾ H) (by the OP-switch on G in G⊸ H)
⇔ ∀σ :: Vld(G).Oinc(Sat(φ ◦ σ),
⋃
S ↾ H) (by the axiom LI on H)
⇔ ∀σ :: Vld(G).Oinc(Sat(φ) ◦ Sat(σ),
⋃
S ↾ H) (by Lemma 4.57)
⇔ Oinc(Sat(φ),
⋃
S) (by the OP-switch on G in G⊸ H)
where
⋃
S ↾ H
df.
= {s ↾ H | s ∈
⋃
S }, and s ↾ H is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves
of H (n.b., it is not a problem to employ Lemma 4.57 for the composition φ ◦ σ at this point
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before completing the proof of Lemma 4.51). On the other hand, it is straightforward to show
that ≃G⊸H satisfies the axioms I1-3 just like the case of linear implication ⊸ between games.
Now, let A and B be games; we have to show P (A⊸ B) = P (A)⊸ P (B), for which it suffices
to show ts(A⊸ B) = LI(P (A), P (B)) by Theorem 4.16, where note that the identifications of
positions clearly coincide. Then, given any t-skeleton φ :: A⊸ B, the family φp = (φpσ)σ::Vld(A)
of t-skeletons φpσ
df.
= {s ∈ φ | s ↾ A ∈ σ } clearly satisfies the three axioms on UoPLIs, whence
φ =
⋃
φp :: P (A) ⊸ P (B). Conversely, any ϕ :: P (A) ⊸ P (B) is a t-skeleton that clearly
satisfies Oinc(ϕ, PA⊸B), whence ϕ :: A⊸ B, completing the proof.
Example 4.52. Let us show that there can be non-valid t-skeletons on a linear implication
between p-games. For example, let us consider a linear implication (!2[0] ⊸ 2[1])⊸ 2[2], where
the subscripts ( )[i] (i = 0, 1, 2) are to distinguish the three copies of 2, and a t-skeleton φ on the
linear implication defined by:
φpσ
df.
=

Pref({q[2]q[1](q, 0)[0](tt , 0)[0]b[1]b[2] | q[1](q, 0)[0](tt , 0)[0]b[1] ∈ σ }) if q[1](q, 0)[0] ∈ σ;
Pref({q[2]q[1](q, i)[0](ff , i)[0]b[1]b[2] | q[1](q, i)[0](ff , i)[0]b[1] ∈ σ }) if q[1](q, i)[0] ∈ σ for some i > 0;
Pref({q[2]q[1]b[1]b[2] | q[1]b[1] ∈ σ }) if q[1]b[1] ∈ σ for some b ∈ B;
Pref({q[2]q[1]}) otherwise
for each σ :: Vld(!2[0] ⊸ 2[1]). Clearly, the UoPLI φ =
⋃
φp is not valid though each PLI φpσ is.
At this point, it is perhaps worth pointing out that, given a linear implication G⊸ H between
p-games G and H , an initial protocol (between Player and Judge) can only control possible plays
in the codomain H , not the domain G, since Opponent and Player are interchanged in G.
Note, however, that Opponent cannot control possible plays in G either for there are no initial
protocols between Opponent and Judge; this asymmetry has already played a key role in the
proof of Lemma 4.51 (specifically for showing that the linear implication G ⊸ H satisfies the
axiom LI) and also will do so in the proof of Theorem 4.61.
Convention. We define A⇒ B
df.
= !A⊸ B for given p-games A and B, and call it the function
space or the implication from A to B.
We have defined all the necessary constructions on p-games, for which we have also defined
constructions on t-skeletons. Let us then proceed to define the corresponding ones on p-strategies:
Definition 4.53 (P-derelictions). The predicative (p-) dereliction on a p-game A is the
p-strategy derA on the implication A⇒ A defined by:
derA
df.
=
⋃
i∈N
der
(i)
A
where recall that, for each i ∈ N, der
(i)
A is the t-skeleton on the same implication, called the i
th
dereliction on A, defined by der
(i)
A
df.
= {s ∈ P!A⊸A | ∀t  s.Even(t)⇒ (t ↾ !A) ↾ i = t ↾ A }.
Lemma 4.54 (Well-defined p-derelictions). Given a p-game A and a natural number i ∈ N, we
have der
(i)
A :: A⇒ A, derA : A⇒ A, der
(i)
A ∝ derA, and the t-skeleton der
(i)
A and the p-strategy
derA are both well-bracketed and winning.
Proof. Straightforward and left to the reader, where they are noetherian because the underlying
arena of each t-skeleton is well-founded (in the same way as the proof of Lemma 3.34).
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Lemma 4.55 (Promotion lemma on t-skeletons on p-games). Let φ :: !A ⊸ B, ψ :: !B ⊸ C
and ϕ :: !C ⊸ D be t-skeletons on p-games. Then, we have:
1. (der
(i)
A )
† ≃!A⊸!A cp!A :: !A⊸ !A for each i ∈ N;
2. ϕ ◦ (ψ ◦ φ†)† = (ϕ ◦ ψ†) ◦ φ† :: !A⊸ D.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.46.
Definition 4.56 (Constructions on p-strategies). Let f : A ⊸ B, g : C ⊸ D, h : A ⊸ C,
k : B⊸ C and e : !A⊸ B be p-strategies.
• The tensor (product) f ⊗ g of f and g is defined by:
f ⊗ g
df.
= {s ∈ PA⊗C⊸B⊗D | s ↾ A,B ∈ f, s ↾ C,D ∈ g };
• The product 〈f, h〉 of f and h is defined by:
〈f, h〉
df.
= {s ∈ PA⊸B&C | (s ∈ A,B ∈ f ∧ s ↾ C = ǫ) ∨ (s ∈ A,C ∈ h ∧ s ↾ B = ǫ) };
• The composition f ; k (also written k ◦ f) of f and k is defined by:
f ; k
df.
= {s ↾ A,C | s ∈ f ‖ k }
where f ‖ k
df.
= {s ∈ P((A⊸B[0])⊸B[1])⊸C | s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ f, s ↾ B[1], C ∈ k };
• The promotion e† of e is defined by:
e†
df.
= {s ∈ P!A⊸!B | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ e }.
Lemma 4.57 (Well-defined constructions on p-strategies). Given p-strategies f : A ⊸ B,
g : C ⊸ D, h : A⊸ C, k : B⊸ C and e : !A⊸ B, we obtain p-strategies f⊗g : A⊗C ⊸ B⊗D,
〈f, h〉 : A ⊸ B&C, f ; k : A ⊸ C and e† : !A ⊸ !B. If t-skeletons λ :: A ⊸ B, γ :: C ⊸ D,
η :: A ⊸ C, κ :: B ⊸ C and ǫ :: !A ⊸ B satisfy λ ∝ f , γ ∝ g, η ∝ h, κ ∝ k and ǫ ∝ e,
then λ ⊗ γ ∝ f ⊗ g, 〈λ, η〉 ∝ 〈f, h〉, λ;κ ∝ f ; k and ǫ† ∝ e†. Moreover, tensor ⊗, pairing 〈 , 〉,
composition ; and promotion ( )† on p-strategies preserve winning and well-bracketing.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.65 (thanks to Lemma 4.48), where we
additionally have to handle the axiom PST, but it is just straightforward.
We are now ready to define:
Definition 4.58 (Categories of p-games and p-strategies). The category PG is defined by:
• Objects are p-games;
• Morphisms A→ B are p-strategies on the implication A⇒ B;
• The composition g • f : A→ C of morphisms f : A→ B and g : B → C is defined by the
composition g • f
df.
= g ◦ f † : A⇒ C of p-strategies;
• The identity idA on each object A is the p-dereliction derA : A⇒ A.
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The lluf subcategory LPG (resp. WPG) of PG has winning (resp. well-bracketed, winning)
p-strategies in PG as morphisms.
Theorem 4.59 (CCCs of p-games and p-strategies). PG is a category with finite products (1,&)
and exponential objects ⇒, and LPG (resp. WPG) is a subCCC of PG (resp. LPG).
Proof. By Lemma 4.57, it suffices to focus on the verification on PG. First, composition is well-
defined by Lemma 4.57, and so are the identities by Lemma 4.54; the associativity and the unit
law hold as in the case of strategies (or by Lemmata 4.32, 4.34, 4.55 and 4.57). Finally, cartesian
closure of PG is by Lemmata 4.40, 4.51, 4.46 and 4.57, where the required equations between
p-strategies hold again as in the case of strategies (or by Lemmata 4.32, 4.34 and 4.57).
Moreover, these CCCs have all limits :
Corollary 4.60 (Game-semantic limits). The CCCs PG, LPG and WPG have all limits.
Proof. Again, let us focus on the case of PG because the other two are just similar. Clearly, we
may generalize (binary) product & on p-games into any cardinality in the obvious manner.
Thus, it remains to show that G has equalizers. Let f, g : A ⇒ B be any morphisms in G.
Let us then define, as an equalizer of f and g, a p-game C and a morphism h : C → A in G as
follows. First, C is the p-subgame of A given by:
T S(C)
df.
= {σ :: Vld(A) | f • Sat(σ) = g • Sat(σ) }
where it is easy to see that C is a well-defined p-game, and so we leave it to the reader.
Finally, let us take h
df.
= derC , for which the required universal property clearly holds.
None of the CCCs G, LG andWG (Definition 3.66) has all limits; we have just shown that the
present work overcomes this deficiency of conventional games and strategies. Moreover, the proof
of Corollary 4.60 exhibits why it is the case: The construction of the p-subgame C P A may not
preserve completeness of p-games; hence, any of the three CCCs does not have equalizers.
Remark. In the proof of Corollary 4.60, the p-game C may not be downward complete if we took
account of non-valid t-skeletons in the downward completeness axiom (Definition 4.20), which is
why the axiom is only on valid ones. Also, C may not be locally or upward complete, which is
one reason why local or upward completeness is not appropriate for p-games.
We have seen so far, mainly in terms of game-semantic concepts, that p-games and p-strategies
are a natural generalization of games and strategies, respectively. The following theorem adds a
category-theoretic evidence for reasonability of the generalization:
Theorem 4.61 (Reflective subcategories). There is an inclusion (i.e., a full, faithful functor)
G →֒ PG (resp. LG →֒ LPG, WG →֒ WPG), and it has a left adjoint, where the functors are all
cartesian closed.
Proof. Let us focus on the inclusion G
P
→֒ PG because the other two are completely analogous.
The inclusion has been already given in Definitions 4.22 and 4.37. It is then clear that P (A) ∈ PG
and P (f) ∈ PG(P (A), P (B)) for any A,B ∈ G and f ∈ G(A,B).
Clearly, P preserves identities. Next, let us show that P preserves composition of morphisms.
Let f : A → B and g : B → C be any composable morphisms in G. By Lemma 3.49, we may
take some valid skeletons φ :: A ⇒ B and ψ :: B ⇒ C such that φ ∝ f and ψ ∝ g. Then, by
Proposition 4.9 and Lemmata 3.52, 4.34 and 4.57, we have P (g • f) = Sat(ψ • φ) = Sat(ψ • φ) =
Sat(ψ)•Sat(φ) = P (g)•P (f). Hence, we have shown that the inclusion G
P
→֒ PG is a well-defined
functor. Moreover, it is clearly full and faithful because ( )Even = P−1 for the arrow-map.
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Now, we define a left adjoint U : PG → G to P by U(G)
df.
= (
⋃
T S(G),≃G) and U(f)
df.
= fEven
for any G,H ∈ PG and f ∈ PG(G,H), i.e., U ‘forgets’ the structures of p-games and p-strategies.
It is easy to check that U is a well-defined functor PG → G, where weakening of the axiom
E1 (Definition 3.2) and embedding of labels into moves (Definition 3.1) are essential for the
object-map to be well-defined. Then, given G ∈ PG and B ∈ G, we have the obvious bijection
G(U(G), B)
∼
→ PG(G,P (B)) natural in G and B, which is essentially the arrow-map of P ,
because on the p-game G⇒ P (B) Opponent cannot control possible plays in the domain !G (by
something like initial protocols) unlike Player (i.e., G in G⇒ P (B) serves just as U(G)).16
Finally, by Lemmata 4.40, 4.46 and 4.51, P is cartesian closed (on the nose). In order to
show cartesian closure of U (on the nose), let us just show that it preserves linear implication⊸
since it is much simpler to show that it preserves product & and exponential !. We have to show
U(G⊸ H) = U(G)⊸ U(H), for which it suffices to show that their positions coincide for their
identifications of positions clearly do. It is easy to show the inclusion PU(G⊸H) ⊆ PU(G)⊸U(H)
by Lemma 4.48; thus, let us focus on the other inclusion. Let s ∈ PU(G)⊸U(H). Then, there are
some σ :: Vld(G) and τ :: Vld(H) such that s ↾ U(G) ∈ σ and s ↾ U(H) ∈ τ . Hence, we may take
a minimal UoPLI φ :: G⊸ H such that s ∈ φ, whence s ∈ PU(G⊸H), completing the proof.
Finally, let us also add a domain-theoretic evidence for reasonability of the generalization:
Corollary 4.62 (CPO-enrichment of p-games and p-strategies). The CCCs PG, LPG andWPG
are all CPO-enriched w.r.t. the partial order of Definition 4.35 in the sense of [AC98]. Moreover,
these CPOs are algebraic, where compact elements in PG (resp. LPG or WPG) are morphisms
φ such that the set φ (resp. ⌈φ⌉) is finite.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 3.68, where directed and downward completeness of
p-games (with the axiom of choice) and the second axiom on UoPLIs induce (domain-theoretic)
algebraic completeness of objects and continuity of morphisms, respectively. To be precise, let us
demonstrate domain-theoretic completeness of the poset PG(G) = (PG(G),6G) for an arbitrary
p-game G in detail as follows. Let D ⊆ PG(G) be directed. By the axiom of choice, Lemma 4.32
and downward completeness of G, we may form a subset D ⊆ VT S(G) such that:
1. ∀d ∈ D. ∃δ ∈ D . Sat(δ) = d;
2. ∀δ ∈ D . Sat(δ) ∈ D;
3. ∀δ1, δ2 ∈ D . δ1 6G δ2 ⇔ Sat(δ1) 6G Sat(δ2)
where note that δ1 .G δ2 ⇔ Sat(δ1) 6G Sat(δ2) holds for all δ1, δ2 ∈ VT S(G) by the third clause
of Lemma 4.34. It is then easy to see that D is directed w.r.t. 6G on VT S(G) (Definition 4.20),
and so
⋃
D ∈ VT S(G) by directed completeness of G. Finally, observe that:
Sat(
⋃
D) = {s ∈ PG | ∃t ∈
⋃
D . s ≃G t }
= {s ∈ PG | ∃δ ∈ D , t ∈ δ.s ≃G t }
= {s ∈ PG | ∃δ ∈ D . s ∈ Sat(δ) }
= {s ∈ PG | ∃d ∈ D. s ∈ d }
=
⋃
D
whence
⋃
D = Sat(
⋃
D) ∈ PG(G) by the first clause of Lemma 4.34.
16The bijection would not exist if we employed the axiom ∀σ, σ˜ :: Vld(!G), smn ∈ (φpσ∪φ
p
σ˜
)Even.sm ∈ φpσ∩φ
p
σ˜
⇒
smn ∈ φpσ ∩ φ
p
σ˜
instead of the second axiom on UoPLIs φ :: !G⊸ P (B) (Definition 4.47).
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In the rest of the paper, we shall focus on the CCC WPG because MLTT is a functional
programming language or a formal system for intuitionistic predicate logic.
Convention. We call objects and morphisms in WPG formulas and (intuitionistic) proofs,
respectively. Abusing notation, we writeWPG(G) for the hom-setWPG(T,G) too (G ∈ WPG),
which does not bring serious confusion since the two sets are isomorphic. A formula G ∈ WPG
is (intuitionistically) true if ∃g ∈ WPG(G), and (intuitionistically) false otherwise.
Notation. The notations for skeletons introduced in Section 3.2.1 are lifted to t-skeletons in the
obvious manner: Given t-skeletons σ :: G, φ :: T ⊸ G, ψ :: T ⇒ G, α :: A and β :: B, and an
innocent t-skeleton ϑ :: !G, we write σT :: T ⊸ G, σ!T :: T ⇒ G, φT , ψ!T :: G, 〈α, β〉 :: A&B,
α† :: !A and ϑ‡ :: G for the obvious t-skeletons. These notation are lifted to strategies and p-
strategies, respectively, in the obvious manner too. Abusing notation, however, we shall usually
omit such subscripts/superscripts for brevity, which would not bring serious confusion in practice.
4.5 Game-Semantic Realizability
Before establishing game semantics of MLTT in the next section, let us briefly make a digression
to consider the relation between the present work and the realizability semantics of MLTT
[Str08]. In fact, it turns out that our generalization of conventional games and strategies forms
a game-semantic instance of the realizability semantics.
The basic idea is as follows. Recall that the realizability semantics employs a mathematical
model of untyped computation, e.g., the untyped λ-calculus [Chu36], for realizers that ‘imple-
ment’ or realize (constructive) proofs. Then, because t-skeletons make sense without underlying
p-games, they can be regarded as a mathematical model of untyped computation, i.e., they are
employable as realizers. Indeed, we may consider the relation σ ∝ g as the t-skeleton σ realizes
the p-strategy g in the sense of the realizability semantics. Let us make the idea precise below.
Convention. For the obvious (set-theoretic) size issue, let us restrict every move to a finite
sequence s ∈ {0, 1}∗ as in [A+97], where ‘tags’ for constructions on games are also formalized
by 0 and 1, in particular S + T
df.
= {s.0xy | sxy ∈ S } ∪ {t.1uv | tuv ∈ T } for any sets S and T of
moves. This restriction does not prohibit at all the game semantics of MLTT given in Section 5.
We write V for the greatest p-game w.r.t. P, which is well-defined by the restriction just made.
Next, we define composition on t-skeletons without underlying p-games or untyped t-skeletons:
Definition 4.63 (Composition on untyped t-skeletons). The composition φ;ψ (also written
ψ ◦ φ) of t-skeletons φ and ψ is defined by:
φ;ψ
df.
= {s ↾ 00, 11 | s ∈ φ ‖ ψ }
where φ ‖ ψ is the set of all prefix j-subsequences of maximal legal positions s ∈ (Mφ +Mψ)∗
such that:
1. s ↾ 0 ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ 1 ∈ ψ ∧ (|s| > 1 ⇒ s(1) ∈ {m1 | m ∈ Mψ}), where s ↾ 0 (resp. s ↾ 1) is
the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of the form l0 (resp. r1) yet changed into l
(resp. r);
2. ∀i ∈ N. s(2i+ 1) ∈ {m1 | m ∈Mψ} ⇒ s(2i+ 2) ↑ ∨s(2i+ 2) ∈ {m1 | m ∈Mψ};
3. ∀i ∈ N. s(2i+ 1) ∈ {m0 | m ∈Mφ} ⇒ s(2i+ 2) ↑ ∨s(2i+ 2) ∈ {m0 | m ∈Mφ};
4. ∀i ∈ N. s(2i) ∈ {r11 | r1 ∈Mψ} ⇒ s(2i+ 1) ↑ ∨s(2i+ 1) ∈ {r11 | r1 ∈Mψ};
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5. ∀i ∈ N. s(2i) ∈ {l00 | l0 ∈Mφ} ⇒ s(2i+ 1) ↑ ∨s(2i+ 1) ∈ {l00 | l0 ∈Mφ};
6. ∀i ∈ N.s(2i) ∈ {r01 | r0 ∈Mψ} ⇒ s(2i+1) ∈ {l10 | l1 ∈Mφ}∧s(2i) ↾ 01 = s(2i+1) ↾ 10,
where r01 ↾ 01
df.
= r and l10 ↾ 10
df.
= l;
7. ∀i ∈ N.s(2i) ∈ {l10 | l1 ∈Mφ} ⇒ s(2i+ 1) ∈ {r01 | r0 ∈Mψ} ∧ s(2i) ↾ 10 = s(2i+ 1) ↾ 01
and s ↾ 00, 11 is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of the form l00 or r11, yet changed
into l0 and r1, respectively.
Remark. If we consider typed t-skeletons φ :: A00 ⊸ B10 and ψ :: B01 ⊸ C11 on p-games, where
the subscripts ( )ij (i, j ∈ {0, 1}) are just to make the formalized ‘tags’ explicit, then what is
intended by Definition 4.63 should be obvious.
Note that the composition on untyped t-skeletons coincides with that on (typed) t-skeletons
(Definition 4.8) when restricted to typed ones, and hence, no ambiguity arises. An important
point is that the untyped composition is defined in such a way that we have cpV ◦ σ = σ for any
(untyped) t-skeleton σ, which is extensively exploited in the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 4.64 (T-skeletons as PCAs). The pair (T S, ◦) of the set T S of all t-skeletons and
the composition ◦ on t-skeletons (Definition 4.63) forms a partial combinatory algebra (PCA).
Proof. It suffices to define the k-combinator to be the t-skeleton k :: V ⇒ T ⇒ V that is
the 0th dereliction der
(0)
V :: V ⇒ V up to ‘tags’, and the s-combinator to be the t-skeleton
s :: (V[0] ⇒ V[1] ⇒ V[2]) ⇒ (V[3] ⇒ V[1]) ⇒ V[0] ⇒ V[2], where the subscripts ( )[i] (i = 0, 1, 2, 3)
are informal ‘tags’ just for convenience, that plays as the 0th dereliction der
(0)
V[i]
:: V[i] ⇒ V[i] for
i = 0, 1, 2 and as the 1st dereliction der
(1)
V :: V[0] ⇒ V[3] up to ‘tags’.
Theorem 4.65 (T-skeletons as realizers). Every p-game G induces a modest set WPG(G) =
(WPG(G), ‖ ‖G), where ‖g‖G
df.
= {σ :: G | σ ∝ g } ⊆ T S, and every morphism f : A → B in
WPG does a morphism WPG(A)→WPG(B) between modest sets that maps a : A 7→ f • a : B.
Proof. For each p-game G, the assembly WPG(G) = (WPG(G), ‖ ‖G) is a modest set thanks to
the second clause of Lemma 4.34.
The resulting realizability semantics of MLTT by modest sets WPG(G) and morphisms of
well-bracketed, winning p-strategies, which follows the standard recipe [Str08], seems to coincide
with the game semantics of MLTT given in Section 5 (though we have not checked all the details).
Consequently, the present work can be seen as a particular instance of the realizability approach,
which is not possible by conventional game semantics because skeletons cannot be untyped.
Hence, in addition to the category-theoretic and the domain-theoretic ones given previously,
this realizability-semantic result makes the present work appear less ad-hoc. Nevertheless, the
short digression made in this section would not be very relevant to the rest of the paper.
5 Game Semantics of MLTT
We are now ready to present our game semantics of MLTT. Let us establish the semantics through
an abstract, algebraic model of MLTT, called categories with families (CwFs) [Dyb96, Hof97],
since it is in general easier to show that a concrete mathematical structure forms an instance of
an abstract model than to directly prove that it is a concrete model of MLTT, and CwFs are
much closer to the syntax than other abstract (or categorical) semantics, so that we would be
able to see directly the semantic counterparts of syntactic phenomena.
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Specifically, the present section is devoted to showing that a subCCC µWPG of WPG gives
rise to a CwF equipped with semantic type formers [Hof97] for one-, zero-, N-, pi- and sigma-
types as well as the cumulative hierarchy of universes, establishing game semantics of MLTT
equipped with these types. Also, we show that MLTT equipped with Id-types and these types
except universes can be interpreted in WPG in the same fashion as well.
The present section proceeds as follows. In Section 5.1, we define our semantics of (dependent)
types, based on which we interpret pi-types in Section 5.2, sigma-types in Section 5.3, Id-types
in Section 5.4 and universes in Section 5.5. Then, we introduce two CwFs WPG and µWPG
in Section 5.6, equipping them with the game-semantic type formers in Section 5.7. Finally, we
show that the interpretation is faithful for the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment of MLTT in Section 5.8.
5.1 Dependent Predicative Games
Let us begin with interpreting (dependent) types. Intuitively, a dependent type Γ ⊢ B type is to
be interpreted in a category C by a non-empty family B = (B(g))g∈C(T,Γ) of objects B(g) ∈ C,
where T ∈ C is terminal, and Γ ∈ C is the interpretation of the context Γ. Hence, let us interpret
types in WPG by:
Definition 5.1 (Dependent p-games). A dependent predicative (p-) game over a p-game
A is a family B = (B(a))a∈WPG(A) of p-games B(a) such that WPG(A) 6= ∅. It is constant if
B(a) = B(a˜) for all a, a˜ ∈ WPG(A).
There is the obvious bijection between p-games and constant dependent p-games; in this
sense, dependent p-games generalize p-games.
Notation. Given p-games A and A′, let us write {A′}A or {A′} for the constant dependent p-
game over A such that {A′}A(a) = A
′ for all a ∈ WPG(A). Also, we write DWPG(A) for the
class17 of all dependent p-games over A.
Example 5.2. Recall, for each k ∈ N, the p-game ListN (k) of finite lists of natural numbers of
length k given in Example 4.24. We then define a dependent p-game ListN over N by:
ListN
df.
= (ListN (k))k∈WPG(N) ∈ DWPG(N)
where note that WPG(N) = {k | k ∈ N }.
Let us proceed to define a convenient auxiliary concept:
Definition 5.3 (Integration on dependent p-games). The integration of a dependent p-game
B over a p-game A is the p-game
∫
B defined by:
T S(
∫
B)
df.
=
⋃
a∈WPG(A)
T S(B(a))
≃∫ B
df.
=
⋃
a∈WPG(A)
≃B(a) .
It is easy to see that the integration of any dependent p-game is a well-defined p-game,
for which non-emptiness of dependent p-games (Definition 5.1), weakening of the axiom E1
(Definition 3.2) and embedding of labels into moves (Definition 3.1) are crucial. Note also that
the integration
∫
{A′}A of a constant dependent p-game {A′}A coincides with the p-game A′.
17Of course, it is always a set if we employ the convention on moves given in Section 4.5.
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5.2 Pi between Predicative Games
Next, let us give our interpretation of pi-types. The construction here is, however, preliminary;
a full interpretation of pi-types is given in Section 5.7.1.
Having defined UoPLIs, linear implication⊸ and implication ⇒ between p-games, it is now
clear how to interpret pi-types in WPG:
Definition 5.4 (UoDPLIs). A union of dependently pointwise linear implication (UoD-
PLI) from a p-game A to a dependent p-game B over A is a UoPLI φ :: A⊸
∫
B that satisfies:
∀σ :: Vld(A). Sat(σ) ∈ WPG(A)⇒ φ ◦ σ :: B(Sat(σ))
where the PLI φpσ of φ at each σ :: A is particularly called the dependently pointwise linear
implication (DPLI) of φ at σ.
Notation. Let us write DLI(A,B) for the set of all UoDPLIs from A to B.
UoDPLIs in fact generalize UoPLIs: Given p-games A and A′, we have DLI(A, {A′}A) =
LI(A,A′). This generalization in turn enables us to generalize linear implication ⊸ between
p-games as follows:
Definition 5.5 (Linear-pi between (dependent) p-games). The linear-pi from a p-game A to
a dependent p-game B over A is the p-game ℓΠ(A,B) defined by:
• T S(ℓΠ(A,B))
df.
= DLI(A,B);
• s ≃ℓΠ(A,B) t
df.
⇔ s ↾ A ≃A t ↾ A ∧ s ↾
∫
B ≃∫ B t ↾
∫
B ∧ att∗ℓΠ(A,B)(s) = att
∗
ℓΠ(A,B)(t)
where att ℓΠ(A,B) :MℓΠ(A,B) → {0, 1} maps a ∈MA 7→ 0, b ∈M
∫
B 7→ 1.
Note that linear-pi ℓΠ indeed generalizes linear implication⊸: Given p-games A and A′, we
have ℓΠ(A, {A′}A) = A⊸ A′. Let us then introduce:
Definition 5.6 (Pi between (dependent) p-games). The pi from a p-game A to a dependent
p-game B over A is the p-game Π(A,B) defined by:
Π(A,B)
df.
= ℓΠ(!A,B‡)
where B‡ ∈ DWPG(!A) is given by B‡(a)
df.
= B(a‡) for all a ∈ WPG(!A).
Remark. Note that the restriction of p-strategies to innocent ones in the CCCWPG is crucial for
the definition of a pi Π(A,B) since otherwise the dependent p-game B‡ would not be well-defined.
Similarly to linear-pi ℓΠ, pi Π generalizes implication ⇒: Given p-games A and A′, we have
Π(A, {A′}A) = A⇒ A′.
It is straightforward to see that positions of a pi Π(A,B) are those s of the implication
A⇒
∫
B that satisfy:
∀a ∈ WPG(A). s ↾ !A ∈ a† ⇒ s ↾
∫
B ∈ PB(a)
which coincides essentially with the interpretation of pi-types in [AJV15].
The idea is best explained by a set-theoretic analogy: The pi Π(A,B) is like the set of all
(partial) functions f : A ⇀
⋃
x∈AB(x), where A is a set, and B = (B(x))x∈A is a family of sets
B(x), that satisfies f(a) ∈ B(a) if f(a) ↓ for all a ∈ A.
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Theorem 5.7 (Well-defined (linear-) pi between (dependent) p-games). Given a dependent p-
game B over a p-game A, the linear-pi ℓΠ(A,B) and the pi Π(A,B) are well-defined p-games.
Proof. It suffices to show that the linear-pi ℓΠ(A,B) is a well-defined p-game, but it is just like
the proof of Lemma 4.51, where it is straightforward to see that ℓΠ(A,B) satisfies the directed
and the downward completeness axioms.
Nevertheless, we will have to handle the case where A for a pi Π(A,B) is a dependent p-game;
thus, the pi Π given above is not general enough. That is, in terms of the syntax of MLTT, we
can interpret the rule
(Π-Form) Γ, x : A ⊢ B(x) type⇒ Γ ⊢ Πx:AB(x) type
only when Γ = ♦ at the moment. We shall generalize pi Π in Section 5.7.1.
Example 5.8. We have the obvious well-bracketed, winning p-strategy F (0) : Π(N+, ListN ),
where N+ is the p-subgame of N such that T S(N+)
df.
= {} ∪ {Pref({qn}) | n ∈ N+}, such that
F (0) • k = 0⊗ 0 · · · ⊗ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
:: ListN (k) for each k ∈ N+, which is a game-semantic refinement of the
map k ∈ N+ 7→ (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Nk. Note that the third axiom on Uo(D)PLIs (Definition 4.47)
prohibits total p-strategies on Π(N+, ListN ) that do not investigate computation at all on the
domain !N+, i.e., non-strict ones, which makes sense from the computational viewpoint. Note
also that F (0) cannot be on Π(N, ListN ) because then it would not satisfy the third axiom.
5.3 Sigma on Predicative Games
Similarly to pi Π, let us define an interpretation of sigma-types. Again, the construction here is
preliminary; see Section 5.7.2 for the full interpretation.
Definition 5.9 (Sigma on (dependent) p-games). The sigma of a p-game A and a dependent
p-game B over A is the p-game Σ(A,B) defined by:
• T S(Σ(A,B))
df.
= {〈σ, τ〉 :: A&
∫
B | Sat(σ) ∈ WPG(A)⇒ τ :: B(Sat(σ)) };
• s ≃Σ(A,B) t
df.
⇔ s ↾ A ≃A t ↾ A ∧ s ↾
∫
B ≃∫ B t ↾
∫
B.
Again, it is straightforward to see that positions of a sigma Σ(A,B) are those s of the product
A&
∫
B that satisfy:
∀a ∈ WPG(A). s ↾ A ∈ a⇒ s ↾
∫
B ∈ PB(a).
Note that a sigma Σ(A,B) is not necessarily upward or locally complete, let alone complete;
let us emphasize once again that it is the main point of the generalization of games into p-games.
Note also that when B is a constant dependent p-game {A′}A, the sigma Σ(A, {A′}A) coincides
with the product A&A′; thus, sigma Σ generalizes product &.
In terms of the set-theoretic analogy again, a sigma Σ(A,B) is just like the set of all pairs
(a, b) ∈ A×
⋃
x∈AB(x) such that a ∈ A and b ∈ B(a).
Nevertheless, again, this construction of sigma Σ is not general enough for the same reason
as the case of pi Π; we shall generalize it shortly.
Theorem 5.10 (Well-defined sigma on (dependent) p-games). Given a dependent p-game B
over a p-game A, the sigma Σ(A,B) is a well-defined p-game.
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Proof. Let us focus on directed and downward completeness of Σ(A,B) because these two points
are the only non-trivial points. First, to show the directed completeness, let D ⊆ VT S(Σ(A,B))
be any directed subset. Assume that there is some 〈σ0, τ0〉 ∈ D such that Sat(σ0) ∈ WPG(A)
since the other case is rather trivial. Note that, by A
df.
= {σ ∈ VT S(A) | ∃τ ::
∫
B.〈σ, τ〉 ∈ D} and
B
df.
= {τ ∈ VT S(
∫
B) | ∃σ :: A. 〈σ, τ〉 ∈ D }, we have
⋃
D = 〈
⋃
A,
⋃
B〉, where note that A and
B are directed. It is clear that
⋃
A = σ0 because σ0 ∈ A, and σ0 is total. Hence, any 〈σ, τ〉 ∈ D
such that 〈σ0, τ0〉 6Σ(A,B) 〈σ, τ〉 satisfies σ = σ0 and τ0 6
∫
B τ :: B(Sat(σ0)). Therefore, by
directed completeness of B(Sat(σ0)),
⋃
B ∈ VT S(B(Sat(σ0))), whence
⋃
D ∈ VT S(Σ(A,B)).
Next, for the downward completeness, let 〈σ, τ〉 ⊆ PΣ(A,B) be an arbitrary valid t-skeleton,
〈σ˜, τ˜〉 ∈ VT S(Σ(A,B)) and 〈σ, τ〉 .Σ(A,B) 〈σ˜, τ˜〉. Note that σ ⊆ PA and τ ⊆ P
∫
B are valid
t-skeletons, σ˜ ∈ VT S(A), τ˜ ∈ VT S(
∫
B), σ .A σ˜ and τ .∫ B τ˜ ; therefore, σ ∈ VT S(A) and
τ ∈ VT S(
∫
B) by downward completeness of A and
∫
B, respectively. Now, assume Sat(σ˜) ∈
WPG(A) since the other case is already done, by which τ˜ :: B(Sat(σ˜)). If σ 6= σ˜, then σ is
not total, whence Sat(σ) 6∈ WPG(A); hence, 〈σ, τ〉 ∈ VT S(Σ(A,B)) by downward completeness
of A and
∫
B. If σ = σ˜, then τ :: B(Sat(σ)) by downward completeness of B(Sat(σ)), whence
〈σ, τ〉 ∈ VT S(Σ(A,B)).
Example 5.11. The sigma Σ(N, ListN ) is a game-semantic counterpart of the set of all dependent
pairs (k, (n1, n2, . . . , nk)) ∈ N
∗. In fact, we have:
WPG(Σ(N, ListN )) = {〈k, n1 ⊗ n2 · · · ⊗ nk〉 | k, n1, n2, . . . , nk ∈ N }.
Remark. It is straightforward to see that the sigma Σ(N, ListN ) is not upward complete. Also,
defining a dependent p-game FN over N by FN (k)
df.
= N(k) for all k ∈ N (Example 4.27),
the sigma Σ(N,FN ) is not locally complete. Hence, neither upward nor local completeness is
appropriate for p-games unless we give up interpreting sigma-types.
5.4 Identity Predicative Games
We proceed to interpret Id-types :
Definition 5.12 (Id p-games). Given a p-game G, the Id predicative (p-) game IdG(g, g˜)
between proofs g, g˜ ∈ WPG(G) is defined by:
IdG(g, g˜)
df.
=
{
1 if g = g˜;
0 otherwise.
Thus, IdG(g, g˜) is true iff g = g˜.
Definition 5.13 (Dependent Id p-games). Given a p-game G, the dependent Id predicative
(p-) game IdG ∈ DWPG(G&G) is defined by:
IdG(〈g, g˜〉)
df.
= IdG(g, g˜)
for all 〈g, g˜〉 ∈ WPG(G&G).
Again, this construction of Id is not general enough; we generalize Id p-games in Section 5.7.7.
Remark. It is possible to define a more intensional version of Id p-games that compare behaviors
of two given proofs of the same formula. However, such an intensional formulation turns out to
be unsatisfactory as we shall see in Section 5.7.7.
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5.5 Universe Predicative Games
Let us proceed to define p-games to interpret the cumulative hierarchy of universes (given in
Section 2.10). For this task, we first need to generalize pi Π, sigma Σ and Id p-games Id:
Definition 5.14 (Pi, sigma and Id on dependent p-games). Given Γ ∈ WPG, A ∈ DWPG(Γ),
B ∈ DWPG(Σ(Γ, A)) and a, a′ ∈ WPG(Π(Γ, A)), the pi Π(A,B) ∈ DWPG(Γ) from A to B,
the sigma Σ(A,B) ∈ DWPG(Γ) of A and B, and the dependent Id predicative (p-) game
IdA(a, a
′) ∈ DWPG(Γ) are defined respectively by:
• Π(A,B)
df.
= (Π(A(g), Bg))g∈WPG(Γ);
• Σ(A,B)
df.
= (Σ(A(g), Bg))g∈WPG(Γ);
• IdA(a, a′)
df.
= (IdA(g)(a • g, a
′ • g))g∈WPG(Γ)
where Bg
df.
= (B(〈g, a˜〉))a˜∈WPG(A(g)) ∈ DWPG(A(g)) for each g ∈ WPG(Γ).
Let us then define game semantics of universes by the following mutual recursion:
Definition 5.15 (Universe p-games). For each natural number k ∈ N, a p-game Uk, called
the kth universe predicative (p-) game, a full subcategory WPG6k →֒ WPG and a subset
DWPG(Γ)6k ⊆ DWPG(Γ) for each Γ ∈ WPG6k are defined by the following mutual recursion:
• Uk is defined by:
T S(Uk)
df.
= {G | G ∈ WPG6k } ∪ {}
≃Uk
df.
= =Uk
where G
df.
= Pref({qOQ.GPA}), and a universe predicative (p-) game refers to the ith
universe p-game for some i ∈ N, which is often abbreviated as U if i is not important;
• WPG6k is the least full subcategory of WPG that satisfies:
1. 1,0, N ∈ WPG6k;
2. Ui ∈ WPG6k if i < k;
3. Σ(Γ, A) ∈ WPG6k if Γ ∈ WPG6k and A ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k;
• DWPG(Γ)6k for each Γ ∈ WPG6k is the least subset of DWPG(Γ) that satisfies:
1. {G}Γ ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k if G ∈ WPG6k;
2. A{f} ∈ DWPG(∆)6k if A ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k, ∆ ∈ WPG6k and f ∈ WPG(∆,Γ);
3. Π(A,B),Σ(A,B) ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k if A ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k and B ∈ DWPG(Σ(Γ, A))6k;
4. IdA(a, a
′) ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k if A ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k and a, a′ ∈ WPG(Π(Γ, A));
5. El(f) ∈ DWPG(Γ)6k if f ∈ WPG(Γ,Uj) such that j 6 k
where El(u) ∈ WPG for each u ∈ WPG(U) is the unique p-game such that El(u) = u, and
El(f) ∈ DWPG(Γ) for each f ∈ WPG(Γ,U) is the unique dependent p-game over Γ given
by El(f)(g)
df.
= El(f • g) for all g ∈ WPG(Γ).
57
Definition 5.16 (The category µWPG). The full subcategory µWPG →֒ WPG is defined by:
ob(µWPG)
df.
=
⋃
k∈N
ob(WPG6k)
and the subset µDWPG(Γ) ⊆ DWPG(Γ) for each Γ ∈ µWPG by:
µDWPG(Γ)
df.
=
⋃
k∈N
DWPG(Γ)6k.
Notation. Given Γ ∈ µWPG, we also write µWPG(Γ) for the set WPG(Γ).
Note that the category µWPG is cartesian closed because pi Π and sigma Σ generalize
implication ⇒ and product & in WPG, respectively, as we have already seen.
The category µWPG and the set µDWPG(Γ) for each Γ ∈ µWPG are inductively constructed
in order to interpret the introduction rule U-Intro of universes (Section 2.10). The idea is that
every object Γ ∈ µWPG is assigned a natural number ♯Γ ∈ N, called the rank of Γ, and the full
subcategory WPG6k →֒ µWPG for each k ∈ N has objects of µWPG whose rank is 6 k, where
♯1
df.
= ♯0
df.
= ♯N
df.
= 0 and ♯Ui
df.
= i + 1 for each i ∈ N, and Ui has the code G : Ui of each p-game
G such that ♯G 6 i. We also define the rank ♯A of each dependent p-game A ∈ µDWPG(Γ)
to be Sup({♯A(g) | g ∈ WPG(Γ)}), and the subset DWPG(Γ)6k ⊆ µDWPG(Γ) contains exactly
the dependent p-games whose rank is 6 k, where ♯Σ(Γ, A)
df.
= ♯Π(Γ, A)
df.
= max(♯Γ, ♯A) and
♯IdΓ(g, g
′)
df.
= ♯Γ for any g, g′ ∈ µWPG(Γ).
Note that universe p-games are referred in the construction of µDWPG(Γ), while they depend
on the category µWPG that in turn refers to µDWPG(Γ) and vice versa; it is why universe p-
games must be defined simultaneously by the mutual recursion. Importantly, WPG6k refers to
Ui only if i < k, by which it is straightforward to see that the mutual recursion is well-defined.
Intuitively, an actual play of a universe p-game U starts with Opponent’s question q, meaning
‘What is your p-game?’, and then Player answers it by some p-game G, meaning ‘It is G!’.
Note that ∀G ∈ µWPG.∃k ∈ N.G ∈ µWPG(Uk), and so we may interpret the rule U-Intro in
µWPG. Clearly, it is impossible in WPG, which is why we shall interpret universes in µWPG.
Remark. We cannot define a single universe p-game U by T S(U)
df.
= {G | G ∈ WPG } ∪ {}
(and ≃U
df.
= =U) because it would bring the obvious Russell’s-like paradox. Note that we have
Ui : Uj for all i, j ∈ N with i < j, which conceptually induces a hierarchy of universe p-games:
U0 : U1 : U2 . . . , while we have circumvented the paradox Ui : Ui for each i ∈ N.
5.6 Game-Semantic Category with Families
We are now ready to give the game-semantic CwF µWPG. Let us first recall the general definition
of CwFs [Dyb96], where our presentation is based on [Hof97]:
Definition 5.17 (CwFs [Dyb96, Hof97]). A category with families (CwF) is a tuple C =
(C,Ty ,Tm, { }, T, . , p, v , 〈 , 〉 ), where:
• C is a category with a terminal object T ∈ C;
• Ty assigns, to each object Γ ∈ C, a set Ty(Γ), called the set of all types in the context Γ;
• Tm assigns, to each pair (Γ, A) of an object Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a set Tm(Γ, A),
called the set of all terms of type A in the context Γ;
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• To each f : ∆→ Γ in C, { } assigns a map {f} : Ty(Γ)→ Ty(∆), called the substitution
on types, and a family ( {f}A)A∈Ty(Γ) of maps {f}A : Tm(Γ, A)→ Tm(∆, A{f}), called
the substitutions on terms;
• . assigns, to each pair (Γ, A) of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a context Γ.A ∈ C,
called the comprehension of A;
• p (resp. v) associates each pair (Γ, A) of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ) with a
morphism p(A) : Γ.A → Γ in C (resp. a term vA ∈ Tm(Γ.A,A{p(A)})), called the first
projection on A (resp. the second projection on A);
• 〈 , 〉 assigns, to each triple (f,A, g) of a morphism f : ∆→ Γ in C, a type A ∈ Ty(Γ) and
a term g ∈ Tm(∆, A{f}), a morphism 〈f, g〉A : ∆→ Γ.A in C, called the extension of f
by g
that satisfies, for any given Γ,∆,Θ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ), f : ∆ → Γ, e : Θ → ∆, h ∈ Tm(Γ, A) and
g ∈ Tm(∆, A{f}), the following equations:
• (Ty-Id) A{idΓ} = A;
• (Ty-Comp) A{f ◦ e} = A{f}{e};
• (Tm-Id) h{idΓ}A = h;
• (Tm-Comp) h{f ◦ e}A = h{f}A{e}A{f};
• (Cons-L) p(A) ◦ 〈f, g〉A = f ;
• (Cons-R) vA{〈f, g〉A} = g;
• (Cons-Nat) 〈f, g〉A ◦ e = 〈f ◦ e, g{e}A{f}〉A;
• (Cons-Id) 〈p(A), vA〉A = idΓ.A.
Next, let us recall the interpretation [Hof97, Jac99] of MLTT in a CwF C. Roughly, judge-
ments of MLTT as presented in Section 2 are interpreted in C as follows:
⊢ Γ ctx 7→ JΓK ∈ C; (1)
Γ ⊢ A type 7→ JAK ∈ Ty(JΓK); (2)
Γ ⊢ a : A 7→ JaK ∈ Tm(JΓK, JAK); (3)
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx⇒ JΓK = J∆K ∈ C; (4)
Γ ⊢ A = B type⇒ JAK = JBK ∈ Ty(JΓK); (5)
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A⇒ JaK = Ja′K ∈ Tm(JΓK, JAK) (6)
where J K denotes the semantic map or the semantic bracket [Hof97, Jac99]. Note that the last
three logical implications are the soundness of J K; see [Hof97] for a proof.
Remark. An interpretation is applied to judgements, and thus JΓK, JAK and JaK should be written,
strictly speaking, as J⊢ Γ ctxK, JΓ ⊢ A typeK and JΓ ⊢ a : AK, respectively. For brevity, however,
we usually adopt the abbreviation whenever it does not bring serious confusion.
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Note that a priori we cannot define an interpretation of MLTT by induction on deductions
since a deduction of a judgement in MLTT is not unique in the presence of the rules Ty-Con and
Tm-Con [Hof97]. For this point, a standard approach is to define an interpretation J K on pre-
syntax, which is partial, by induction on the length of pre-syntax, and show that it is well-defined
on every valid pre-syntax, i.e., judgement, and preserves judgmental equality by the semantic
equality. By this soundness theorem [Hof97], which establishes (1)-(6) given above, a posteriori
we may describe the interpretation J K of the syntax by induction on derivation of judgements:
Definition 5.18 (Interpretation of MLTT in CwFs [Hof97]). The interpretation J K of MLTT
in a CwF C = (C,Ty ,Tm, { }, T, . , p, v , 〈 , 〉 ) is defined by:
• (Ct-Emp) J⊢ ♦ ctxK
df.
= T ;
• (Ct-Ext) J⊢ Γ, x : A ctxK
df.
= J⊢ Γ ctxK.JΓ ⊢ A typeK;
• (Var) JΓ, x : A ⊢ x : AK
df.
= vJAK;
JΓ, x : A,∆, y : B ⊢ x : AK
df.
= JΓ, x : A,∆ ⊢ x : AK{p(JΓ, x : A,∆ ⊢ B typeK)}JAK;
• (Ty-Con) J∆ ⊢ A typeK
df.
= JΓ ⊢ A typeK;
• (Tm-Con) J∆ ⊢ a : BK
df.
= JΓ ⊢ a : AK
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
We leave the interpretation of one-, zero-, N-, pi-, sigma- and Id-types as well as universes
by semantic type formers [Hof97] to the next section.
Let us now define our game-semantic CwF:
Definition 5.19 (CwF of p-games and well-bracketed, winning p-strategies). The CwF µWPG
is the tuple (µWPG,Ty,Tm , { }, T, . , p, v , 〈 , 〉 ), where:
• The underlying category µWPG has been defined in Definition 5.16;
• For each Γ ∈ µWPG, Ty(Γ)
df.
= µDWPG(Γ);
• For each pair (Γ, A) of Γ ∈ µWPG and A ∈ µDWPG(Γ), Tm(Γ, A)
df.
= µWPG(Π(Γ, A));
• For each f : ∆ → Γ in µWPG, the map {f} : Ty(Γ) → Ty(∆) is defined by A{f}
df.
=
(A(f • d))d∈µWPG(∆) for all A ∈ Ty(Γ), and the map {f}A : Tm(Γ, A) → Tm(∆, A{f})
by a{f}A
df.
= a • f for all a ∈ Tm(Γ, A);
• T is the unit p-game 1 (Example 4.23), also called the terminal predicative (p-) game;
• Given Γ ∈ µWPG and A ∈ µDWPG(Γ), Γ.A
df.
= Σ(Γ, A);
• p(A)
df.
= fstΣ(Γ,A) : Σ(Γ, A)→ Γ, which is derΓ up to ‘tags’;
• vA
df.
= sndΣ(Γ,A) : Π(Σ(Γ, A), A{p(A)}), which is der
∫
A up to ‘tags’;
• Given Γ ∈ µWPG, A ∈ µDWPG(Γ), f ∈ µWPG(∆,Γ) and a ∈ µWPG(Π(∆, A{f})),
〈f, a〉A
df.
= 〈f, a〉 : ∆→ Σ(Γ, A).
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Notation. We often omit subscripts A on { }A and 〈 , 〉A, and write fst and snd respectively
for fstΣ(Γ,A) and sndΣ(Γ,A) if the underlying sigma Σ(Γ, A) is obvious.
Remark. Our interpretation of (dependent) types in µWPG corresponds to p-strategies whose
codomains are universe p-games, while the interpretations of types in [AJV15, BL18] are by
continuous functions (in the sense of domain theory).
Theorem 5.20 (Well-defined CwF µWPG). The CCC µWPG gives rise to a well-defined CwF
as given in Definition 5.19.
Proof. Let us focus on substitutions on terms and extensions because the other components
of µWPG are simpler to verify. Let Γ,∆ ∈ µWPG, A ∈ µDWPG(Γ), f ∈ µWPG(∆,Γ),
a ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ, A)) and a˜ ∈ µWPG(Π(∆, A{f})).
For the substitution a{f} = a • f , by Lemma 4.57, a • f is a well-bracketed, winning p-
strategy on the p-game ∆ ⇒
∫
A. Now, by Lemma 4.32, let us take arbitrary valid t-skeletons
α :: Π(Γ, A) and φ :: ∆⇒ Γ such that α ∝ a and φ ∝ f . By Lemma 4.57, we have α • φ ∝ a • f .
Hence, by Lemma 4.34, it remains to show α • φ :: Π(∆, A{f}), for which it now suffices to
show (α • φ) • δ :: A{f}(Sat(δ)) for all δ :: Vld(∆) such that Sat(δ) ∈ µWPG(∆). Then, by
Lemmata 4.55 and 4.34, we have (α • φ) • δ = (α ◦ φ†) ◦ δ† = α ◦ (φ† ◦ δ†) = α ◦ (φ ◦ δ†)† ::
A‡(Sat(φ ◦ δ†)†) = A(Sat(φ • δ)) = A(Sat(φ) • Sat(δ)) = A(f • Sat(δ)) = A{f}(Sat(δ)).
For the extension 〈f, a˜〉, by a similar argument to the case of the substitution a{f}, we may
show that 〈f, a˜〉 is a well-bracketed, winning p-strategy on the p-game ∆⇒ Γ&(
∫
A), and there
is an arbitrary valid t-skeleton α˜ :: Π(∆, A{f}) such that α˜ ∝ a˜, whence 〈φ, α˜〉 ∝ 〈f, a˜〉. Hence,
by Lemma 4.34, it remains to show 〈φ, α˜〉 :: ∆ ⇒ Σ(Γ, A). Again, let us take any δ :: Vld(∆)
such that Sat(δ) ∈ µWPG(∆); we have to show 〈φ, α˜〉 • δ = 〈φ • δ, a˜ • δ〉 :: Σ(Γ, A), for which it
suffices to show a˜•δ :: A(Sat(φ•δ)). Then, observe that a˜•δ :: A{f}‡(Sat(δ)†) = A{f}(Sat(δ)) =
A(f • Sat(δ)) = A(Sat(φ) • Sat(δ)) = A(Sat(φ • δ)).
Finally, we verify the required equations:
• (Ty-Id) A{idΓ} = (A(derΓ • d))d∈µWPG(∆) = (A(d))d∈µWPG(∆) = A;
• (Ty-Comp) Given Θ ∈ µWPG and g : Γ→ Θ in µWPG, we have:
A{g • f} = (A((g • f) • d))d∈µWPG(∆)
= (A(g • (f • d)))d∈µWPG(∆)
= (A{g}(f • d))d∈µWPG(∆)
= (A{g}{f}(d))d∈µWPG(∆)
= A{g}{f};
• (Tm-Id) a{idΓ} = a • derΓ = a;
• (Tm-Comp) a{g • f} = a • (g • f) = (a • g) • f = a{g} • f = a{g}{f};
• (Cons-L) p(A) • 〈g, a˜〉 = fst ◦ 〈g, a˜〉† = fst ◦ 〈g†, a˜†〉 = g;
• (Cons-R) vA{〈g, a˜〉} = snd • 〈g, a˜〉 = snd ◦ 〈g, a˜〉† = snd ◦ 〈g†, a˜†〉 = a˜;
• (Cons-Nat) 〈g, a˜〉 • f = 〈g • f, a˜ • f〉 = 〈g • f, a˜{f}〉;
• (Cons-Id) 〈p(A), vA〉 = 〈fstΣ(Γ,A), sndΣ(Γ,A)〉 = idΣ(Γ,A) = idΓ.A
which completes the proof.
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5.7 Game-Semantic Type Formers
Note that a CwF handles only the ‘core’ of MLTT: It interprets only the fragment of the syntax
common to all types. Therefore, for a full interpretation of MLTT, we need to equip the CwF
µWPG with additional structures, called semantic type formers [Hof97], to interpret one-, zero-,
N-, pi-, sigma- and Id-types as well as universes. This is the aim of the present section.
We first need the following two lemmata:
Lemma 5.21 (Pi-sigma correspondence). Let Γ ∈ WPG, A ∈ DWPG(Γ) and B ∈ DWPG(Σ(Γ, A)).
Then, there is a bijection
λA,B :WPG(Π(Σ(Γ, A), B))
∼
→WPG(Π(Γ,Π(A,B))).
Proof. It suffices to show that Π(Σ(Γ, A), B) and Π(Γ,Π(A,B)) coincide up to ‘tags’ for disjoint
union of sets of moves since well-bracketing and winning of p-strategies are both invariant w.r.t.
the ‘tags’. Their identifications of positions clearly coincide up to the ‘tags’; hence, it remains to
show the correspondence between their (not necessarily well-bracketed or winning) t-skeletons.
Let β :: Π(Σ(Γ, A), B) be any t-skeleton. Let us then obtain another λA,B(β) :: Π(Γ,Π(A,B))
from β simply by adjusting ‘tags’ appropriately, which is the standard currying operation in game
semantics [AM99, McC98]. Thanks to the characterization of (D)PLIs of a given Uo(D)PLIs in
Lemma 4.48, it is then straightforward to see that λA,B(β) is in fact a well-defined t-skeleton on
the pi Π(Γ,Π(A,B)) with the obvious inverse λ−1A,B, completing the proof.
Definition 5.22 (Constructions on codes of types). Given Γ, G ∈ µWPG, u : Γ → U , v :
Σ(Γ,El(u))→ U and a, a′ ∈ Tm(Γ,El(u)) in µWPG, morphisms GΓ,Π(u, v),Σ(u, v), Idu(a, a
′) :
Γ→ U in µWPG are defined respectively by:
• GΓ : Γ⇒ U is the (non-strict) p-strategy G : U up to ‘tags’.
• By Lemma 4.32, let us take any valid t-skeletons µ :: Γ⇒ U and ν :: Σ(Γ,El(u))⇒ U such
that µ ∝ u and ν ∝ v. For each γ :: Vld(!Γ), we get a valid t-skeleton Π(µ, ν)pγ from µ
p
γ by
replacing the last P-move El ◦Sat(µ◦γ) of U (if any) with Π(El ◦Sat(µ◦γ),El ◦Sat(λ(ν)◦γ)),
where λ(ν) :: Π(Γ,Π(El (u), {U})) is obtained from ν by the bijection given in the proof of
Lemma 5.21, and then a valid t-skeleton Π(µ, ν)
df.
=
⋃
γ::Vld(!Γ)Π(µ, ν)
p
γ :: Γ ⇒ U . Finally,
let us take a p-strategy Π(u, v)
df.
= Sat(Π(µ, ν)) : Γ⇒ U by Lemma 4.34.
• Σ(u, v) : Γ⇒ U is defined in the same manner as Π(u, v).
• Again, let us take any valid t-skeletons α, α′ :: Π(Γ,El (u)) such that α ∝ a and α′ ∝ a′.
For each γ :: Vld(!Γ), we obtain a valid t-skeleton Idµ(α, α
′)pγ from µ
p
γ by replacing the
last P-move El ◦ Sat(µ ◦ γ) of U (if any) with IdEl◦Sat(µ◦γ)(Sat(α ◦ γ), Sat(α
′ ◦ γ)), and
then a valid t-skeleton Idµ(α, α
′)
df.
=
⋃
γ::Vld(!Γ) Idµ(α, α
′)pγ :: Γ ⇒ U . Finally, let us take a
p-strategy Idu(a, a
′)
df.
= Sat(Idµ(α, α
′)) : Γ⇒ U again by Lemma 4.34.
Lemma 5.23 (El-lemma). Given Γ, G ∈ µWPG, u : Γ → U , v : Σ(Γ,El(u)) → U and a, a′ ∈
Tm(Γ,El(u)) in µWPG, we have El(GΓ) = {G}Γ, El(Π(u, v)) = Π(El (u),El(v)), El(Σ(u, v)) =
Σ(El(u),El (v)) and El(Idu(a, a
′)) = IdEl(u)(a, a
′).
Proof. Straightforward and left to the reader.
As the notation indicates, morphisms constructed in Definition 5.22 are the game-semantic
counterparts of the constructions on terms of universes given in Section 2.10.
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5.7.1 Game Semantics of Pi-Types
We begin with interpreting pi-types. Let us first recall the general interpretation of pi-types in
an arbitrary CwF:
Definition 5.24 (CwFs with pi-types [Hof97]). A CwF C supports pi-types if:
• (Π-Form) For any Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ) and B ∈ Ty(Γ.A), there is a type
Π(A,B) ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (Π-Intro) If b ∈ Tm(Γ.A,B), then there is a term
λA,B(b) ∈ Tm(Γ,Π(A,B));
• (Π-Elim) If k ∈ Tm(Γ,Π(A,B)), a ∈ Tm(Γ, A), then there is a term
AppA,B(k, a) ∈ Tm(Γ, B{a})
where a
df.
= 〈idΓ, a〉A : Γ→ Γ.A;
• (Π-Comp) AppA,B(λA,B(b), a) = b{a};
• (Π-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ C and f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
Π(A,B){f} = Π(A{f}, B{f+})
where f+
df.
= 〈f ◦ p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A;
• (λ-Subst) λA,B(b){f} = λA{f},B{f+}(b{f
+}) ∈ Tm(∆,Π(A{f}, B{f+}));
• (App-Subst) AppA,B(k, a){f} = AppA{f},B{f+}(k{f}, a{f}) ∈ Tm(∆, B{a}{f}).
Furthermore, C supports pi-types in the strict sense if it also satisfies:
• (λ-Uniq) λA,B ◦AppA{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(k{p(A)}, vA) = k.
Definition 5.25 (Interpretation of pi-types in CwFs [Hof97]). The interpretation J K of pi-types
in a CwF C that supports pi-types is given by:
• (Π-Form) JΓ ⊢ Πx:AB typeK
df.
= Π(JΓ ⊢ A typeK, JΓ, x : A ⊢ B typeK);
• (Π-Intro) JΓ ⊢ λx. b : Πx:ABK
df.
= λJAK,JBK(JΓ, x : A ⊢ b : BK);
• (Π-Elim) JΓ ⊢ f(a) : B[a/x]K
df.
= AppJAK,JBK(JΓ ⊢ f : Πx:ABK, JΓ ⊢ a : AK)
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
Again, the soundness of the interpretation holds for this interpretation of pi-types, where the
uniqueness rule Π-Uniq is also interpreted if the CwF C supports pi-types in the strict sense; see
[Hof97] for the details. This point holds for the other semantic type formers given below, and
therefore, we shall henceforth skip pointing it out.
Let us now propose our game semantics of pi-types:
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Theorem 5.26 (Game semantics of pi-types). The CwF µWPG supports pi-types in the strict
sense.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ µWPG, A ∈ µDWPG(Γ), B ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, A)) and b ∈ WPG(Π(Σ(Γ, A), B)).
• (Π-Form) Let us define:
Π(A,B)
df.
= (Π(A(g), Bg))g∈µWPG(Γ) ∈ µDWPG(Γ)
where Bg
df.
= (B(〈g, a˜〉))a˜∈µWPG(A(g)) ∈ µDWPG(A(g)), as given in Definition 5.14.
• (Π-Intro) By Lemma 5.21, we get λA,B(b) ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ,Π(A,B))), where recall that
the operation λA,B and the inverse λ
−1
A,B simply ‘adjust tags’.
Notation. We often omit the subscripts A and B on λA,B and λ
−1
A,B .
• (Π-Elim) Given k ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ,Π(A,B))) and a ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ, A)), we define:
AppA,B(k, a)
df.
= λ−1A,B(k) • a
where a = 〈derΓ, a〉 : Γ → Σ(Γ, A). Then, as in the proof of Theorem 5.20, we have
λ−1A,B(k) • a : Π(Γ, B{a}), whence AppA,B(k, a) ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ, B{a})) by Lemma 4.57.
Notation. We often omit the subscripts A,B on AppA,B.
• (Π-Comp) By a simple calculation, we obtain:
AppA,B(λA,B(b), a) = λ
−1
A,B(λA,B(b)) • a
= b • a
= b{a}.
• (Π-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆→ Γ in µWPG, we have:
Π(A,B){f} = (Π(A(g), Bg))g∈µWPG(Γ){f}
= (Π(A(f • d), Bf•d))d∈µWPG(∆)
= (Π(A{f}(d), B{f+}d))d∈µWPG(∆)
= Π(A{f}, B{f+})
where f+
df.
= 〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉 : Σ(∆, A{f}) → Σ(Γ, A). Note that the third equation
holds because we have:
B{f+}d(aˆ) = B{f
+}(〈d, aˆ〉)
= B(〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉 • 〈d, aˆ〉)
= B(〈f • fst , snd〉 • 〈d, aˆ〉)
= B(〈f • fst • 〈d, aˆ〉, snd • 〈d, aˆ〉〉)
= B(〈f • d, aˆ〉)
= Bf•d(aˆ)
for all aˆ ∈ µWPG(A(f • d)).
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• (λ-Subst) We clearly have:
λA,B(b){f} = λA,B(b) • f
= λA{f},B{f+}(b • 〈f • fstΣ(∆,A{f}), sndΣ(∆,A{f})〉) (by the definition of λ)
= λA{f},B{f+}(b • 〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉)
= λA{f},B{f+}(b{f
+}).
• (App-Subst) Moreover, it is easy to see that:
AppA,B(k, a){f} = (λ
−1
A,B(κ) • 〈derΓ, a〉) • f
= λ−1A,B(k) • (〈derΓ, a〉 • f)
= λ−1A,B(k) • 〈f, a • f〉
= λ−1
A{f},B{f+}(k • f) • 〈der∆, a • f〉 (by the definition of λ
−1)
= λ−1
A{f},B{f+}(k • f) • (a • f)
= AppA{f},B{f+}(k • f, a • f)
= AppA{f},B{f+}(k{f}, a{f})
where a • φ
df.
= 〈der∆, a • f〉 : ∆→ Σ(∆, A{f}).
• (λ-Uniq) Finally, we have:
λA,B(AppA{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(k{p(A)}, vA)) = λA,B(λ
−1
A{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(k{p(A)}) • vA)
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(k) • p(A)
+ • vA) (by the definition of λ
−1)
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(k) • derΣ(Γ,A))
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(k))
= k
where vA
df.
= 〈derΣ(Γ,A), vA〉 : Σ(Γ, A) → Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A{p(A)}) and p(A)
+ df.= 〈p(A) •
p(A{p(A)}), vA{p(A)}〉 : Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A{p(A)})→ Σ(Γ, A)
which completes the proof.
5.7.2 Game Semantics of Sigma-Types
Next, we consider sigma-types. Again, we begin with the general interpretation of sigma-types
in an arbitrary CwF:
Definition 5.27 (CwFs with sigma-types [Hof97]). A CwF C supports sigma-types if:
• (Σ-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ) and B ∈ Ty(Γ.A), there is a type
Σ(A,B) ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (Σ-Intro) There is a morphism in C
PairA,B : Γ.A.B → Γ.Σ(A,B);
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• (Σ-Elim) Given P ∈ Ty(Γ.Σ(A,B)) and p ∈ Tm(Γ.A.B, P{PairA,B}), there is a term
RΣA,B,P (p) ∈ Tm(Γ.Σ(A,B), P );
• (Σ-Comp) We have RΣA,B,P (p){PairA,B} = p;
• (Σ-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ C and f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
Σ(A,B){f} = Σ(A{f}, B{f+})
where f+
df.
= 〈f ◦ p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A;
• (Pair-Subst) We have p(Σ(A,B)) ◦ PairA,B = p(A) ◦ p(B) and f⋆ ◦ PairA{f},B{f+} =
PairA,B ◦ f++, where f⋆
df.
= 〈f ◦ p(Σ(A,B){f}), vΣ(A,B){f}〉Σ(A,B) : ∆.Σ(A,B){f} →
Γ.Σ(A,B) and f++
df.
= 〈f+ ◦ p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉B : ∆.A{f}.B{f
+} → Γ.A.B;
• (RΣ-Subst) We have RΣA,B,P (p){f
⋆} = RΣ
A{f},B{f+},P{f⋆}(p{f
++}).
Moreover, C supports sigma-types in the strict sense if it also satisfies:
• (RΣ-Uniq) If p ∈ Tm(Γ.A.B, P{PairA,B}), q ∈ Tm(Γ.Σ(A,B), P ) and q{PairA,B} = p,
then q = RΣA,B,P (p).
Definition 5.28 (Interpretation of sigma-types in CwFs [Hof97]). The interpretation J K of
sigma-types in a CwF C that supports sigma-types is given by:
• (Σ-Form) JΓ ⊢ Σx:AB typeK
df.
= Σ(JΓ ⊢ A typeK, JΓ, x : A ⊢ B typeK);
• (Σ-Intro) JΓ ⊢ (a, b) : Σx:ABK
df.
= Pair JAK,JBK ◦ 〈JΓ ⊢ a : AK, JΓ ⊢ b : B[a/x]K〉JBK;
• (Σ-Elim) JΓ ⊢ RΣ(C, g, p) : C[p/z]K
df.
= RΣJAK,JBK,JCK(JΓ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[(x, y)/z]K)◦JΓ ⊢ p : Σx:ABK
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2, JΓ ⊢ a : AK
df.
= 〈id JΓK, JaK〉 : JΓK →
JΓK.JAK and JΓ ⊢ p : Σx:ABK
df.
= 〈id JΓK, JpK〉 : JΓK → JΓK.JΣx:ABK.
Now, we describe our game-semantic interpretation of sigma-types:
Theorem 5.29 (Game semantics of sigma-types). The CwF µWPG supports sigma-types in the
strict sense.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ µWPG, A ∈ µDWPG(Γ) and B ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, A)).
• (Σ-Form) Similarly to pi Π, we define:
Σ(A,B)
df.
= (Σ(A(g), Bg))g∈µWPG(Γ) ∈ µDWPG(Γ)
as in Definition 5.14.
• (Σ-Intro) By the correspondence Σ(Σ(Γ, A), B) ∼= Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B)) up to ‘tags’ (similar to
and much simpler than the proof of Lemma 5.21), let us define PairA,B : Σ(Σ(Γ, A), B)→
Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B)) to be the obvious p-dereliction up to ‘tags’, i.e.,
PairA,B
df.
= 〈fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉.
Note that we then have:
Pair−1A,B = 〈〈fst , fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉.
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• (Σ-Elim)Given P ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B))) and h ∈ µWPG(Π(Σ(Σ(Γ, A), B), P{PairA,B})),
we define RΣA,B,P (h) ∈ µWPG(Π(Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B)), P )) by:
RΣA,B,P (h)
df.
= h • Pair−1A,B.
• (Σ-Comp) We clearly have:
RΣA,B,P (h){PairA,B} = R
Σ
A,B,P (h) • PairA,B
= (h • Pair−1A,B) • PairA,B
= h • (Pair−1A,B • PairA,B)
= h • derΣ(Σ(Γ,A),B)
= h.
• (Σ-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆ → Γ in µWPG, by the same reasoning as the
case of pi-types, Σ(A,B){f} = Σ(A{f}, B{f+}).
• (Pair-Subst) Under the same assumption, we clearly have:
p(Σ(A,B)) • PairA,B = fst • 〈fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉
= fst • fst
= p(A) • p(B)
and we also have:
f⋆ • PairA{f},B{f+}
= 〈f • p(Σ(A,B){f}), vΣ(A,B){f}〉 • PairA{f},B{f+}
= 〈f • p(Σ(A{f}, B{f+})) • PairA{f},B{f+}, vΣ(A,B){f} • PairA{f},B{f+}〉
= 〈f • p(A{f}) • p(B{f+}), vΣ(A{f},B{f+}) • PairA{f},B{f+}〉 (by the established equations)
= 〈f • fst • fst , snd • 〈fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉〉
= 〈f • fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉
= 〈fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉 • 〈〈f • fst • fst , snd • fst〉, snd〉
= 〈fst • fst , 〈snd • fst , snd〉〉 • 〈〈f • fst , snd〉 • fst , snd〉
= PairA,B • 〈〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉 • p(B{f
+}), vB{f+}〉
= PairA,B • 〈f
+ • p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉
= PairA,B • f
++
where f⋆
df.
= 〈f • p(Σ(A,B){f}), vΣ(A,B){f}〉 : Σ(∆,Σ(A,B){f}) → Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B)) and
f++
df.
= 〈f+ • p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉 : Σ(Σ(∆, A{f}), B{f
+})→ Σ(Σ(Γ, A), B).
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• (RΣ-Subst) Clearly, we have:
RΣA,B,P (h){f
⋆}
= h • Pair−1A,B • 〈f • p(Σ(A,B){f}, vΣ(A,B){f}〉
= h • 〈〈fst , fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉 • 〈f • fst , snd〉
= h • 〈〈f • fst , fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= h • 〈〈f • fst , snd〉 • fst , snd〉 • 〈〈fst , fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= h • 〈f+ • fst , snd〉 • 〈〈fst , fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= h • 〈f+ • p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉 • Pair
−1
A{f},B{f+}
= RΣA{f},B{f+},P{f∗}(h • 〈f
+ • p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉)
= RΣA{f},B{f+},P{f∗}(h{f
++}).
• (RΣ-Uniq) If any p ∈ µWPG(Π(Σ(Γ,Σ(A,B)), P )) satisfies p{PairA,B} = h, then:
p = h • Pair−1A,B
= RΣA,B,P (h)
which completes the proof.
5.7.3 Game Semantics of N-Type
We proceed to give our game semantics of the N-type. Again, let us first present the general,
abstract interpretation of the N-type in an arbitrary CwF:
Definition 5.30 (CwFs with the N-type [Hof97]18). A CwF C supports the natural number
(N-) type or natural numbers if:
• (N-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type
NΓ ∈ Ty(Γ)
called natural number (N-) type in the context Γ, which we often abbreviate as N ;
• (N-Intro) There are a term and a morphism in C
0Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, N)
succΓ : Γ.N → Γ.N
that satisfy
0Γ{f} = 0∆ ∈ Tm(∆, N)
p(N) ◦ succΓ = p(N) : Γ.N → Γ
succΓ ◦ 〈g, vN 〉N = 〈g, vN{succ∆}〉N : ∆.N → Γ.N
for any morphisms f : ∆→ Γ and g : ∆.N → Γ in C;
18In the reference, the definition is actually left to the reader; accordingly, this definition is an author’s solution,
which may be shown to be sound in the same manner as in the case of pi- and sigma-types introduced above
[Hof97]. This point applies for the zero-type and universes too.
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Notation. By defining zeroΓ
df.
= 〈idΓ, 0Γ〉N : Γ → Γ.N , we have zeroΓ ◦ f = 〈f, 0∆〉N =
〈f, vN{zero∆}〉N : ∆→ Γ.N . We often omit the subscript Γ on 0Γ, zeroΓ and succΓ. Also,
for each n ∈ N, we define nΓ ∈ Tm(Γ, N) by:
– 0Γ is already given;
– n+ 1Γ
df.
= vN{succΓ ◦ 〈idΓ, nΓ〉};
• (N-Elim)Given any triple (P, cz , cs) of a type P ∈ Ty(Γ.N), and terms cz ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero})
and cs ∈ Tm(Γ.N.P, P{succ ◦ p(P )}), there is a term
RNP (cz , cs) ∈ Tm(Γ.N, P );
• (N-Comp) We have the following equations:
RNP (cz , cs){zero} = cz ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero});
RNP (cz , cs){succ} = cs{〈idΓ.N ,R
N
P (cz , cs)〉P } ∈ Tm(Γ.N, P{succ});
• (N-Subst) NΓ{f} = N∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (RN -Subst)RNP (cz , cs){f
+} = RN
P{f+}(cz{f}, cs{f
++}) ∈ Tm(∆.N, P{f+}), where f+
df.
=
〈f ◦ p(N), vN 〉N : ∆.N → Γ.N and f++
df.
= 〈f+ ◦ p(P{f+}), vP{f+}〉P : ∆.N.P{f
+} →
Γ.N.P .
Definition 5.31 (Interpretation of the N-type in CwFs). The interpretation J K of the N-type
in a CwF C that supports the N-type is given by:
• (N-Form) JΓ ⊢ N typeK
df.
= N JΓK;
• (N-IntroZ) JΓ ⊢ zero : NK
df.
= 0JΓK;
• (N-IntroS) JΓ ⊢ succ(n) : NK
df.
= vN{succJΓK ◦ 〈id JΓK, JΓ ⊢ n : NK〉};
• (N-Elim) JΓ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, n) : C[n/x]K
df.
= RNJCK(JczK, JcsK){〈id JΓK, JnK〉N}
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
It is easy to see by mathematical induction that we have JΓ ⊢ n : NK = nJΓK for any context
⊢ Γ ctx and natural number n ∈ N.
We now propose our game semantics of the N-type by basically employing the standard game
semantics of PCF [AM99] for the total fragment:
Theorem 5.32 (Game semantics of the N-type). The CwF µWPG supports the N-type.
Proof. Let Γ,∆ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆→ Γ in µWPG.
• (N-Form) NΓ is defined to be the constant dependent p-game {N}Γ.
• (N-Intro) 0Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, {N}) is 0 : N up to ‘tags’, and similarly, succΓ : Σ(Γ, {N[0]}) →
Σ(Γ, {N[1]}) is 〈p({N}), sΓ〉, where the subscripts [0] and [1] are to distinguish two copies
of N , and sΓ : Π(Σ(Γ, {N[0]}), {N[1]}}) is Pref({q[1].q[0].n[0].(n + 1)[1] | n ∈ N }) up to
‘tags’. Clearly, we have 0Γ • f = 0∆ and sΓ • 〈g, v{N}∆〉 = s∆ = v{N}∆{succ∆}, where
g : Σ(∆, {N}∆)→ Γ is any morphism in µWPG, and hence, the required equations hold.
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• (N-Elim) Given any triple (P, cz , cs) of P ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, {N})), cz ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero})
and cs ∈ Tm(Σ(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ), P{succ ◦ p(P )}) in µWPG, there are two terms
c˜z ∈ Tm(Σ(Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σ(Γ, {N})}), P{zero • fst • snd});
c˜s ∈ Tm(Σ(Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σ(Γ, {N})}), P{succ • pred • snd})
defined by:
c˜z : Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P )&Σ(Γ, {N})
snd
→ Σ(Γ, {N})
fst
→ Γ
cz→
∫
P{zero};
c˜s : Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P )&Σ(Γ, {N})
〈pred•snd ,ev{〈fst ,pred•snd〉}〉
→ Σ(Γ, {N})&
∫
P
cs→
∫
P{succ ◦ fst}
where ev ∈ Tm(Σ(Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σ(Γ, {N})}), P{snd}) (or written evP ) is the evalua-
tion on P [A+97] given by ev
df.
= λ−1(derΠ(Σ(Γ,{N}),P )), and pred : Σ(Γ, {N})→ Σ(Γ, {N})
is the predecessor defined in a similar manner to succ such that pred • succ = derΣ(Γ,{N})
and pred • zero = zero (see [AM99] for the details). Also, if we define:
Pz
df.
= P{zero • p(N)}) ∈ Ty(Σ(Γ, {N}));
Ps
df.
= P{succ • pred • p(Pz )} ∈ Ty(Σ(Σ(Γ, {N}), Pz ))
then we have:
cond ∈ Tm(Σ(Σ(Σ(Γ, {N}), Pz ), Ps), P{p(Pz ) • p(Ps )})
that is the standard interpretation of conditionals in PCF [AJM00, HO00, AM99, McC98]:
It first asks an input natural number in the component N of the domain, and plays as the
p-dereliction between Pz and P{p(Pz ) • p(Ps )} if the answer is 0, and as the p-dereliction
between Ps and P{p(Pz ) • p(Ps )} otherwise.
We then define FNP (cz , cs) : Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P )→ Π(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ) by:
FNP (cz , cs)
df.
= λ{Σ(Γ,{N})},{P{snd}}(cond{〈〈snd , c˜z 〉, c˜s〉}).
Finally, we define RNP (cz , cs) ∈ Tm(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ) to be the least upper bound of the
following chain of (RNP (cz , cs)n ∈ Tm(Σ(Γ, {N}), P ))n∈N:
RNP (cz , cs)0
df.
= ∗ (up to ‘tags’);
RNP (cz , cs)n+1
df.
= FNP (cz , cs) • R
N
P (cz , cs)n.
• (N-Comp) By the definition of RNP (cz , cs), we clearly have:
RNP (cz , cs){zero} = cz ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero});
RNP (cz , cs){succ} = cs{〈derΣ(Γ,{N}),R
N
P (cz , cs)〉} ∈ Tm(Σ(Γ, {N}), P{succ}).
• (N-Subst) It is clear that {N}Γ{f} = {N}∆.
• (RN -Subst) Finally, by induction on n ∈ N, we clearly have:
RNP (cz , cs)n{f
+} = RNP (cz , cs)n • 〈f • p({N}∆), v{N}∆〉
= RNP{f+}(cz{f}, cs{f
++})n
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for all n ∈ N, where f+
df.
= 〈f • p({N}∆), v{N}∆〉 : Σ(∆, {N}∆)→ Σ(Γ, {N}Γ) and f
++ df.=
〈f+ • p(P{f+}), vP{f+}〉 : Σ(Σ(∆, {N}∆), P{f
+}) → Σ(Σ(Γ, {N}Γ), P ). Therefore, we
may conclude that
RNP (cz , cs){f
+} = RNP{f+}(cz{f}, cs{f
++})
which completes the proof.
5.7.4 Game Semantics of One-Type
We further proceed to consider the one-type though it is rather simple. First, the general
interpretation of the one-type in an arbitrary CwF is as follows:
Definition 5.33 (CwFs with the one-type [Hof97]). A CwF C supports the one-type if:
• (Unit-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type
1Γ ∈ Ty(Γ)
called the unity type in the context Γ;
• (Unit-Intro) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a term
∗Γ ∈ Tm(Γ,1
Γ);
• (Unit-Elim) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ.1Γ), a ∈ Tm(Γ, A{∗Γ}) and t ∈ Tm(Γ,1Γ), there is
a term
R1A(a, t) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{t})
where ∗
df.
= 〈idΓ, ∗Γ〉1Γ : Γ→ Γ.1
Γ and t
df.
= 〈idΓ, t〉1Γ : Γ→ Γ.1
Γ;
• (Unit-Comp) Under the same assumption, we have:
R1A(a, ∗Γ) = a;
• (Unit-Subst) Given a morphism f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
1Γ{f} = 1∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (∗-Subst) Finally, we have:
∗Γ{f} = ∗∆ ∈ Tm(∆,1
∆).
Moreover, C supports the one-type in the strict sense if it additionally satisfies:
• (∗-Uniq) t = ∗Γ for all t ∈ Tm(Γ,1Γ).19
Definition 5.34 (Interpretation of the one-type in CwFs). The interpretation J K of the one-type
in a CwF C that supports the one-type is given by:
• (1-Form) JΓ ⊢ 1 typeK
df.
= 1JΓK;
19Note that ∗-Uniq implies Unit-Elim and Unit-Comp by defining R1
A
(a, t)
df.
= a.
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• (1-Intro) JΓ ⊢ ⋆ : 1K
df.
= ∗JΓK;
• (1-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R1(C, c, t) : C[t/x]K
df.
= R1JCK(JcK, JtK)
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
We now propose our game semantics of the one-type:
Theorem 5.35 (Game semantics of the one-type). The CwF µWPG supports the one-type in
the strict sense.
Proof. Let Γ,∆ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆→ Γ in µWPG.
• (Unit-Form) We define 1Γ to be the constant dependent p-game {1}Γ, where 1 is the
unit p-game (Example 4.23).
• (Unit-Intro) We define ∗Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, {1}Γ) to be ∗ : 1 up to ‘tags’.
• (Unit-Elim)GivenA ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, {1}Γ)), a ∈ Tm(Γ, A{〈derΓ, ∗Γ〉}) and t ∈ Tm(Γ, {1}Γ)
in µWPG, clearly t = ∗Γ, i.e., ∗-Uniq is satisfied, and thus, we define R1A(a, j)
df.
= a.
• (Unit-Comp) We clearly have R1A(a, ∗Γ) = a.
• (Unit-Subst) Clearly, {1}Γ{f} = {1}∆.
• (∗-Subst) Clearly, ∗Γ • f = ∗∆ : ∆→ 1
which completes the proof.
5.7.5 Game Semantics of Zero-Type
Next, we interpret the zero-type. First, the general interpretation of the zero-type is:
Definition 5.36 (CwFs with the zero-type [Hof97]). A CwF C supports the zero-type if:
• (Zero-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type
0Γ ∈ Ty(Γ)
called the zero-type in the context Γ;
• (Zero-Elim) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ.0Γ) and z ∈ Tm(Γ,0Γ), there is a term
R0A(z) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{z})
where z
df.
= 〈idΓ, z〉0Γ : Γ→ Γ.0
Γ;
• (Zero-Subst) Given f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
0Γ{f} = 0∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (R0-Subst) Under the same assumption, we have:
R0A{f+}(z{f}) = R
0
A(z){f}
where f+
df.
= 〈f • p(0∆), v0Γ〉0Γ : ∆.0
∆ → Γ.0Γ.
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Definition 5.37 (Interpretation of the zero-type in CwFs). The interpretation J K of the zero-
type in a CwF C that supports the zero-type is given by:
• (0-Form) JΓ ⊢ 0 typeK
df.
= 0JΓK;
• (0-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R0(C, a) : C[a/x]K
df.
= R0JCK(JaK)
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
Let us propose our game-semantic interpretation of the zero-type:
Theorem 5.38 (Game semantics of the zero-type). The CwF µWPG supports the zero-type.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆→ Γ in µWPG.
• (Zero-Form) We define 0Γ to be the constant dependent p-game {0}Γ, where 0 is the
empty p-game (Example 4.23).
• (Zero-Elim) Let A ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, {0}Γ)) and z ∈ Tm(Γ, {0}Γ) in µWPG. We obtain
R0A(z) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{z}) in µWPG by the obvious case distinction: It is obtained from z by
replacing the first move of {0}Γ with those of A{z} if any, and it is simply ∗ (up to ‘tags’)
otherwise, where z
df.
= 〈derΓ, z〉 : Γ→ Σ(Γ, {0}).
• (Zero-Subst) We clearly have {0}Γ{f} = {0}∆.
• (R0-Subst) By the definition of the operation R0( ), we have:
R0A{f+}(z{f}) = R
0
A{f+}(z • f)
= R0A{f+}(z) • f
= R0A(z){f}
which completes the proof.
5.7.6 Game Semantics of Universes
Now, let us interpret the cumulative hierarchy of universes. Recall that we have adopted Tarski-
style universes equipped with the dependent type El and the meta-theoretic operation En (see
Section 2.10). They in particular allow us to formulate universes in CwFs in such a way that
follows the usual pattern of formation, introduction, elimination and computation rules:
Definition 5.39 (CwFs with universes). A CwF C supports (a cumulative hierarchy of)
universes if:
• (U-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type
UΓk ∈ Ty(Γ)
called the kth universe in the context Γ for each k ∈ N;
Notation. We often omit the superscript Γ on UΓk , and even write U , for Uk.
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• (U-Intro) Given A ∈ Ty(Γ), there is a term
En(A) ∈ Tm(Γ,Uk)
for some k ∈ N, and in particular
En(UΓk ) ∈ Tm(Γ,U
Γ
k+1)
for all k ∈ N;
• (U-Elim) Any term C ∈ Tm(Γ,U) induces a type El(C) ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (U-Comp) El(En(A)) = A for all A ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (U-Cumul) If C ∈ Tm(Γ,Uk), then C ∈ Tm(Γ,Uk+1);
• (U-Subst) Given f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
UΓk {f} = U
∆
k ∈ Ty(∆)
for all k ∈ N;
• (En-Subst) En(A){f} = En(A{f}) ∈ Tm(∆,U) for all A ∈ Ty(Γ).
Definition 5.40 (Interpretation of universes in CwFs). The interpretation J K of universes in a
CwF C that supports universes is given by:
• (U-Form) JΓ ⊢ Ui typeK
df.
= U
JΓK
i ;
• (U-Intro) JΓ ⊢ En(A) : Ui−1K
df.
= En(JAK);
• (U-Elim) JΓ ⊢ El(c) typeK
df.
= El(JcK)
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
We are now ready to interpret universes:
Theorem 5.41 (Game semantics of universes). The CwF µWPG supports universes.
Proof. Let Γ,∆ ∈ µWPG and f : ∆→ Γ in µWPG.
• (U-Form) UΓk
df.
= {Uk}Γ for each k ∈ N, where Uk is given in Definition 5.15.
• (U-Intro) Let A ∈ µDWPG(Γ). We define En(A) ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ, {U})) by the following
induction on A:
1. If A = {G}Γ for some G ∈ µWPG, then En({G}Γ) is G up to ‘tags’;
2. If A = A′{g} for some Γ′ ∈ µWPG, A′ ∈ µDWPG(Γ′) and g ∈ µWPG(Γ,Γ′), then:
En(A′{g})
df.
= En(A′) • g;
3. If A = Π(B,C) orA = Σ(B,C) for someB ∈ µDWPG(Γ) and C ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Γ, B)),
then:
En(Π(B,C))
df.
= Π(En(B),En(C));
En(Σ(B,C))
df.
= Σ(En(B),En(C));
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4. If A = IdB(b, b
′) for some B ∈ µDWPG(Γ) and b, b′ ∈ µWPG(Π(Γ, B)), then:
En(IdB(b, b
′))
df.
= IdEn(B)(b, b
′);
5. If A = El(u) for some u ∈ µWPG(Γ,U), then:
En(El(u))
df.
= u;
• (U-Elim) The operation El has been already given in Definition 5.15;
• (U-Comp) It is straightforward to see that El ◦ En(A) = A holds for all Γ ∈ µWPG and
A ∈ µDWPG(Γ) by induction on A with the help of Lemma 5.23;
• (U-Cumul) Immediate from the definition of universe p-games;
• (U-Subst) As in the case of the zero-type;
• (En-Subst) It is not hard to see that En(A){f} = En(A{f}) ∈ µWPG(Π(∆, {U})) holds
for all A ∈ µDWPG(Γ) by induction on A
which complete the proof.
5.7.7 Game Semantics of Id-Types
Next, we consider Id-types. Again, we first review the general interpretation of Id-types in an
arbitrary CwF:
Definition 5.42 (CwFs with Id-types [Hof97]). A CwF C supports Id-types if:
• (Id-Form) Given Γ ∈ C and A ∈ Ty(Γ), there is a type
IdA ∈ Ty(Γ.A.A
+)
where A+
df.
= A{p(A)} ∈ Ty(Γ.A);
• (Id-Intro) There is a morphism in C
ReflA : Γ.A→ Γ.A.A
+.IdA;
• (Id-Elim) Given B ∈ Ty(Γ.A.A+.IdA) and b ∈ Tm(Γ.A,B{ReflA}), there is a term
RIdA,B(b) ∈ Tm(Γ.A.A
+.IdA, B);
• (Id-Comp) RIdA,B(b){ReflA} = b;
• (Id-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ C and f : ∆→ Γ in C, we have:
IdA{f
++} = IdA{f} ∈ Ty(∆.A{f}.A{f}
+)
where A{f}+
df.
= A{f}{p(A{f})} ∈ Ty(∆.A{f}), f+
df.
= 〈f ◦p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} →
Γ.A, and f++
df.
= 〈f+ ◦ p(A+{f+}), vA+{f+}〉A+ : ∆.A{f}.A
+{f+} → Γ.A.A+;
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• (Refl-Subst) ReflA ◦ f
+ = f+++ ◦ ReflA{f} : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A.A
+.IdA, where f
+++ df.=
〈f++ ◦ p(IdA{f++}), vIdA{f++}〉IdA : ∆.A{f}.A
+{f+}.IdA{f} → Γ.A.A
+.IdA;
• (RId-Subst) RIdA,B(b){f
+++} = RId
A{f},B{f+++}(b{f
+}).
Definition 5.43 (Interpretation of Id-types in CwFs [Hof97]). The interpretation J K of Id-types
in a CwF C that supports Id-types is given by:
• (=-Form) JΓ ⊢ a =A a′ typeK
df.
= IdJAK{〈JΓ ⊢ a : AK, JΓ ⊢ a
′ : AK〉JAK};
• (=-Intro) JΓ ⊢ reflA : a =A aK
df.
= vIdJAK{ReflJAK ◦ JΓ ⊢ a : AK};
• (=-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a′, q) : C[a/x, a′/y, q/p]K
df.
= RIdJA,CK(JcK){〈〈JaK, Ja
′K〉JAK, JqK〉Ja=Aa′K}
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Section 2.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to interpret Id-types in µWPG due to Id-Form:
• Let Γ ∈ µWPG and A ∈ µDWPG(Γ);
• Then, we must define IdA ∈ µDWPG(Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A+)) by:
IdA
df.
= (IdA(g)(a, a
′))〈〈g,a〉,a′〉∈µWPG(Σ(Σ(Γ,A),A+));
• However, it may be the case that IdA 6∈ µDWPG(Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A+)) since otherwise En(IdA)
would be able to tell if any given two p-strategies are identical only by a finitary interaction
with them, which is impossible, e.g., particularly in the presence of N ∈ µWPG.
In other words, the rules U-Intro and Id-Form are incompatible at least from our game-
semantic point of view. Let us also confess that our computational perspective is in favor of
U-Intro rather than Id-Form, i.e., we believe that an arbitrary construction of dependent Id
p-games should not be allowed; nevertheless, we leave it as future work to reformulate Id-types
in such a way that is compatible with universes.
In the following, let us temporally give up interpreting universes and instead interpret Id-
types. For this aim, observe the following obvious fact:
Corollary 5.44 (The CwF WPG). The CCC WPG gives rise to a CwF that supports one-,
zero-, N-, pi- and sigma-types in the strict sense, where Ty(Γ) = DWPG(Γ) for each Γ ∈ WPG.
We then equip the CwF WPG with our game-semantic Id-types:
Theorem 5.45 (Game semantics of Id-types). The CwF WPG supports Id-types.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ WPG and A ∈ DWPG(Γ).
• (Id-Form) We define IdA ∈ DWPG(Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A
+)) by:
IdA
df.
= (IdA(g)(a, a
′))〈〈g,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(Γ,A),A+))
as given in Definition 5.14.
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• (Id-Intro) We define ReflA : Σ(Γ, A[1])→ Σ(Σ(Σ(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA) to be the p-strategy
that plays as the p-dereliction between Σ(Γ, A[1]) and Σ(Γ, A[2]), between
∫
A[1] and
∫
A+[3],
or as the canonical one Σ(Γ, A[1])→ 1, where the subscripts [1], [2] and [3] are to distinguish
the three copies of A. Note that there is the inverse Refl−1A : Σ(Σ(Σ(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA)→
Σ(Γ, A[1]) which is the p-dereliction between Σ(Γ, A[2]) and Σ(Γ, A[1]).
Notation. We often omit the subscript A on ReflA when A is obvious.
Remark. Note that if we had allowed a non-canonical proof of IdA, then ReflA would have
only the left inverse, being unable to satisfy Id-Elim given below, which is why we have
defined Id p-games in the rather extensional form in Definition 5.12.
• (Id-Elim) Given B ∈ DWPG(Σ(Σ(Σ(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA)) and b ∈ Tm(Σ(Γ, A), B{ReflA})
in WPG, we define:
RIdA,B(b)
df.
= b • Refl−1A ∈ Tm(Σ(Σ(Σ(Γ, A[1]), A
+
[2]), IdA), B).
• (Id-Comp) We then clearly have:
RIdA,B(b){ReflA} = R
Id
A,B(b) • ReflA
= (b • Refl−1A ) • ReflA
= b • (Refl−1A • ReflA)
= b • derΣ(Γ,A)
= b.
• (Id-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ WPG and f : ∆→ Γ in WPG, we have:
IdA{f
++}
= (IdA(g)(a, a
′))〈〈g,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(Γ,A),A+)){f
++}
= (IdA(〈〈g, a〉, a
′〉))〈〈g,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(Γ,A),A+){f
++}
= (IdA(f
++ • 〈〈d, a〉, a′〉))〈〈d,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(∆,A{f}),A{f}+))
= (IdA(〈f • d, a〉, a
′〉))〈〈d,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(∆,A{f}),A{f}+))
= (IdA(f•d)(a, a
′))〈〈d,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(∆,A{f}),A{f}+))
= (IdA{f}(d)(a, a
′))〈〈d,a〉,a′〉∈WPG(Σ(Σ(∆,A{f}),A{f}+))
= IdA{f}
where f+
df.
= 〈f•p(A{f}), vA{f}〉 : Σ(∆, A{f})→ Σ(Γ, A) and f
++ df.= 〈f+•p(A+{f+}), vA+{f+}〉 :
Σ(Σ(∆, A{f}), A+{f+})→ Σ(Σ(Γ, A), A+). Note that the forth equation holds because:
f++ • 〈〈d, a〉, a′〉 = 〈f+ • p(A+{f+}), vA+{f+}〉 • 〈〈d, a〉, a
′〉
= 〈f+ • p(A+{f+}) • 〈〈d, a〉, a′〉, vA+{f+} • 〈〈d, a〉, a
′〉〉
= 〈〈f • d, a〉, a′〉.
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• (Refl-Subst) Also, the following equation holds:
ReflA • f
+
= ReflA • 〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉
= 〈〈〈f • p(A{f}), vA{f}〉 • p(A
+{f+}) • p(IdA{f
++}), vA+{f+} • p(IdA{f
++})〉, vIdA{f++}〉 • ReflA{f}
(by the definition of Refl)
= 〈〈f+ • p(A+{f+}), vA+{f+}〉 • p(IdA{f
++}), vIdA{f++}〉 • ReflA{f}
= 〈f++ • p(IdA{f
++}), vIdA{f++}〉 • ReflA{f}
= f+++ • ReflA{f}
where f+++
df.
= 〈f++ • p(IdA{f++}), vIdA{f++}〉.
• (RId-Subst) Finally, we have:
RIdA,B(b){f
+++} = (b • Refl−1A ) • f
+++
= b • (Refl−1A • f
+++)
= b • (f+ • Refl−1
A{f}) (by Refl-Subst)
= (b • f+) • Refl−1
A{f}
= RIdA{f},B{f+++}(b • f
+)
= RIdA{f},B{f+++}(b{f
+})
which completes the proof.
5.8 Faithfulness
Having established our game semantics of MLTT, let us remark that we shall not give a full
completeness result like the one in [AJV15] simply because it is not our main goal (n.b., our aim
is to establish game semantics of MLTT that is natural from the conceptual and the mathematical
points of view, e.g., Theorem 4.61 and Corollary 4.62); also, the full completeness result [AJV15]
requires a substantial modification of the standard syntax of MLTT given in Section 2. In other
words, the present work is not concerned that much with designing a syntax for which our game
semantics becomes fully complete.
Instead, let us just prove faithfulness of our game semantics for the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment
of MLTT, for which we need to exclude zero-, N- and Id-types as well as universes because these
types do not have uniqueness rules.
Corollary 5.46 (Faithfulness). Let Γ ⊢ b : B and Γ ⊢ b′ : B be terms of MLTT such that the type
B is built without 0, N, Id or U. If the interpretations of b and b′ in the CwF µWPG or WPG
coincide, then we have Γ ⊢ b = b′ : B in MLTT.
Proof (sketch). Let b, b′ : Γ → B be the interpretations of b and b′ in µWPG or WPG, respec-
tively. We may prove b = b′ ⇒ Γ ⊢ b = b′ : B by induction on b, where for each b we consider
all possible b′. Note that, by Π-Uniq, Π-Comp, Σ-Uniq, Π-Comp, 1-Uniq and 1-Comp, we may
exclude the cases where terms are constructed by Π-Uniq, Σ-Uniq, 1-Uniq or Var.
Of course, the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment has no non-constant dependent types. However, as
the proof of Corollary 5.46 goes through inductively, our game semantics would remain faithful
when we add types to MLTT and interpret new terms in a faithful manner.
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6 Intensionality
Finally, let us investigate how intensional our game semantics of MLTT in WPG is in terms of
some well-known syntactic rules, where we do not employ µWPG because we cannot interpret
Id-types in the latter.
6.1 Equality Reflection
The axiom of Equality reflection (EqRefl), which states that propositionally equal terms are
judgmentally equal as well, i.e., Γ ⊢ p : IdA(a, a′)⇒ Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A, is the difference between the
intensional and the extensional variants of MLTT: The extensional one is the intensional one
(given in Section 2) equipped with EqRefl.
EqRefl is not valid inWPG when we consider open terms. For example, terms x : N, y : 0 ⊢ x : N
and x : N, y : 0 ⊢ succ(x) : N are interpreted as different morphisms T&N&0
fst
→ T&N
snd
→ N
and T&N&0
fst
→ T&N
succ
→ N in WPG, respectively. Nevertheless, we may interpret a term
x : N, y : 0 ⊢ p : IdN(succ(x), x) as p : Π(Σ(Σ(T, {N}), {0}), Id{N}{〈〈der , snd • fst〉, succ • fst〉}) in
WPG that plays in the component game 0 in the domain for the second move.
In other words, our computational interpretation of propositional equality differs from equality
between p-strategies on the nose (i.e., our interpretation of judgmental equality).
6.2 Function Extensionality
Next, we consider the principle of function extensionality (FunExt), which states that given types
Γ ⊢ A type and Γ, x : A ⊢ B type, and terms Γ ⊢ f : Πx:AB(x) and Γ ⊢ g : Πx:AB(x), we can inhabit
the type
Γ ⊢ Πx:AIdB(x)(f(x), g(x))⇒ IdΠx:AB(x)(f, g) type.
Let us focus on the case where ⊢ Γ = ♦ ctx for simplicity.
It is not hard to see that the interpretation of MLTT in WPG does not satisfy FunExt
because some f ∈ WPG(Π(A,B)) is not completely specified by the map a ∈ WPG(!A) 7→
f ◦ a ∈ WPG(
∫
B) and its play in !A and
∫
B. For instance, consider 0N , 0
′
N : N → N in WPG
given by 0N
df.
= Pref({q.0}) and 0′N
df.
= Pref({q.(q, i).(n, i).0 | n, i ∈ N }). Then, we do not have
a morphism Π(N, Id{N}{〈〈derN , 0N 〉, 0
′
N 〉}) → IdN⇒N (0N , 0
′
N ) in WPG because the domain is
true but the codomain is false.
6.3 Uniqueness of Identity Proofs
Next, we investigate the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP), which states that for
any type Γ ⊢ A type, the following type can be inhabited:
Γ ⊢ Πa1,a2:AΠp,q:IdA(a1,a2)IdIdA(a1,a2)(p, q) type.
If the zero-type occurs in Γ, then the interpretation has a proof in the same way as EqRefl; so
assume otherwise. Then, given Γ ∈ WPG, A ∈ DWPG(Γ), and a1, a2 ∈ Tm(Γ, A) in WPG, any
p, q ∈ Tm(Γ, IdA{〈〈derΓ, a1〉, a2〉}) in WPG must coincide. It is now clear that in either case
there is some r ∈ Tm(JΓK, JΠa1,a2:AΠp,q:IdA(a1,a2)IdIdA(a1,a2)(p, q)K) inWPG. That is, we have shown
that UIP is valid in our game semantics of MLTT in WPG.
We regard this point as unsatisfactory since it has been shown by the classic groupoid model
[HS98] by Hofmann and Streicher that UIP is not derivable in MLTT. Of course, one may say that
it is just a deficiency or incompleteness of the syntax (for instance, it is Streicher’s motivation
to introduce Axiom K [Str93]); however, our view is that UIP should not be valid in MLTT for:
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• The active research on HoTT is stimulated by the infinite hierarchy of Id-types, and its
connection with higher categories and homotopy theory, which becomes trivial if UIP holds;
• More importantly, proofs Γ ⊢ p : IdA(a1, a2) and Γ ⊢ q : IdA(a1, a2) are conceptually compu-
tations or constructions that witness equality of a1 and a2, and hence, it would be natural
that p and q can be different.
6.4 Criteria of Intensionality
There are Streicher’s three Criteria of Intensionality [Str93]:
• (I) x, y : A, z : IdA(x, y) 6⊢ x = y : A for some type A;
• (II) x, y : A, z : IdA(x, y) 6⊢ B(x) = B(y) type for some types ⊢ A type and x : A ⊢ B type;
• (III) If ⊢ p : IdA(t, t′), then ⊢ t = t′ : A.
For the criterion I, let us take N as the type A. We have two p-derelictions on N (up to ‘tags’)
as the interpretations of x, y : N, z : IdN(x, y) ⊢ x : N and x, y : N, z : IdN(x, y) ⊢ y : N, respectively.
These p-strategies are different as Opponent may behave differently for x and y. Hence, our
interpretation of MLTT in WPG satisfies the criterion I. On the other hand, by the definition
of dependent p-games, it is easy to see that the interpretation in WPG refutes the criterion II.
Finally, the criterion III is obviously satisfied for the terms t and t′ are both closed.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In the present work, we have established game semantics of MLTT equipped with one-, zero-, N-,
pi- and sigma-types as well as Id-types (in the case ofWPG) or universes (in the case of µWPG).
The game semantics inherits the conceptual naturality of standard game semantics of simple type
theories, and the former generalizes the latter in a canonical way from the category-theoretic and
the domain-theoretic points of view as well, solving the long-standing open problem.
Our game semantics is faithful for the (one, pi, sigma)-fragment of MLTT, and it gives some
game-semantic analysis on the syntax: incompatibility of Id-types and universes, denial of EqRefl
and FunExt, and validity of UIP.
Recall that the incompatibility is caused because the interpretation of Id-types inWPG is not
computational; this point suggests us to reformulate Id-types in a more computational fashion,
which we leave as future work. Furthermore, it seems possible to combine the present work and
existing game semantics [AM99, McC98] so that, e.g., we may give game semantics of dependent
type theories with linear typing [Gir87] and computational effects [PP04] though it is beyond the
scope of the present work.
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A Proof of Proposition 4.9
Notation. For readability, we write ⌈s⌉G and ⌊s⌋G for the P-view ⌈s⌉ and the O-view ⌊s⌋ of a
j-sequence s of an arena G, respectively. Also, we do not notationally distinguish games and the
underlying arenas for brevity.
A.1 O-view Lemma
Lemma A.1. Let A, B and C be games, and J P A⊸ B and K P B⊸ C subgames. Assume
that s ∈ P EvenJ‡K does not end with a move of B. Then, ⌊s ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C  ⌊s⌋J‡K ↾ A,C, where
J ‡K is the concatenation of J and K [YA16] (n.b., roughly, J ‡K is a game that accommodates
the parallel composition of a strategy on J and that on K; we do not need the details here).
Proof. We proceed by induction on |s|. The base case s = ǫ is trivial; assume s = tmn. We
focus on the case n ∈MA since the other case n ∈MC is simpler.
Assume t is of the form ulv, where l justifies n in s; the other case (i.e., when m justifies n)
is handled below. Note that l ∈MA +MB. If l ∈MA, then:
⌊s ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C = ⌊ulvmn ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C
= ⌊u ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C .ln
 (⌊u⌋J‡K ↾ A,C).ln (by the induction hypothesis)
= ⌊u⌋J‡K .ln ↾ A,C
= ⌊ulvmn⌋J‡K ↾ A,C
= ⌊s⌋J‡K ↾ A,C.
On the other hand, if l ∈ MB, then n ∈ M InitA and l ∈ M
Init
B ; thus, we may write s =
w1cw2llvmn, where c ∈M InitC and it justifies the left occurrence of l, which in turn justifies the
right occurrence of l. Hence, we may conclude that:
⌊s ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C = ⌊w1cw2llvmn ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C
= ⌊w1 ↾ A,C⌋A⊸C .cn
 (⌊w1⌋A⊸C ↾ A,C).cn (by the induction hypothesis)
= ⌊w1⌋A⊸C .clln ↾ A,C
= ⌊w1cw2l⌋J‡K .ln ↾ A,C
= ⌊w1cw2llvmn⌋J‡K ↾ A,C
= ⌊s⌋J‡K ↾ A,C.
Finally, consider the case where m justifies n in s. It is just reduced to the induction
hypothesis if m ∈ MA; and it is handled in the same manner as the second case above if
m ∈ M InitB (in this case, we may write s = ucvmmn, where c ∈ MC and it justifies the left
occurrence of m), completing the proof.
A.2 Covering Lemma 1
Lemma A.2. Let φ :: A⊸ B and ψ :: C ⊸ D be skeletons, s ∈ φ⊗ ψ and sm ∈ PA⊗C⊸B⊗D.
Then, sm ↾ A,C ∈ LA⊗C ∧ sm ↾ B,D ∈ LB⊗D ⇔ sm ↾ A,B ∈ LA⊸B ∧ sm ↾ C,D ∈ LC⊸D.
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Proof. We proceed by the case analysis on m. Let us focus on the case m ∈MA since the other
three cases are similar or simpler. In this case, we have to show that (s ↾ A,C).m ∈ LA⊗C ⇔
(s ↾ A,B).m ∈ LA⊸B. Clearly, the two alternation conditions are logically equivalent.
Now, note that Jsm(m) ∈MA for m is an O-move. Thus, the two justification conditions are
logically equivalent. Finally, since only Player may switch between the domain and the codomain
of a linear implication, it is not hard to see that the two visibility conditions are also logically
equivalent, completing the proof.
A.3 Covering Lemma 2
Lemma A.3. Let A, B and C be games, and assume that sm is an odd-length j-sequence of
the arena ((A ⊸ B[0]) ⊸ B[1])⊸ C, where the subscripts ( )[i] (i = 1, 2) are to distinguish
the two copies of B, such that m ∈ MA⊸C , s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ LA⊸B[0] , s ↾ B[1], C ∈ LB[1]⊸C and
s ↾ B[0], B[1] ∈ prB, where prB
df.
= Pref(cpB). Then, sm ↾ A,C ∈ LA⊸C ⇔ sm ↾ A,B[0] ∈
LA⊸B[0] ∧ sm ↾ B[1], C ∈ LB[1]⊸C .
Proof. The implication ⇐ has been well-established in the literature; see [McC98]. Let us show
the other implication ⇒. Assume sm ↾ A,C ∈ LA⊸C .
First, it is clear that sm ↾ A,B[0] (resp. sm ↾ B[1], C) is a j-sequence of the arena A⊸ B[0]
(resp. B[1] ⊸ C) that satisfies alternation. It remains to establish visibility. Let us focus on
the case m ∈ MA as the other case m ∈ MC is similar. Clearly, we may write sm = ta1m with
a1 ∈ MA. Note that the O-view ⌊ta1⌋ does not have moves of B[0], B[1] or C after the justifier
l ∈ MA of m in s occurs because otherwise it cannot contain l, contradicting the visibility
of sm ↾ A,C for ⌊ta1 ↾ A,C⌋  ⌊ta1⌋ ↾ A,C (by Lemma A.1). Thus, ⌊ta1⌋ is of the form
ula2ka2k−1 . . . a4a3a2a1, where a2i ∈ MA justifies a2i−1 ∈ MA for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Therefore,
the O-view ⌊s ↾ A,B[0]⌋ is of the form vla2ka2k−1 . . . a4a3a2a1, and so it in particular contains
l = Js(m). Hence, sm ↾ A,B[0] satisfies visibility (and sm ↾ B[1], C trivially satisfies it).
A.4 Proposition 4.9
Proposition A.4. Given skeletons φ :: A⊸ B, ψ :: C ⊸ D, ϕ :: !A⊸ B and ϑ :: A⊸ C, we
have:
1. φ⊗ ψ = φ⊗ ψ :: A⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗D;
2. ϕ† = ϕ† :: !A⊸ !B;
3. 〈φ, ϑ〉 = 〈φ, ϑ〉 :: A⊸ B&C;
4. ϑ;ψ = ϑ;ψ :: A⊸ D.
Proof. Let us begin with the equation 1. It is easy to see that (φ⊗ψ)Even = φ⊗ψ = (φ⊗ ψ)Even
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holds. To show (φ⊗ ψ)Odd = (φ ⊗ ψ)Odd, it suffices to observe the following:
sm ∈ (φ ⊗ ψ)Odd
⇔ s ∈ φ⊗ ψ ∧ sm ∈ PA⊗C⊸B⊗D
⇔ sm ∈ L ∧ s ↾ A,B ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ C,D ∈ ψ ∧ sm ↾ A,C ∈ PA⊗C ∧ sm ↾ B,D ∈ PB⊗D
⇔ sm ∈ L ∧ s ↾ A,B ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ C,D ∈ ψ ∧ sm ↾ A,B ∈ PA⊸B ∧ sm ↾ C,D ∈ PC⊸D
(by Lemma A.2)
⇔ sm ∈ L ∧ s ↾ A,B ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ C,D ∈ ψ ∧ ((s ↾ A,B).m ∈ PA⊸B ∨ (s ↾ C,D).m ∈ PC⊸D)
⇔ sm ∈ L ∧ ((s ↾ A,B).m ∈ φ ∧ s ↾ C,D ∈ ψ) ∨ (s ↾ A,B ∈ φ ∧ (s ↾ C,D).m ∈ ψ)
⇔ sm ∈ L ∧ sm ↾ A,B ∈ φ ∧ sm ↾ C,D ∈ ψ
⇔ sm ∈ (φ ⊗ ψ)Odd
where L
df.
= LA⊗C⊸B⊗D. The equations 2 and 3 are even simpler to prove, and therefore, we
leave the details to the reader.
It remains to establish the equation 4. Again, the equation (ϑ;ψ)Even = ϑ;ψ = (ϑ;ψ)Even is
straightforward to show; for (ϑ;ψ)Odd = (ϑ;ψ)Odd, observe:
sm ∈ (ϑ;ψ)Odd
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . tm ↾ A,D = sm ∧ tm ↾ A,C[0] ∈ ϑ ∧ tm ↾ C[1], D ∈ ψ ∧ tm ↾ C[0], C[1] ∈ prC
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . tm ↾ A,D = sm ∧ t ↾ A,C[0] ∈ ϑ ∧ t ↾ C[1], D ∈ ψ ∧ tm ↾ C[0], C[1] ∈ prC
∧ ((t ↾ A,C[0]).m ∈ PA⊸C[0] ∨ (t ↾ C[1], D).m ∈ PC[1]⊸D)
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . tm ↾ A,D = sm ∧ t ∈ ϑ ‖ ψ ∧ tm ↾ C[0], C[1] ∈ prC
∧ tm ↾ A,C[0] ∈ PA⊸C[0] ∧ tm ↾ C[1], D ∈ PC[1]⊸D
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . tm ↾ A,D = sm ∧ t ∈ ϑ ‖ ψ ∧ tm ↾ C[0], C[1] ∈ prC
∧ tm ↾ A,C[0] ∈ LA⊸C[0] ∧ tm ↾ C[1], D ∈ LC[1]⊸D ∧ tm ↾ A ∈ PA ∧ tm ↾ D ∈ PD
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . tm ↾ A,D = sm ∧ t ∈ ϑ ‖ ψ ∧ tm ↾ C[0], C[1] ∈ prC
∧ tm ↾ A,D ∈ LA⊸D ∧ tm ↾ A ∈ PA ∧ tm ↾ D ∈ PD (by Lemma A.3)
⇔ ∃tm ∈ J . t ∈ ϑ ‖ ψ ∧ sm = tm ↾ A,D ∧ tm ↾ A,D ∈ PA⊸D
⇔ s ∈ ϑ;ψ ∧ sm ∈ PA⊸D
(⇐ holds for m, Jsm(m) and the last move of s (if exists) all belong to A or B)
⇔ sm ∈ (ϑ;ψ)Odd
where J
df.
= J((A⊸C[0])⊸C[1])⊸D, completing the proof.
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